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THE INTERACTION OP NATURALISM AND IDEALISM IN
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, I86O-I96G
CHAPTER I 
POLAR TENSION
The history of American educational theory in the 
century between I86O-I96O has been characterized, among other 
things, by a polar tension involving opposing philosophical 
approaches to education. At one polar position was tradi­
tional idealism, usually couched in Christian terms and sym­
bols. The other polar position expressed educational theory 
in naturalistic concepts. Since the culture of the United 
States has pluralistic origins, it is necessary to state that 
other philosophies in additional to naturalism and idealism 
have exerted formative influences on American educational 
theory. However, it appears that the philosophies of natural­
ism and idealism have exerted the greatest impact on American 
educational thought. Since these two philosophical positions, 
naturalism and idealism, are polar opposites, a prolonged ten­
sion has been evident in American educational thought. A major 
source of tension in contemporary educational philosophy is the 
persistence of naturalism and idealism in educational theory.
2Statement of Purpose 
The primary purpose of this investigation is to 
ascertain the influence of the philosophies of naturalism and 
idealism'on educational theory and practice in the United 
States between I86O-I96O. Another purpose is to attempt to 
discover significant trends in educational philosophy in the 
century under consideration. A final purpose is the state­
ment of relevant conclusions based on the data presented by 
the study.
Objectives of Study
While the particular problem under consideration in 
this study is the interaction of idealism and naturalism in 
American education between I86O-196O, it seems necessary to 
present a brief summary of the historical developments of 
these two philosophies, as well as a survey of their influ­
ence on educational theory. For, as Brubacher points out, 
the problems of philosophy and the problems of education have 
been closely interrelated:^
Sometimes educational innovations have been instituted 
without awareness of the philosophical problems in­
volved. At other times new departures have been made 
in education under the deliberate guidance of philos­
ophy. In either event, educational practice down the 
centuries has been persistently dogged by philosophical 
implications. Perhaps no century has been so aware cf 
these implications as the twentieth.2
Ijohn S. Brubacher, A History of the Problems of 
Education (Hew York: McGraw-Hill Book Ô0., 1947J, p. 96.
Zibid.
3Keeping the idea of the interrelation between philos­
ophy and education in mind, it is proposed in this study (1) 
to discuss briefly the crigin and the development of natu­
ralistic philcsophy, indicating its salient ccncepts and 
pointing out its expression in educational theory; (2) to 
present a survey of the history of idealism in its various 
types, accompanied by a discussion of its impact on educational 
thought ; (5) to describe succinctly the tension between relig­
ious idealism and scientific utilitarianism in American edu­
cation between I86O-196O; (4) to depict the struggle between 
idealism and naturalism as both traditional colleges and 
sectarian institutions gained strength; (5) to investigate, in 
representative fashion, the tension between idealism and 
naturalism in the curricular development of higher education;
(6) to discuss the tension between idealism and naturalism as 
these philosophies were expressed in rational idealism and 
pragmatic naturalism; (7) to analyze the philosophy and the 
educational theory of John Dewey as the outstanding expression 
of naturalism in American education; (8) to discuss the reac­
tion to the naturalism of Dewey in the idealistic philosophy 
of Herman H. Horne; (9) to attempt to point out salient points 
of comparison or contrast between Dewey and Horne.
Value of Study
This study has possible value and significance in two 
areas. (1) It has value to the writer because of his position 
as an instructor in the philosophy of education in a college
4that is accredited by the State of Oklahoma in the area of 
teacher preparation; (2) the study may have significance be­
cause of the contemporary reassessment of educational theory 
and practice.
Problems Involved 
The writing of a dissertation inevitably presents a 
number of problems to the writer. The outstanding problems 
involved in this thesis are four in number; (1) the subject 
"The Tension Between Idealism and Naturalism in American Edu­
cational Theory Between I86O-196O" indicates a topic with an 
almost too comprehensive scope. Because of the comprehensive 
nature of the study, it was necessary to select arbitrarily 
or to omit certain aspects of the period under consideration. 
Such arbitrary selection or omission could appear to be the 
result of deliberate bias or of a lack of awareness that such 
material existed; (2) another problem was the prolific amount 
of material produced by John Dewey as contrasted with a 
paucity of material available from the pen of H. H. Horne, 
However, since eight publications of Horne were secured, these 
eight works were regarded as furnishing sufficient sources of 
research; (3) a third problem was the matter of historic per­
spective. The primary aim of the study was to consider the 
interaction between idealism and naturalism between I86O-196O. 
However, the writer decided that it would be desirable to 
structure the problem in its historic setting. This decision 
to present the historic background of idealism and of
5naturalism resulted in the treatment of these two philos­
ophies in separate chapters at the beginning of the thesis;
(4) another problem was the retention of a spirit of objec­
tivity. Prior to the initiation of the study, almost all the 
information regarding John Dewey had come from secondary 
sources and from educational cliches. Admittedly, such in­
formation did not engender a heightened appreciation of Dewey. 
On the other hand, the writer had studied under Home and was 
highly appreciative of his personal qualities and of his 
philosophical concepts. The problem of objectivity was solved 
rather early in the investigation, for in spite of a heavy and 
a ponderous writing style, Dewey presents his philosophy with 
such profound scholarship and such logical consistency that it 
is easy to join the ranks of those who regard him as one of 
the most influential thinkers in the history of American 
thought.
Review of Research 
Since World War II the United States has experienced a 
resurgence of interest in educational theory and practice.
The educational philosophy of John Dewey has undergone critical 
reassessment. Representatives of idealism have been extremely 
articulate in the past two decades.
Representing a sympathetic reassessment of Dewey are
(1) John L. Childs in American Pragmatism and Education;
(2) Boyd H. Bode in Progressive Education at the Crossroads;
(3) C. Prankel in The Case for Modern Man; (4) George S.
6Oounts In Pare the School Build A M’ew Soolal Order; (5) Sid­
ney Hook in Education for Modern Man; (6) George Geiger in 
John Pewey in Perspective. Representing those who have 
attacked Pewey and have supported either idealism or essen- 
tialism in education are (1) Bernard I. Bell in Crisis in 
Education; Clyde M. Hill and C. Winfield Scott in Public 
Schools Under Criticism; (3) Robert M. Hutchins in Higher 
Learning in America; (4) Arthur Bestor in The Restoration of 
Learning ; (5) Hels Ferre in Christian Faith and Higher Educa­
tion; (6) Jacques Maritan in Education at the Crossroads;
(7) Walter Moberly in The Crisis in the University; (8) M. 
Cunniggim in The College Seeks Religion; (9) Ponald Butler in 
Four Philosophies; (10) G. O'Connell in Haturalism in Education. 
Typical of objective^ expositional presentations of educational 
philosophies is Modern Philosophies and Education, edited by 
Nelson B. Henry.
This study differs from the various studies mentioned 
above in the following ways: (1) a specific historical period
is used as a background in which to structure the study; (2) 
instead of presenting general propositions, the study attempts 
to focalize the investigation in two representative men; (3) 
the cultural impetus to particular philosophical approaches is 
stressed; (4) the attempt was made to present an objective 
exposition of opposing points of view.
Sources of Information
Two sources of information were used to secure material
7for the first two chapters, dealing with the historic develop­
ment of idealism and naturalism. One source of information 
was the writings of accepted authorities in the history of 
philosophy. In addition to the writings of recognized 
scholars in the history of philosophy, wherever possible, 
information was gained from the original writings of the men 
under consideration.
In chapter three, dealing with the growth and the 
development of colleges and universities in America, the 
histories of individual institutions were used extensively. 
Another source of information also treating the rise of aca­
demic institutions was the writings of officials associated 
with the establishment and the expansion of such institutions. 
Wherever possible, catalogues of the institutions under con­
sideration were used, as well as the writings of educational 
historians. In the final chapters, the sources of information 
were limited to the literary productions of the men selected 
for discussion.
Method of Procedure 
The following steps were taken in the fulfillment of 
research involved in this study:
1. Much important literature in the fields of philos­
ophy, philosophy of education, and the history of education 
was studied for the purpose of background and perspective.
This study included a survey of (1) the history of ancient 
philosophy, (2) the history of modern philosophy, (3) the
8history of American philosophy, (4) the history of education, 
and (5) a study of the various schools of educational phi­
lo sphy.
2. One week of a summer vacation was spent in the 
Library of Congress securing material from periodicals and 
books not available in Oklahoma.
3. Arrangements were made with the library of Bethany 
Nazarene College, Bethany, Oklahoma, to secure copies of 
essential books through inter-library loan. Books were 
borrowed from Southern Methodist University, New York Uni­
versity, and Columbia University.
4. For the school year 1959-1960 the library of the 
University of Oklahoma granted the use of a study "cage," 
making possible a more consistent and effective use of the 
university's library facilities.
5. Approximately two years were spent in collecting 
data from the sources already stated. These data were sur­
veyed, analyzed, and evaluated, and formed the basis for this 
report.
6. Beginning in October, I960, rough drafts of pro­
posed chapters were submitted to the committee. Changes and 
revisions were made in the manuscript as suggested. Copies 
of the complete dissertation were deposited in the graduate 
office of the University of Oklahoma in accordance with 
regulations.
CHAPTER II
BPUOATIOirAI THEORY STRUCTURED HITHIH 
THE PHILOSOPHY OP NATURALISM
The earliest attempt to explain the nature of the uni­
verse in Western culture at least, was the naturalistic 
philosophy of the pre-Socratic Greeks. Because the Greeks 
had no dogma, no ultimate authority, and no sacred scriptures, 
they were free to ask penetrating questions regarding the 
nature of the world and of existence. This freedom to ques­
tion and to probe for rational answers was one of the primary 
causes in the birth and the development of Greek philosophy. 
The first school of Greek philosophy attempted to explain the 
universe in terms of nature. Later Greek philosophy inter­
preted the universe in rational, or idealistic terms. The 
combination of Greek idealism and Christian thought eclipsed 
the early philosophy of naturalism for many centuries. Yet 
naturalistic concepts have persisted in human thought.
During the last four centuries, beginning with the 
Renaissance, naturalism has won an increasingly large fol­
lowing. In the first half of the twentieth century the 
philosophy of naturalism appears to have dominated the in­
tellectual life of Occidental culture. Naturalism has
9
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served as a rich source of ideas for such diverse movements 
as dialectical materialism, industrial individualism, polit­
ical and religious liberalism, and educational progressivism. 
Naturalism is defined by Sellars as follows;
Naturalism is a term which is largely self-explanatory.
It takes the common world . . .  as the real and only 
world; and it is skeptical of those religious and 
philosophical traditions which want to reduce it to 
illusion or to dependence upon something more real 
back of it all in some mysterious sense. To the 
naturalist the physical universe is self-sufficient and 
substantial . . . that which is physical is real, and 
that which is real is physical.!
Hooking presents a brief and concise definition of naturalism
in this statement: "Naturalism is that type of philosophy
which takes nature as the whole of reality.Naturalism is
described in a negative sense by Joyce in these words:
"Naturalism is a system whose salient characteristic is the
exclusion of whatever is spiritual, or indeed, whatever is
transcendental, from our philosophy of nature and of man.
It appears to be sufficient to limit the discussion 
of naturalism to three aspects of its development. First, 
the attempt is made to present a brief history of naturalism 
by discussing the development of the various types of natu­
ralism. Then the endeavor is made to discuss the concepts of 
naturalism which would be relevant to this particular study.
iRoy Wood Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism 
(New York: Charles Scribner's èons, 1932), pp. 12-13.
2William E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 25.
^George H. Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology 
(London: Longman's, Green and Co., 19^4), p. 51.
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Finally, the direct application of the principles of 
naturalism to educational philosophy is discussed.
Types of Naturalism
Generally, naturalism has been divided into three 
types, or three schools of thought: (1) reductionistic natu­
ralism, (2) mechanistic naturalism, and (3) developmental 
naturalism. However, because of changing trends of thought 
within a scientific and technological culture, a fourth cate­
gory, that of dialectical materialism may be added to the 
above list.
Reductionistic naturalism has been called by some 
"naive naturalism.According to Donald Butler naive natu­
ralism includes all attempts to designate some one substance 
as the be-all and end-all of nature, and therefore of 
existence i t s e l f .5 Naive naturalism may be further classified 
as materialism and energism.
The earliest attempts to reduce reality to a substance 
were carried on by the early Greek schools of speculation, and 
is called materialism. Prior to the sixth century B.C. the 
idea of a single substance underlying all things had never 
been reasoned out, nor had there been any attempt to argue a 
description of its nature based on a methodical observation of
^Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies 
(New York: Longman's, Green, and Co., 1912), p. 6j>.
5j, Donald Butler. Four Philosophies (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1951;» p.
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phenomena.^ After the sixth century B.C. two representative 
schools arose among the Greeks, both endeavoring to explain 
the universe in terms of a single substance. These schools 
were called the Milesian School, and the Atomistic School.
The Milesian School was founded by Thales, who was 
born about 624 B.C. The solution to the problem of reality, 
or the "World-stuff" was, according to Thales, to be found in 
Water. Water was the World-stuff to which all the variety 
and complexity of natural phenomena could be reduced. 
Anaximander, a follower of Thales, reasoned that the essence, 
or principle, of things is not water, as Thales proposed. 
Rather the essence of reality was the Boundless, or the In­
finite, conceived as an eternal, imperishable substance out 
of which all things are made and to which all things return.? 
A third Milesian philosopher was Anaximenes, 588-524 B.C., who 
was supposed to have been a pupil of Anaximander. According 
to Anaximenes, the first principle of things, or the under­
lying substance was neither the Water of Thales nor the inde­
terminate Boundless of Anaximander, but was air, vapor, or 
mist.® The common feature of the Milesian school was the 
attempt to explain reality in terms of a simple, observable 
substance.
^B. A. G. Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy-(New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923), p. 55.
?Prank Ihilly, A History of Philosophy (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1914), p. 24.
Qjbid.. p. 26.
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That the one substance, whatever it was, had a variety 
of aspects and appearances, the Milesians admitted. But the 
Milesians completely ignored any ground, or reason, for this 
ceaseless change of the cosmic matter which was accepted by 
them as something living, as something which was animated. 
Partly because of the idea of nature as alive and dynamic, 
the Milesian doctrine is usually known as "hylozoism.
Another important contributor to a monistic concept 
of the nature of reality was Parmenides who wrote about 490 
B.C., and who is considered the founder of the Eleatic school 
of philosophy. Parmenides carried the idea of a single sub­
stance to its logical, reductionistic conclusion. One writer 
lucidly states the position of Parmenides in these words:
Here, then, Parmenides, seems to say is the logical con­
clusions: if anything is seriously meant by the state­
ment that the world is one, it must be a continuous 
homogeneous body and nothing else. . . the world being 
is an absolutely continuous body, it is not devisible 
. . . nor can it move, for motion implies empty space, 
to which is nothing and does not exist.10
The extreme, rigid universe of Parmenides, with its one
limitless substance, appeared to be unsatisfactory to the
Greek mind. In order to solve the dilemma suggested by
Parmenides, another group of thinkers, called the Atomists,
came into prominence. Among the Atomists the names of
Empedocles and Democritus are representative.
9w. Windelband, A History of Philosophy (London: 
Macmillan Company, 1893), p- 32.
lOoyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus 
(Oxford: The Oalrendon Press, 1928), p. A6.
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Empedocles, born about 495 B.C., offered a solution 
to the problem of the nature of reality by suggesting that 
there are beings, or particles which are permanent, original, 
imperishable, and underived and which are not subject to 
change. However, these bits of reality can change their 
relations to each other. What man calls change is thus only 
a change in the relationship of these particles. Empedecles 
has expressed his ideas in poetic form:
. . . there is no birth
of all things mortal, nor in ruinous death;
But mingling only and interchange of mixed 
There is, and birth is but its name with men.
. . . Now grows the One from Many 
into Being, now Even from One departing 
Come the Many, —  Fire, Water, Earth, and 
Awful heights of Air.il
Democritus (460-570 B.C.) modified the ideas of his 
predecessors in the Atomistic school, namely Empedocles, 
Leuceppus, and Anaxagorus. Democritus accepted the idea of 
an infinite number of elements, and organized the atomistic 
concept into a systematic pattern. To Democritus the nature 
of external things was in small existences, unlimited in 
n u m b e r . I t  was Democritus who first advanced the following 
principle: " . . .  nothing is created out of the non-existent
or is destroyed into the non-existent."13 ,Reality, then, is 
a matter of the arrangement of atoms in an object.
llwilliam E. Leonard, The Fragments of Empedocles 
(Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1908), p. 22.
l^Bailey, op. cit., p. 118.
13lbid.. p. 119.
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This atomic structure of reality, however, revealed 
disturbing weaknesses. Democritus suggested that the ethical 
problems, good and evil, could not be stated in atomic rela­
tions. Therefore the atomic theory did not include all of 
reality.Anaxagorus had also stated that if reality is 
expressed by atomic relations, then the mind which expressed 
the relations must be outside nature.15 Nature appeared to 
be deficient as a means of solving the problems of existence, 
so the Greeks turned toward the dialectical philosophy of 
Socrates and toward the idealistic philcsophy of Plato. While 
naturalism appears in a limited degree in the writings of 
Aristotle, it does not reappear as a prominent philosophy 
until after the Renaissance and the Reformation. At that time 
it recurred as "Energism."
While the materialists reduced reality to a substance, 
or to elements, a secondary principle underlying their ap­
proach was the idea of hylozoism. By hylozoism is meant the 
belief that matter, whatever its ultimate essence, contains 
a kind of vitality which is equivalent to self-generation. 
Aristotle seems to have accepted the idea cf self-generation 
without any serious q u e s t io n s. B u t  it remained for Herbert
l^Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (London: John
Murray, 1905), p. 70.
^5Johann E. Erdman, A History of Philosophy (New 
York: Macmillan and Co., 1893), p. 70.
iGj. A. Smith (ed.), "Historia Animalum," Works of 
Aristotle (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1864), p. 530.
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Spencer to formulate a naturalistic system in which reality 
was reduced either to energy, or to the principle of hylozoism.
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was an exponent of the 
idea that energy was the ultimate reality. To Spencer matter 
was indestructible, for to accept the annihilation of matter 
was unthinkable.17 But Spencer would define the indestruc­
tibility of matter in terms of energy, for he believed that 
the force exerted is the ultimate measure of matter. The ap­
pearance of matter may change, said Spencer, but the force 
it exerts remains constant. He writes; " . . .  thus, by the 
indestructibility of the force with which matter affects us 
is seen the indestructibility of matter.
Spencer was one of the latest thinkers to interpret 
reality in terms of either substance or of a single entity. 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in particular, 
the more common approach among naturalistic thinkers was to 
interpret reality in terms of structure rather than substance. 
This approach to naturalism has been called mechanistic 
naturalism.
Beginning with Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, 
and Newton in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, physi­
cal scientists tended to place more emphasis upon a mechanical 
and a deterministic view of the physical world.^9 Regarding
l^Herbert Spencer. First Principles (New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 1864), p. 1Ü3.
IGibid.. p. 183.
IBwalter S. Gamertsfelder. Fundamentals of Philosophy 
(New York; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1934), p. 4l8.
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the rise of the mechanistic view in science and philosophy one
historian wrote :
Physical scientists at the beginning of the modern 
period of thought accepted mechanism as a sound prin­
ciple of explanation for all physical phenomena. How­
ever, to most of them, the mechanical aspect of nature 
was regarded as subordinated to the purposive will of
God.20
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the mechan­
ical naturalistic position appears to have rejected any supra- 
natural purpose in nature. The tendency was to accept as 
valid and real only scientifically observable data. This view 
was named positivism and found classic expression in Auguste 
Comte.
According to Comte, the advance of natural sciences 
appeared to call for a complete revolution in man's inter­
pretation of the universe. His theory is set forth in the 
famous dictum;
. . . each of our leading conceptions, each branch of 
our knowledge, passes successively through three dif­
ferent theoretical conditions: the theological, or
fictitious; the metaphysical, or abstract; and the 
scientific, or positive. . . . Hence arise three 
philosophies, or general systems of conceptions on the 
aggregate of phenomena, each of which excludes the 
other. The first is the necessary point of departure 
of the human understanding. The third is its fixed 
and definite state. The second is merely a state of
transition.21
Comte states that all theological and metaphysical
20lbid.
2lHarriet Martineau (trans.). The Positive Philos­
ophy of Auguste Comte (London: George Bell and Sons, 1596),
I, 2.
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philosophy proceeds to explain the phenomena of the external
world from the starting point of our consciousness and human
phenomena, while positive philosophy would subordinate the
conception of man to the external w o r l d .^2 Hence a study of
the world, or of natural phenomena, is the starting point of
true science. The direct study of the universe, says Oomte,
suggests and develops the great idea of the laws of nature,
which is the basis of all positive philosophy, and which is
capable of extension to the whole of phenomena, including at
last those of Man and S o c i e t y .23 Carrying the concept of a
mechanical universe to its logical conclusion Comte states:
"All phenomena, inorganic and organic, physical or moral,
industrial or social, are all subjected in a continuous manner
to rigorously invariable l a w s . F r o m  the concept of natural,
invariable law a specific task emerges for the philosopher
and for the scientist:
Our business is . . .  to pursue an accurate discovery of 
these Laws, with a view to reducing them to the smallest 
possible number. . . . our real business is to analyze 
accurately the circumstances of phenomena, and to con­
nect them by the natural relations of succession and 
resemblance.25
From such dogmatic assertions of naturalism were de­
rived mechanical schools of psychology, mechanistic concepts 
of sociology, and deterministic ideas of natural phenomenon.
22ibid.. II, 1. 23ibid. p. 2.
Levy-Bruhl, The Philosophy of Auguste Oomte 
(London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1903), p. S3.
25Martineau, op. cit.. I, 6.
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Due to advances in the field of natural science, 
particularly in the area of physics, since the beginning of 
the twentieth century, it was seen that physical laws, like 
social laws, are in the nature of statistical a v e r a g e s .^6 
With the presentation of the idea of indeterminancy in physics, 
it appeared that crass materialism had to be abandoned in 
favor of a more non-quanitative, non-mechanical theory of 
nature.27 A new type of naturalism, called developmental 
naturalism, became generally accepted because it allowed for 
the inclusion of the ideas of indeterminacy and of develop­
ment. In developmental naturalism the processes of nature 
became the key to an interpretation of nature, rather than 
substance or structure.
In contrast to the older naturalism of the eighteenth 
century, which resulted in a mechanistic, "world-machine" 
concept, the new naturalism of the second half of the nine­
teenth century was stimulated in part by the theories of 
evolution and by the ideas of the conservation of matter.
Perry suggests a distinct difference between the older and 
the newer naturalism:
The older naturalism had represented the cosmos as a 
system of moving bodies governed by mathematical law, 
while the newer naturalisms represented the cosmos as 
a majestic process of natural history, or as a fixed 
quantity of matter, force or energy having multiple and
2%amertsfelder, op. cit.. p. 314.
27ibid.. p. 421.
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variable manlfestations.28
The new approach to naturalism may be described as 
finding expression in two different ways» one of which was 
evolutionary naturalism which stressed the concept of emer­
gence. The other point of emphasis in the new naturalism 
was the attention given to final results in experience, which 
was called pragmatism.
As early as the Eleatics, represented by Heraclitus,
(535-475 B.C.), philosophers had wrestled with the concept of 
"Becoming," the polar opposite of "Being." Heraclitus 
believed that life is an invisible activity, a ceaseless 
cycle of change. Greek thinkers who succeeded Heraclitus 
turned their attention to different problems in philosophy, 
and the problem of change remained relatively obscure until 
the early years of the nineteenth century.
Lamarck, early in the nineteenth century, presented 
the hypothesis that the direct effect of the environment upon 
individual organisms, and the reaction of the organism to the 
environment, produced changes in the organisms. These changes, 
according to Lamarck, were inherited by the descendants of the 
original organism, resulting in the appearance of new varieties 
and new species. Shortly after Lamarck's ideas were presented, 
Charles Darwin presented his revolutionary theory of Natural 
Selection. With the introduction of Darwin's theory of evo­
lution, scientists and philosophers were given a ready-made
^%alph Barton Perry. Philosophy of the Recent Past 
(New York; Charles Scribner s Sons, 1926), p. 19.
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vehicle by which to transfer the emphasis from substance and 
structure to process. The consequent stress on the processes 
of nature found expression in evolutionary naturalism.
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) made two major contribu­
tions to biology, and through biology to scientific naturalism. 
His first contribution was the theory, based on available data 
and comprehensive inductions, of the natural origin of new 
species of plants and animals. Secondly, Darwin formulated 
and presented evidence for a specific hypothesis he gave the 
name of "natural selection." The point of departure in Dar­
win's thinking, variation within the species, was partly due 
to natural selection, or the ability of the organism to adapt 
to the environment. Essentially, this concept of adaptability 
was called "the survival of the fittest."
While Darwin was essentially a biologist with no 
great concern for metaphysical speculation, his ideas did 
tend to reduce nature to an all-pervading and ceaseless flux. 
Platonic and Christian idealism had always pervaded the inter­
pretation of nature with eternal forms or paternal benevolence. 
As Perry said: "All these moorings seemed to be dissolved
into a flood sweeping blindly on without origin, destination, 
of fixed landmarks."29
With Darwin evolution was a biological law, but with 
Herbert Spencer it became cosmic generalization. To Spencer 
the law of evolution applied to all phenomena. All the special
29lbid., p. 27.
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laws In the various fields of investigation were expressions
of the law of evolution, according to Spencer:
Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant 
dissipation of function; during which the matter 
passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity tc a 
definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the 
retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.30
Both Darwin and Spencer regarded evolution as a cosmic 
law. In the years following the Civil War the theory of evo­
lution was applied to religion, to political science, and, in 
fact, to every phase of culture. After the beginning of the 
twentieth century, however, many thinkers, having accepted the 
idea of evolution, turned their attention to the results, or 
to the products of the evolutionary process. This type of 
naturalism, stressing the results of the process, applied the 
principle of evolution to practical affairs and was called 
Pragmatism.
Most of the philosophy in America seems to have its 
roots in English and European thought, but Pragmatism is the 
most distinctly American in its outlook. Pragmatic thinkers, 
such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and 
George H. Mead were profoundly affected by two developments 
within science and philosophy. The first development within 
science and philosophy to influence the founders of American 
pragmatism was the theory of evolution and its application to
^^Herbert Spencer. First Principles (New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 1864), Part II, Chapter VII, p. 322.
31joseph L. Blair, Men and Movements in American 
Philosophy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 2^8.
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fields of study other than the biological field. The impact
of the concept of evolution on pragmatic thought is expressed
in the following statement:
Peiroe adopted an evolving concept of natural law 
rather than the fixed mechanical view. James formu­
lated a dynamic, functional view of mind rather than 
a static, "substantial" theory of mind; Santayana con­
ceived the human ideal of reason as having a natural­
istic or animal origin; Dewey accepted a biological 
basis of inquiry.32
The founders of pragmatism also perceived that the 
method of experimental science made it necessary, and at the 
same time, provided the basis for a new interpretation of 
nature and a fresh approach to the pattern of reflective 
thought.33 John L. Ohilds expresses the methodological ap­
proach of the pragmatists in these words:
Rejecting the role of the apologist who seeks to rec­
oncile the procedures of experimental inquiry with the 
authoritarian and intuitive assumptions of the tradi­
tional logic, the pragmatists turned to the construc­
tion of a logic frankly grounded in the principles and 
practices of experimental s c i e n c e . 34
The name "pragmatism" originated with Charles S. 
Peirce, who in 1878, published his epoch-making article 
entitled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." In this paper Peirce 
laid down the thesis that the whole meaning of any object 
consists in the habit or reaction it establishes or induces 
in u s . ^3 He writes:
32ibid.. p. 241.
33John L. Childs, American Pragmatism and Education 
(Hew York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), p. iv.
3^ bid.. p. 10.
35charles S. Peirce, "How To Make Cur Ideas Clear," 
Popular Scienoe Monthly. XII (January, 1878), 286.
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Consider what effects which might conceivably have 
practical bearings we consider the bbject of our con­
ceptions to have. Then our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the object.3o
In essence Peirce states that to develop the meaning of a
thought is to determine what habit it induces, for meaning is
determined by the habit it involves.
Pragmatism, while widely accepted, seemed to avoid 
several basic philosophical problems which persisted in spite 
of the attempt to make philosophy a practical science. The 
problem of metaphysics was a particularly challenging one to 
pragmatic naturalists. In recent years some naturalistic 
thinkers have openly faced the metaphysical aspects of their 
philosophy. This most recent development within naturalism 
has been called "dialectical naturalism."
In more recent years a new type of "open-ended" natu­
ralism has found acceptance among some scholars who were dis­
satisfied with the older materialistic, mechanistic, or 
process approach to the soientific study of nature. This new 
type of naturalism is called by its followers "a spirit of 
investigation" rather than a system. Pratt describes the new 
approach to naturalism In these words:
An earnest and courageous desire to find out and face 
the truth Is the first characteristic of the genuine 
upholder of naturalism. Naturalism believes that the 
truth is what it is, no matter what we think about it. 
Nature, the world of reality, has a character, a 
structure of its own, and our opinions are true in so
36lbld.. p. 293.
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far as they conform to this actual situation.57
Dialectical naturalism disavows any relation to both 
dogmatic materialism and to instrumentalism. Neo-naturalism 
has much in common with instrumentalism, but in so far as 
instrumentalism denies to reality an antecedent structure, 
the new naturalism refuses to join forces with it.58
The latest form of naturalism also has much in common 
with pragmatism, but disagrees with pragmatic naturalism in 
some basic concepts. The new naturalism believes that it was 
not only the practical need of dealing efficiently with the 
environment that led man to investigate the nature of the 
world in which he lived. In addition to the pragmatic motive, 
there was also a purely intellectual one, according to dia­
lectical naturalism. Man's response to nature is thus based 
on both practical and theoretical needs, or impulses.
Naturalism, according to Pratt, is characterized by 
(1) its aim, (2) its method, and by (3) its resulting system. 
But the system that naturalism builds is not only less im­
portant, but also less fundamental to naturalism than to its 
methods. Further, the method is less permanent and less 
essential than its aim, which is to ascertain the truth of 
the world we live in.59 Romanell, a contemporary naturalist, 
describes the new approach in concise words:
57james Bissett Pratt, Naturalism (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1939), p. 4.
^®Ibid. 39pratt, op. cit.. p. 10.
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In short. . . present day American naturalists have 
abandoned the Democritean theory of nature and have 
replaced it with novel and subtle forms of ^is- 
totalian, Spinozist, and Baconian outlooks.40
The new type of naturalism operates on the idea of 
levels of nature, such as matter, life, and mind. Each of 
these levels is controlled by laws that are not only peculiar 
to itself but also in accord with those laws that are common 
to all levels. The kind of naturalism which emphasizes the 
opposing considerations that must be taken into consideration 
when dealing with different levels of nature is termed dia­
lectical naturalism.41 Dialectical naturalism is characterized 
by what Cohen names "the principle of polarity," which he 
describes as follows;
. . . opposites such as immediacy and mediation, unity 
and plurality, the fixed and the flux, substances and 
function, ideal and real, actual and possible. . . like 
the north (positive) and south (negative) poles of a 
magnet, all involved each other when applied to any 
significant entity.42
By the principle of polarity the neo-naturalist is saved from 
a position of reductionistic insularity and is able to approach 
the totality of nature, on all levels, with a method which per­
mits nature to relate its own story. One might draw the con­
clusion that contemporary American naturalism approaches the 
theory of nature from the fact of living, rather than from the 
fact of doubting, for the very evident reason that nature on
40patrick Romanell, Toward A Critical Naturalism 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 195Ô), p. 3.
4llbid.. p. 6.
42Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature (New York:
Harcourt Brace and Co., 1931)» P» 1&5.
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examination turns out to be a dynamic, productive system of 
interrelated processes.
In discussing the history of naturalism, considera­
tion has been given to four types, or phases, of naturalistic 
thought. The Greeks helped to develop the most primitive 
form of naturalism which has been labeled Materialism. Sub­
sequently naturalism became more mechanical, with the emphasis 
being shifted from substance to structure. As evolutionary 
concepts arose, emphasis in naturalism was turned away from 
both substance and structure and toward the processes of 
nature. Contemporary naturalism tends to be more open-ended 
than was the case in earlier periods of history, and appears 
to be more concerned with nature qua nature.
Having reviewed the historic development of natural­
ism, it seems appropriate next to discuss some of the concepts 
of naturalism that are particularly relevant for educational 
philosophy.
Concents of naturalism
Any philosophical attempt to interpret the meaning of 
life and of nature inevitably involves several fundamental con­
cepts such as the nature of reality, the problem of knowledge, 
and the nature of value. For the purposes of this study it 
seems essential to limit the discussion to naturalistic meta­
physics, naturalistic epistemology, naturalistic axiology, and
^^Romanell, on. cit.. p. 5.
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the naturalistic concept of man.
The springboard of all naturalistic metaphysics is 
the rejection of supernatural cosmology and ontology. Camp­
bell, a militant naturalist, states his position bluntly:
Belief in the supernatural is an epiphenomenon of human 
existence which is more or less an active menace to an 
ethical, eugenic and altogether worth-while living out 
of one's natural existence in this world. . . . the 
postulate of the supernatural is not something to en­
hance the values of this life, but to belittle them.44
A romantic naturalist, Santayana, discussing the idea of the
supernatural, writes: "What is called the supernatural is
only ultra-mundane, an extension of this world on its own
plane, and a recognition of forces ruling over it not reckoned
with in vulgar commerce."45 Haeckel calls the idea of the
^ySli^rnatura 1 a "ridiculous imperial folly," and continues:
" . . .  only when we have abandoned this untenable illusion,
and taken up the correct cosmological perspective, can we hope
to reach the solution of the 'riddles of the u n i v e r s e . '"46
naturalism stands for the self-sufficiency and intel­
ligibility of the world of space and time. Negatively, natu­
ralism is the rejection of the supernatural. Otto has stated 
the naturalistic position in these words:
4^ercy A. Campbell, Generation of the Universe 
(Cleveland: The Caston Co., 1954), p. 6.
45George Santayana, The Realm of Matter (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), p. 4.
4^Emst Haeckel, The Riddle of the Universe (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1902), p. 15.
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At first tentative, but becoming ever more distinctly 
conscious of its real motive, naturalism has always 
arisen in opposition to what we may call "supernatural" 
propositions, whether those be the naive mythological , 
explanations of world-phenomena found in primitive 
religions, or the supernatural metaphysics which 
accompanies the higher forms.
While rejecting the metaphysical concept of any super­
natural reality the naturalists accept "nature" in some form 
or another, as the only reality. Santayana refuses to state 
any formal concept of nature, but presents a panoramic, pic­
torial concept of nature by describing nature in this state­
ment: ". . . it is public experience. . . the stars, the 
seasons, the swarms of animals, the spectacle of birth and 
death, of cities and wars. . . the facts before every man's 
eyes."48 Sellars states that matter is the only reality pos­
sible to the scientist and adds these words:
. . . the materialist as a philosopher has nothing 
factual to add to the account of the scientists. The 
materialist holds that philosophers cannot improve 
upon the descriptive concepts of matter supplied by 
the working scientist of his time. He accepts what 
the physicist, chemist, biologist, histologist, etc., 
say as the best approximation at any given time.49
Woodbridge, a serene naturalist who confessedly is not 
greatly concerned with the problems of philosophy, is a natu­
ralist who accepts nature as ultimate reality, but who refuses
4?Max Carl Otto, Naturalism in Education (New York: 
Henry Holt Co., 1926), p."5Tl
48(jeorge Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924), p. x.
^^Roy Wood Sellars, Philosophy For the Future (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), p. vl.
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to define nature. To Woodbridge nature is described as a
realm of possibilities. He says; "A naturalistic philosophy
should not think of nature as something first created or
first defined, which only tolerates the existence of man in
some mysterious w a y ."50 Expanding the idea of nature as a
realm of possibilities Woodbridge continues:
. . . the world does not exist for other purposes than 
its own. It exists as something to be experienced in 
order to discover the possibilities its existence offers. 
Metaphysically considered . . . the world is something 
out of which something can be made. . . . Hature is not 
a creation, but the challenge and the opportunity to 
create.51
In conclusion, three elements may be drawn from the 
metaphysical aspect of naturalistic philosophy. First, natu­
ralism rejects any concept of the supernatural. Secondly, for 
its tools of discovery and for verification, naturalism is 
based on the various branches of natural science. Finally, 
naturalists may regard nature either as a created given, a 
substance, a realm of experiences, or as an area of possibil­
ities. Growing directly out of the naturalistic idea of 
reality, is the closely related idea of naturalistic episte­
mology.
The mind of man may be studied in two ways, rationally 
or e m p i r i c a l l y . 52 Assuming some metaphysical system one may
50prederic J. E. Woodbridge, Nature and Mind (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 255-
5lFrederic J. E. Woodbridge, "The Nature of Man," 
Columbia University Quarterly. XXIII (1931), 414.
52^fiiiiam C. Uamoier. A History of Science (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), p. 323.
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deduce rationally the plan of the human mind in that system.
On the other hand, assuming no such system, one can investi­
gate the phenomena of mind by empirical observation, or by 
experiment. Naturalism accepts the study of the problem of 
knowledge from the standpoint of empirical observation. 
According to Dampier the method of empirical observation 
stresses man’s affinity with the animal world, and with the 
totality of nature.
As Copernicus and Galileo deposed the Earth from its 
position at the center of the universe, so Darwin took 
man from his cold pedestal of isolation as a fallen 
angel, and forced him to recognize his Kith and Kin in 
Saint Francis’ little brothers, the birds.53
Woodbridge succinctly states the naturalistic approach to the 
problem of knowledge in these words: "We begin our reflec­
tions as animals living in a visible world around us.
This approach of Woodbridge, which is scientific and evolu­
tionary, rejects the philosophical expression of the eighteenth 
century glorification of reason in favor of empirical and 
rational observation. Discussing the nature of mind Wood­
bridge further states metaphysics has never succeeded in 
revealing by analysis a mind and a body as primary facts from 
which the distinction between the mental and the physical is 
d e r i v e d . 55 Santayana echoes the thought of Woodbridge:
55ibid.. p. 333.
54prederic J. E. Woodbridge, An Essay in Nature 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1904), p. 11.
55woodbridge, Nature and Mind, p. 6.
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Belief; In its very soul; is belief about nature; it is 
animal faith. To entangle faith in anything non-natural ; 
or avowedly tangential to aotion; would be to cheat at 
the game. Honest speculative belief is always specu­
lative physics.56
Some naturalists regard mind and consciousness as
wholly physico-chemical in their nature; as are all parts of
the body. In naturalistic terms both mind and consciousness
are often reduced to physical reactions:
. . . the immediate unknowns whose mutual association 
constitutes consciousness become themselves inferen- 
tially known as functionings of the body. That iS; the 
Immediate terms whose mutual association constitutes the 
operations .of consciousness can be none other than brain 
functionings or cerebration. Cerebration is a series of 
Physico-chemical processes mutually related in associa­
tion fashion. All the relations of consciousness are 
immediately present in the relations of these cerebral 
processes.57
Pratt; representing a later school of naturalism; 
rejects all older naturalistic theories which attempt to 
reduce man; including his mind; to physical action.; or inter­
action. Pratt appears to reverse the historic concepts of 
naturalism by picturing the entire universe as a natural spir­
itual organism, with mind as one aspect of the purposeful, 
organistic Cosmos. Pratt expresses his "spiritualized" 
naturalism in these words :
It is perfectly consistent with a very real naturalism 
to take into serious consideration the hypothesis that 
the Cosmos as a whole is permeated with immanent pur­
pose, that it is a telelogical and, therefore, a
S^gantayana, Scepticism and Antmal Faith, p. 6. 
57oampbell; op. cit.. p. 85.
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spiritual organism.58
Naturalistic epistemology appears to run the gamut 
from regarding mind as a chemical reaction to external stim­
uli to the expression in nature of an intelligent, on-going 
purpose. Whatever the position of the naturalist, the 
psychical is enclosed in the physical, and man's ability to 
think and to know is a natural function of a natural organ­
ism. Directly and logically derived from naturalistic con­
cepts of reality and knowledge is a naturalistic concept of 
axiology.
The naturalistic thinker rejects all ideas of ethics 
based on conventional, traditional, institutional or authori­
tarian approaches. Naturalistic ethical concepts vary greatly. 
One naturalistic approach is illustrated by David Hume, who 
feels that the descriptive approach to ethics is the only 
rational position. Other naturalists such as John Stuart 
Mill, are hedonistic in their approach. Still others approach 
the problem of ethics from the more abstract level of Santay­
ana, who feels that ethical concepts should be individualized.
Among the earliest of naturalistic proposals in the 
area of ethics was that suggested by David Hume. Hume pro­
posed that the empirical thinker should merely observe and 
record the various forms of approval and disapproval which 
different social groups have revealed. Hume applied the
5^Pratt, OP. cit.. p. 142.
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descriptive approach to the area of ethics, stating that
philosophy has no proper grounds for fixing the structure
of ethics. Regarding this relative, descriptive approach
to ethics Hume writes:
They think it a reproach to all literature, that 
philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond con­
troversy, the foundations of morality, reasoning and 
criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and 
falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, 
without being able to determine the source of these 
distinctions.59
To the utilitarian naturalist natural rights and 
standards of morality are arbitrary fictions corresponding 
to nothing in human nature. The utilitarian would not limit 
relational activity to mere observation and recording of data. 
From the utilitarian point of view all action is for the sake 
of some end, and rules of action take their whole character 
and color from the ends and purposes to which they are sub­
servient. Pleasure and pain are the great teachers of 
morality, according to the utilitarian. Mature has put within 
each man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery, and 
these natural tendencies influence all our actions. Following 
the tendencies of a desire to happiness and an aversion to 
misery Mill calls that good which affords pleasure and labels 
that evil which causes pain.
Mill presents a formal definition of the utilitarian
59pavid Hume, "An Inquiry Concerning Human Under­
standing," Great Books of the Hestem World (Chicago: 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1937), 451.
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concept of ethics in harmony with his utilitarian philosophy:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals. 
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds 
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 
reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended plea­
sure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, 
and the privation of pleasure.
According to the "Greatest Happiness Principle," 
the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which 
all other things are desirable, is an existence exempt as far 
as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, 
both in point of quantity and quality. To the utilitarian 
not only is happiness the end of human action, it is also the 
standard of morality. Morality may be defined as the rules 
and preoepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an 
existence may be secured which assures happiness to the great­
est extent possible.
In the philosophy of utility, then, pleasure and 
freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends. 
Further, utilitarian, naturalistic ethics presumes that all 
desirable things are desirable either from the pleasure in­
herent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of 
pleasure and the prevention of pain.
In the naturalistic approach to ethics, concepts of 
ethical activity may be regarded as descriptive, as utili­
tarian, or as highly individualized. The common strand
^Ojohn S. Mill, Utilitarianism (London: Longmans,
Green and Co., I9OI), p. 3.
Gllbid.. p. 17.
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running through the various naturalistic interpretation of 
ethics is the rejection of any external authority as a basic 
source of ethics, and the acceptance of nature, or of natural 
processes, as the source of ethics.
The great difficulty confronting traditional natu­
ralism was the task of including man in nature in a way that 
would do justice to all his distinguishing characteristics.
As Sellars stated it, an adequate naturalism must not belittle 
man in order to press him into some rigid mold.^2 prior to 
1859, the Achilles heel of naturalism appeared to be that of 
the problem of man. When Charles Darwin wrote the Origin of 
the Species in 1859, naturalistic thinkers were given a focal 
theory of Interpretation, toward problems, not only of man, 
but also toward every aspect of physical phenomena. The theory 
of evolution had been in the academic air for at least half a 
century before it was presented by Charles Darwin. However, 
before Darwin's time, it was more of a speculation that a 
coherent principle. Regarding the impact of the theory of 
evolution on the natural sciences Shafer writes:
It gave to the sciences of organic life the center of 
the intellectual stage, while to science as a whole it 
gave a miifying concept of apparently unlimited appli­
cation. o3
According to naturalism, the nature of man and the 
nature of nature go together.Woodbridge places man at the
^^Sellars, Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 5.
^^Robert Shafer, Christianity and Naturalism (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), p. 122.
6%oodbridge, Nature and Mind, p. 254.
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center of nature, as indicated by the remark:
Guided by the philosophy of naturalism we have 
incorporated man wholly within nature. This now 
means that, with respect to human life, there is 
propriety in nature fully as much as in any other 
instance. Man, from his lowest physiological func­
tions to the highest aspiration of thought, illus­
trates the propriety of nature.°5
Naturalistic concepts of man vary from the mechanical
stimulus-response ccncept to the idea of man as a purposeful,
self-determining organism. The one distinctive aspect of all
naturalistic interpretations of man is that he is one with
nature.
Naturalism In Education 
The Protestant Reformation of the early sixteenth 
century had reinforced the Judeo-Christian approach to educa­
tion and had expanded the ideals of humanism. But in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the religious Refor­
mation appeared to lose both its dynamic spiritual quality and 
its intellectual vigor. With the waning of religious and 
humanistic forces the era of naturalism and sense realism 
began to be theorized in terms of education. New discoveries 
and novel inventions led many to regard nature as a source of 
knowledge and to view education as a natural rather than an 
artificial development. Wolfgang Ratke and John Amos Oomenius 
began to apply the Baconian principles that pertain to the 
discovery of truth in nature to the area of education. Three
65Ibid.. p. 258.
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men appear to be the leaders In introducing naturalistic con­
cepts into education. These three thinkers are John Locke,
Jean J. Rousseau, and Herbert Spencer.
Those who are acquainted with Quintilian, Oomenius,
and Montaigne will not discover any startling innovations in
Some Thoughts Gonceming Education by Locke. Quintilian
stated that the general assumption that only a few well-
favored people could learn was false. He thought that most
people were quick to reason and ready to learn, for he wrote:
Reasoning comes as naturally to man as flying to birds, 
speed to horses and ferocity to beasts of prey: our 
minds are endowed by nature with such activity and 
sagacity that the soul is believed to proceed from 
heaven.oo
Montaigne, like Quintilian, reacted to the practice of imposing 
artificial study patterns in the child. He taught that the 
child should be taught according to his capacity, learning 
such things as he can from self-discovery and from open inves­
tigation to free discussion.
Oomenius also emphasized the importance of conducting 
education in accordance with nature. As a Protestant bishop 
he accepted the traditional Ohristian doctrine of the innate 
depravity of man. Yet he did not regard nature as anti­
thetical to human growth. On the contrary, in his most 
renowned educational work. Didactic Magna, he stated: "If we
wish to find a remedy for the defects of nature, it is in
^Robert Ulich, Three Thousand Years of Educational 
Wisdom (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 104.
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nature herself that we must look for it, since it is certain 
that art can do nothing unless it imitates nature."^?
However, it is with John Locke, empiricist and free­
thinker, that the tendency toward naturalism in education 
becomes clearly d e f i n e d . Referring to the naturalism of 
Locke Monroe states; "In a sense, Locke is the founder of 
the naturalistic movement in education, for in many respects 
Rousseau freely acknowledges indebtedness to him;"^9 The 
great influence of the theories of education advanced by 
Locke arises from the fact that these theories expressed pre­
cisely the type of education preferred by the practical busi­
ness men of England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Locke begins his discussion on educational philosophy 
by rejecting the popular concept of innate ideas. He states:
"Ho proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never 
knew, which it was never conscious o f . L o c k e  says that if 
there are innate ideas, the person will have innate thought, 
for there can be no ideas without thoughts. Locke goes even 
further by suggesting that.there are no such things as innate 
moral principles, and no innate ideas of God. To Locke all
G7M. W. Keatings, Oomenius (Hew York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1931), p. 52.
G^Geoffrey O'Connell, Haturalism in American Educa­
tion (Hew York: Benziger Brothers, 1934), p. 34.
^9paul Monroe, A Text-Book In The History of Edu­
cation (Hew York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p . 177.
70john Locke, "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," 
Great Books of the Webern World fChicago: Encyclopedia
Brittannica, 1937), XXÎXVII, 9fl
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ideas arise from experience making an impression on the mind, 
which is completely blank at birth.
The educational objectives of Locke are stated simply 
in the phrase "a sound mind in a sound b o d y . A n y  one 
possessing these two has little more for which to wish, while 
a person lacking in either one will not attain happiness, 
according to Locke. While the molding of the mind is impor­
tant to Locke, yet education should begin with the "clay 
cottage" in which the mind resides.
Discipline is the basic principle in Locke's approach
to the educational process:
As the strength of the body lies chiefly in being able 
to endure hardship, so also does that of the mind. And 
the great principle and foundation of all virtue and 
worth is placed in this, that a man is able to deny him­
self his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and 
purely follow what reason directs as best.73
A strict hand kept over children in the beginning will result
in submission to reason later and thereby assist in developing
the good life, in the thinking of Locke.
However, Locke thinks that discipline is best achieved 
by rewards and punishments. But he does not mean physical 
punishment or reward, for he writes: "Esteem and disgrace
are, of all others, the most powerful incentives to the mind, 
when once it is brought to relish t h e m . B u t  discipline
Tllbid.. p. 121.
72john Locke, Some Thoughts on Education (Boston: 
Library of Education, 1830), 1,1.
73ibid.. p. 27. . p. 50.
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should be exercised carefully aad should not interfere with 
innocent folly, playing, or childish actions. Discipline is 
a means to the end of establishing proper habits. Desirable 
habits, further, are established by practice, not by mem­
orizing rules. Regarding the method of learning by doing 
Loche writes:
This method of teaching children by a repeated practice, 
and the same action done over and over again, under the 
eye and direction of the tutor, till they have got the 
habit of doing it well, and not by relying on rules 
trusted to their memories, has so many advantages that 
I wonder why it could possibly be so much neglected.75
Children should be allowed, according to Locke, to follow 
their inclinations, with favorable seasons of aptitude and 
inclination serving as a starting point in learning anything. 
The subject should be adapted to the age level of the pupil, 
with the development of the body first, then the inculcation 
of the various phases of morality, to be followed by language, 
geography, arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, history, rhetoric, 
logic and natural philosophy. But whatever the subject or 
method, it must, in Locke's thinking, harmonize with natural 
tendencies. It appears sound to conclude that Locke's natu­
ralism was primarily in the area of methodology, rather than 
in any revolutionary concept of the curriculum. In fact, it 
would appear that Locke was not advancing far from the 
trivium and the quadrivium of the medieval age along with 
Renaissance-Eeformation embellishments.
75ibid.. p. 60.
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Similar ideas are found in the educational theories 
of Jean J. Rousseau. Rousseau belonged to a revolutionary age 
and seems to serve as the spokesman of the intellectual re­
bellion during the eighteenth century against what the 
intelligentsia regarded as formal, artificial and hypocritical 
thinking. For Rousseau himself, education was regarded as an 
essential part of a revolutionary plan to lead mankind from 
absolutism and authoritarianism toward freedom and inde­
pendence.?^ In his Social Gontract Rousseau launched the 
back-te-nature movement along with the idea of the inherent 
q.uality of human freedom. In Emile Rousseau presented the ed­
ucational counterpart of his political writing. Social Con­
tract . in order to make, it was hoped, the educational revo­
lution an ally of the proposed social revolution.
On the negative side, the historical significance of 
Emile seems to rest in its protest against the educational 
practices of the eighteenth century. Education, according to 
Rousseau, should be based on the principle that the child is 
by nature innately good. Rousseau was aware that he was 
directly contradicting one of the fundamental tenets of his­
toric Ohristian doctrine, the idea of innate depravity. The 
keynote of the educational platfhrm of Rousseau is found in 
the famous statement: "Everything is good as it comes from
the hands of the author of nature, but everything degenerates 
in the hands of man."?? Sin e evil is the result of man’s
?^Ulich, OP. cit.. p. 383.
??Jean J. Rousseau, Emile (Eew York: E. P. Dutton
and Co., 1911)» Book I, p. 5.
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social activity, the teacher's primary task is protective—  
to prevent the pupil from coming into contact with scciety 
until he has matured sufficiently to cope with society.78 
Education offers, to Rousseau, the one grand pos­
sibility of shaping human lives. Few men present the poten­
tial of education in more exalted terms than the following 
statement of Rousseau:
We are b o m  weak, we need strength; helpless, we need 
aid; foolish, we need reason. All that we lack at 
birth, all that we need when we come to man's estate, 
is the gift of education.79
This education, so essential in Rousseau's thinking,
comes from nature, from men, or from things. The inner growth
of the organs and faculties is the education of nature, the
use one learns to make of this growth is the education of
men, and what is gained by experience from our surroundings
is the education of things. In this way each person has three
teachers: nature, men, and surroundings. If these three
schoolmasters agree and work in harmony, the person under
this instruction is happy and well-educated. If these three
teachers are in conflict, then the pupil is unhappy and ill-
educated.
Rousseau rejects both classical education and voca­
tional training as such. He reasons that in the natural order 
men are all eq.ual and their common calling is that of manhood, 
for he writes:
78ibid.. p. 18. 79ibid.. p. 6.
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It matters little to me whether my pupil is intended 
for the army, the church, or the law. Before his
parents chose a calling for him nature called him to
be a man. Life is the trade I would teach him.°0
The grand objective, of education, says Rousseau, is to make
a man. Because the individual has learned to live as a man,
he will quickly leam how to be a magistrate, a soldier, or
a priest.
Since man cannot control nature, then in education he 
should learn how to cooperate with nature. Everything should 
be done to bring the processes of education into harmony with 
the natural tendencies of the child. The educational text
of Rousseau could be the statement: "Fix your eye on the
nature, follow the path traced by h e r . A l l  the habits of 
the individual should be self-developed, not imposed from 
without. The only habit the child should be allowed to con­
tract is that of having no habits.
To Rousseau, life consisted of a series of stages, 
ranging from infancy, through puberty and adolescence into 
maturity and manhood. The great need, then, is to adapt the 
learning process to the age, or stage, in which the pupil 
finds himself. With the help of education the pupil learns 
the art of self-discipline, he 1earns how to meet suffering 
and he learns how to adapt to life's many novel situations. 
But this process takes time. It develops, then, that one of 
the main functions of education in the years of childhood up
80lbid.. p. 9. 8llbid.. p. 14.
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to twelve, is that of retardation, or of prevention. However, 
by retardation, Rousseau means the slowing down of the pos­
sibility of the pupil's acquaintance with the evils of 
society, not the prevention of natural and desirable self- 
discipline and growth. Rousseau writes:
May I venture to lay down the greatest, the most 
important, and most influential rule of education. It 
is this, not to gain time, but to lose it. . . . the 
first part of education, therefore, ought to be purely 
negative. It consists, neither in teaching virtue nor 
truth, but in guarding the heart from vice, and the 
mind from error.82
Up to the age of twelve or thirteen, the wants of a child are
primary. After this age his faculties develop rapidly and he
is ready to leam from nature and the questions engendered by
nature. Prom a study of nature it is a natural step in
later stages to develop the rational and the aesthetic powers.
The writing of Spencer, Education, appeared in 1861, 
two years after the work of Darwin, The Origin of the Species. 
In this book Spencer, following the naturalistic trend in 
education,launched an attack on current education by the state­
ment: "Ren dress their children's minds as they do their
bodies, in the prevailing f a s h i o n . Subjects are taught, 
says Spencer, not because of their intrinsic value, but be­
cause they are socially acceptable:
Hot what knowledge is of most real worth, is the con­
sideration; but what will bring most applause, honor,
82lbid.. p. 45.
S^Herbert Spencer, Education (New York: Hurst and
Company, n. d.), p. 7.
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respect— what will conduce to social position and 
influence— what will be most imposing. . . in educa­
tion, the question is, not the intrinsic value of 
knerwledge, so much as its extrinsic effects on o t h e r s . 84
Rather than learning useless subjects simply because these
subjects are socially acceptable, the process of education
should prepare one for complete living, according to Spencer.
Spencer approached the matter of education from the 
physical side. Fundamentally, the child is an animal, but 
the human animal must be directed in the habits that are bene­
ficial, for Spencer writes: "People are beginning to see that
the first requisite to success in life, is to be a good ani­
mal. "85
While Spencer regarded the child as an animal, he is 
unique in that his period of infancy is a relatively long one. 
Whereas animals are born with a set of behavior patterns all 
ready to function, the human animal has to learn everything 
except his vital body processes. Prolonged infancy, says 
Spencer, which requires a period of guidance and thus provides 
the occasion for the learning needed by human beings, outlines 
the purpose and function of education in the human r a c e . 86
The objectives of education, to Spencer, are ele­
mental and clear:
Is it not that education of whatever kind has for its 
proximate end to prepare a child for the business of 
life— to produce a citizen, who, at the same time that
84%bid.. p. 11. 85ibid.. p. 101.
86of. Ibid.. pp. 13-14.
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he is well conducted, is also able to make his way
in the world.87
The objectives of education, then, are determined by the lead­
ing kinds of activity that constitute life. According to 
Spencer it is easy to classify, in the order of their impor­
tance, these life-satisfying activities. They are arranged 
naturally as follows:
1. Those activities which, by securing the necessaries 
of life, directly minister to self-preservation;
2. Those activities which, by securing the necessaries 
of life, indirectly minister to self-preservation;
3. Those activities which have for their end the rearing 
and discipline of offspring;
4. Those activities which are involved in the maintenance 
of proper, social and public relations;
5. Those miscellaneous activities which make up the lei­
sure part of life, devoted to the gratification of 
the tastes and f e e l i n g s . 88
Spencer realizes that the educational objectives which he sug­
gested are contrary to the traditional, classical education of 
his day. But he also was aware that there was much dissatis­
faction with current educational ideas and practices. The 
ready acceptance of his objectives by the practical middle 
class indicated that Spencer was an educational prophet who 
was honored in his own time.
The educational process, according to Spencer, is not 
to be turned indiscriminately toward the forces of nature. 
Spencer states that the two aspects of human nature which re­
quires direct supervision by adults are (1) the prolonged 
period of infancy and (2) the nature of human nature itself.
Q7ibid.. p. 178. 88ibid.. p. 18.
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Spencer offers no formal concept of human nature, but does
reject the idea of innate goodness in favor of a tentative
acceptance of depravity:
We are not among those who believe in Lord Palmerton's 
dogma, that "all children are born good." On the whole, 
the opposite dogma, untenable, as it is, seems to us 
less wide of the truth.89
In stating his objectives Spencer is naturalistic, but re­
frains from the free rule of nature. He favors a program of 
education directed and controlled, but harmonious with the 
nature of the child as such.
Spencer regards the educative process as a deliberate 
and positive program. The distinctive character of the pro­
longed educative process by which Spencer proposes to guide 
the pupil through his extended infancy can be summarized in
eight principles.90
The first principle is that education must conform to 
the natural processes of growth and mental development. It is 
the make-up of the learner that determines the character of 
the learning process, not the designs of teachers or of society, 
A second principle in Spencer's system is the idea that the 
teacher should attempt to make the acquisition of knowledge 
pleasurable rather than painful. This idea is based on the 
assumption that at each age the intellectual action which a 
child likes is a healthful one for it. Another fundamental
Q9ibid.. p. 175.
90cf. Ibid.. pp. 104-110.
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concept of Spencer is that education should engage the spon­
taneous self-activity of the child. Spencer believed that the 
child largely educates himself by those things he discovers in 
his own active relations with things and people. The remain­
ing concepts of Spencer are: acquisition of knowledge is an
important part of education; education includes the physical 
as well as the mental; precocity should never be encouraged, 
for education should practice the art of delay, or provide for 
natural maturation; methods of instruction should be inductive, 
rising out of the child's personal observations; all punitive 
aspects of the educational process should fit into a natural 
consequence of actions and should be administered with sympathy.
From Spencer's point of view, the classical, artificial 
education of the nineteenth century was an imposition on the 
child which ran directly counter to the child's natural devel­
opment. By suggesting a concept of education which recognized 
the child as an integral aspect of nature Spencer hoped to 
make education more effioient as well as more enjoyable. Many 
of Spencer's educational ideas became an accepted part of 
later naturalistic philosophies of education.
Within the confines of this chapter an attempt has been 
made to present a brief, yet comprehensive, survey of the his- 
torioal development of naturalism, particularly of those 
ideas in naturalism which are relevant for naturalistic edu­
cational philosophy. In developing the study of naturalism 
first the various types of naturalism were defined as: (1)
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reductionistlc naturalism, (2) mechanistic naturalism, (3) 
developmental naturalism, and (4) dialectical naturalism. 
Reductionistic naturalism was described as the attempt to 
reduce nature to a substance, or to a state, such as energy. 
Mechanistic naturalism involved the interpretation of the 
world as a gigantic machine operating according to fixed and 
immutable laws. Developmental naturalism presented the idea 
of nature as a process in which the principle of evolution was 
dominant. Finally, dialectical naturalism was depicted as an 
open-ended approach to nature, characterized by a spirit of 
investigation concerned with the functions of nature as such, 
rather than by the attempt to explain nature completely.
Following the discussion of the development of the 
various types of naturalistic philosophy, those concepts of 
naturalism which have direct bearing upon educational theory 
were presented. The concepts of naturalism considered were 
naturalistic metaphysics, naturalistic epistemology, natural­
istic ethics, and the naturalistic concept of man. Negatively 
stated naturalistic metaphysics is the rejection of the idea 
of the supernatural. Positively stated, naturalistic meta­
physics is the acceptance of nature, in some form or another, 
as the only reality. Naturalism accepts the study of the 
problem of knowledge from the standpoint of empirical obser­
vation. In the area of axiology naturalism rejects external 
authority, regarding ethics from the descriptive, the util­
itarian, or the relativistic point of view. Guided by the
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philosophy of naturalism, man has been incorporated wholly 
within nature, although concepts of man may vary from the 
mechanical stimulus-response ccncept to the idea of man as 
a purposeful, self-determining organism.
Finally, the chapter is brought to a close by a brief 
survey of representative attempts to apply the concepts of 
naturalism in educational theory. Three writers were chosen 
as representative of naturalistic educational philosophy.
These three thinkers were John Locke, Jean J. Rousseau, and 
Herbert Spencer. Many ideas of these naturalistic thinkers 
were in agreement and became a part of naturalistic educa­
tional theory, such as: (1) developing proper habits by 
physical activity, (2) learning by doing, (3) finding pleasure 
in the learning activity, (4) allowing the pupil to follow his 
individual interests, and (5) producing an effective human 
being, capable of effective social living. However, Locke, 
Rousseau, and Spencer had some sharp points of difference in 
their systems. Rousseau believed human nature was innately 
good, Spencer accepted a modified type of natural depravity, 
while Locke seemed to regard human nature as neutral, or rather, 
as having no tendencies toward either goodness or badness. To 
Locke man became what his environment brought to him ezperi- 
entially. Another point of difference between the three 
previously mentioned thinkers was the nature of society. Locke 
and Spencer appeared to accept the existing social morality as 
an ideal objective for education, while Rousseau was critical
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o f  s o c i e t y .  A l s o ,  b o t h  L o c k e  a n d  S p e n c e r ,  m o r e  t h a n  R o u s s e a u ,  
s t r e s s e d  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  p h y s i c a l  v i t a l i t y  a n d  s e l f -  
d i s c i p l i n e  f o r  h e a l t h ' s  s a k e .
D u r i n g  t h e  l a s t  d e c a d e  o f  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  a n d  
t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  
n a t u r a l i s t i c  i d e a s  o n  A m e r i c a n  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e d u c a t i o n a l  
t h i n k i n g  w a s  p r o n o u n c e d .  T h e s e  n a t u r a l i s t i c  i d e a s  f o u n d  
e x p r e s s i o n  i n  w r i t e r s  a s  v a r i e d  a s  T h o m a s  P a y n e  a n d  T h o m a s  
J e f f e r s o n .  T h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  n a t u r a l i s m  i n t o  A m e r i c a n  
p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e d u c a t i o n a l  t h e o r y  w a s  t h e  o c c a s i o n  o f  p r o l o n g e d  
t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  n a t u r a l i s m  a n d  a n o t h e r  p h i l o s o p h y  a l r e a d y  
e x i s t e n t  i n  A m e r i c a ,  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  i d e a l i s m .  T h e  f o l l o w ­
i n g  c h a p t e r  p r e s e n t s  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i d e a l i s m ,  i t s  c o n c e p t s ,  
a n d  i t s  e d u c a t i o n a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
C H A P T E R  I I I
EDUOATIONAL T H E O R Y  E X P R E S S E D  H I T H I H  
T H E  P H I L O S O P H Y  O P  I D E A L I S M
I n  t h e  W e s t e r n  w o r l d ,  I d e a l i s m  a s  a  t e c h n i c a l  p h i l o s ­
o p h y  b e g a n  w i t h  S o c r a t e s  a n d  P l a t o .  T h e  c o m p a t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
i d e a l i s t i c  a p p r o a c h  t o  p h i l o s o p h y  w i t h  C h r i s t i a n  c o n c e p t s  
m a d e  i d e a l i s m ,  i n  s o m e  f o r m ,  t h e  d o m i n a n t  p h i l o s o p h y  i n  
W e s t e r n  t h o u g h t  u n t i l  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  o f  n a t u r a l i s m  a f t e r  t h e  
R e n a i s s a n c e .  F r o m  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  u n t i l  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  
i d e a l i s m  a n d  n a t u r a l i s m  w e r e  t h e  t w o  d o m i n a n t  p h i l o s o p h i e s .
T h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  r e a l i s m  h a s  a l s o  w o n  a  l a r g e  f o l l o w i n g .
I d e a l i s m ,  l i k e  n a t u r a l i s m ,  h a s  m a n y  v a r i a t i o n s  a n d  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e f i n e  c o n c i s e l y .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  H o c k i n g  
i d e a l i s m  i s  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  w h i c h  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  
r e a l i t y  i s  m i n d . ^  K e m p  S m i t h  d e f i n e s  t h e  t e r m  " i d e a l i s m "  a s  
c o v e r i n g  a l l  t h o s e  p h i l o s o p h i e s  w h i c h  a g r e e  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  
t h a t  s p i r i t u a l  v a l u e s  h a v e  a  d e t e r m i n i n g  v o i c e  i n  t h e  o r d e r i n g  
o f  t h e  universe. 2  A  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i d e a l i s m  i s  
a t t e m p t e d  b y  C u n n i n g h a m ,  w h o  w r i t e s :
^ H o c k i n g ,  o n .  c i t . .  p .  2 4 7 .
^ A .  0 .  E w i n g ,  I d e a l i s m :  A  C r i t i c a l  S u r v e y  ( L o n d o n :
M e t h u e n  a n d  C o . ,  1 9 3 3 ) ,  p .  2 .
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Idealism is that philosophical doctrine which under­
takes to show that, in order to think matter on the 
spatio-temporal order of events in its ultimate nature, 
we are logically compelled to think mind or spirit 
along with it as in some sense foundational to it.5
A. 0. Ewing also attempts to given an all-inclusive definition 
in the following statement: "Idealism proceeds from the con­
clusion that physical objects depend on God or the Absolute, 
or are themselves psychical in character, or things are 
abstractions of collective human experience."^
Hocking states that the idealist's position may be 
expressed in two propositions, one negative and one positive.5 
The negative proposition is that the apparent self-sufficiency 
of nature is illusory. Nature appears to be independent, to 
operate according to its own laws, to require no ground out­
side itself, but in reality nature does depend on something 
else. The second proposition of idealism according to Hooking, 
is that ultimately nature, and all reality, can be explained 
only in terms of mind. Brightman states that it is both dif­
ficult and urgent to define idealism, for in defining the term 
the entire concept evaporates into triviality.^  However, 
Brightman does present a general definition of idealism in
3watts Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent 
British and American Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Go..
1931), p. 155.
^Ewing, OP. cit.. p. 4.
^Hoeking, OP. cit.. p. 248.
^Edgar S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1928), p. 165.
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t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w o r d s :
N e v e r t h e l e s s  w e  s h a l l  h a v e  a  v a g u e  w o r k i n g  d e f i n i t i o n  
i f  w e  s a y  t h a t  a l l  i d e a l i s m  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  b e l i e f  
i n  t h e  u l t i m a t e  r e a l i t y  o r  c o s m i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e  e i t h e r  
o f  m i n d  ( u s i n g  t h e  t e r m  i n  i t s  b r o a d e s t  s e n s e )  o r  o f  
t h e  i d e a l s  a n d  v a l u e s  r e v e a l e d  t o  a n d  p r i z e d  b y  m i n d . '
P r o m  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  d e f i n i t i o n s  i t  a p p e a r s  s o u n d  t o  s t a t e  t h a t
i d e a l i s m ,  i n  a n y  o f  i t s  v a r i o u s  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  r e g a r d s  i d e a s ,
v a l u e s ,  o r  m i n d  a s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  r e a l .
H i s t o r i c  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  I d e a l i s m
B r i g h t m a n  h a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y  i d e a l i s m  
h a s  f o u n d  e x p r e s s i o n  i n  f o u r  t y p e s . &  T h e  f i r s t  t y p e ,
P l a t o n i c  I d e a l i s m ,  a s s e r t s  t h e  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  v a l u e  a n d  i s  
s o m e t i m e s  c a l l e d  O b j e c t i v e  I d e a l i s m .  T h e  s e c o n d  t y p e ,  
s p o n s o r e d  c h i e f l y  b y  B e r k e l e y ,  h o l d s  t h a t  a l l  k n o w a b l e  
r e a l i t y  i s  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  a n d  i s  l a b e l e d  
S u b j e c t i v e  I d e a l i s m .  A n  i m p e r s o n a l  i d e a l i s m  w a s  p r o p o s e d  b y  
H e g e l  w h o  t a u g h t  t h a t  t h e  c o h e r e n c e  o f  o n e  a b s o l u t e  s y s t e m  i s  
t h e  o n l y  t r u e  v a l u e ,  o r  e x i s t e n c e .  H e g e l i a n  i d e a l i s m  i s  s o m e ­
t i m e s  c a l l e d  O r g a n i c  I d e a l i s m .  A  f o u r t h  t y p e  o f  i d e a l i s m  i s  
c a l l e d  P e r s o n a l i s m ,  w h i c h  s t a t e s  t h a t  o n l y  p e r s o n s ,  o r  s e l v e s ,  
a r e  r e a l .
W i t h  t h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  S o p h i s t s  i n  a n c i e n t  G r e e c e ,  G r e e k  
t h i n k i n g  t o o k  a n  a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l ,  o r  s u b j e c t i v e ,  d i r e c t i o n ,  
s t u d y i n g  t h e  i n n e r  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  m a n ,  h i s  i d e a t i o n  a n d  h i s  
v o l i t i o n .  T h i s  s u b j e c t i v e  a p p r o a c h  o f  t h e  S o p h i s t s  d e n i e d
Tibid.. p. 172. % b i d .. p. 171.
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all transcendental realities, attempting to identify reality 
with what man knows of it. Reality is what is known, accord­
ing to the Sophist, to man. Reality is immanent in knowledge. 
Referring to the "subjeot-man" approach to knowledge, Mueller 
wrote: "This metaphysics of immanence absolutizes the sub­
jective side of knowledge."9
Protagoras, most eminent of the Sophists, stated that
there is no belief that is not of this subjective character.
The natural result is skepticism. Protagoras argued that sense
qualities are clearly dependent upon the actual operations of
the senses, and all knowledge may be reduced ultimately to
sense experiences. This skeptical subjectivism is well stated
in the following statement of Protagoras:
The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; 
there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, 
fear, and many more which are named. . . with each of 
them is born an object of sense,— all sorts of colors 
born with all sorts of sights and sounds in like manner 
with hearing, and other objects with the other senses.10
The Sophistic teaching of man as subject was accepted 
by Socrates in the early dialogues of Plato. However,
Socrates avoids the pedantic relativism of the Sophistic move­
ment by insisting that all truth is contained in the subject, 
but only in so far as it is universal. Consequently the 
searching out of universal conceptions was for Socrates the 
essence of science, and thus determined the outer form of his
^ G u s t a v  M u e l l e r ,  T h e  I n t e r p l a y  o f  O p p o s i t e s  ( N e w  
Y o r k :  B o o k m a n  A s s o c i a t e s ,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  p .  7 6 .
1Opiate, "Theaetetus," The Works of Plato, trans.
B. Jowett (New York: Dial Press, n. d.), p. 156.
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p h i l o s o p h y .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  S o p h i s t i c  d i s c o v e r y  w a s  
s a n c t i o n e d  b y  S o c r a t e s  a n d  w a s  c a r r i e d  t o  i t s  u l t i m a t e  m e a n i n g  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  P l a t o  p r e s e r v e s  a n d  c l a r i f i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
d e s t r o y s  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t .  Y e t  h e  d o e s  s o  w i t h o u t  
y i e l d i n g  t o  t h e  e x t r e m e  s u b j e c t i v i s m  o f  t h e  S o p h i s t .
S o c r a t e s  h a s  u s e d  d i a l e c t i c s  a s  a  m e t h o d  o f  d i s ­
c o v e r i n g  u n i v e r s e l s ,  b u t  t h e  u n i v e r s e l s  w e r e  a l w a y s  e m b o d i e d  
i n  e x p e r i e n c e .  P l a t o  e x p a n d e d  t h e  d i a l e c t i c s  o f  S o c r a t e s  
i n t o  a  s y s t e m ,  a s  i n d i c a t e d  b y  J o w e t t  i n  t h e s e  w o r d s ;  " W h e r e  
S o c r a t e s  u s e d  u n i v e r s a l  a x i o m s ,  P l a t o  d e v e l o p e d  a  s y s t e m .  
F u r t h e r ,  t h a t  w h i c h  S o c r a t e s  l a i d  d o w n  a s  a  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
k n o w l e d g e ,  P l a t o  a n n o u n c e d  a s  a  p r i n c i p l e  o f  m e t a p h y s i c s . " ^ ^  
A n o t h e r  w r i t e r  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  P l a t o  i n  t h e s e  
w o r d s  :
. . . P l a t o  h a d  c o m e  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  b a s i s  
o f  o b j e c t i v e  r e a l i t y  i n  o u r  m o r a l  j u d g m e n t s  l a y  i n  t h e s e  
p e r f e c t  o r  i d e a l  f o r m s  w h i c h  w e r e  n e v e r  d i s c o v e r e d  o r  
r e a l i z e d  c o m p l e t e l y  i n  t h e  w o r l d  k n o w n  t o  s e n s e - p e r c e p -  
t i o n .  B u t  t h e y  w e r e  r e a l  a n d  k n o w a b l e  i n  e x a c t l y  t h e  
s a m e  s e n s e  a s  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  m a t h e m a t i c a l  science.1 2
A n o t h e r  P l a t o  s c h o l a r ,  P a u l  S h o r e y ,  a l s o  s t a t e s  t h a t  
P l a t o  a c c e p t e d  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  u n i v e r s e l s ,  f o r  h e  
s a y s :  " U n i v e r s a l s ,  i d e a s ,  n o t i o n s ,  a r e  t r e a t e d  a s  t h i n g s ,
h y p o s t a t i z e d  e n t i t i e s .  T h e y  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  w o r l d  o f  t r u e  b e i n g  
a n d  u n c h a n g i n g  r e a l i t y .
H l b i d . , p .  x l v .
0 .  F i e l d ,  T h e  P h i l o s o p h y  o f  P l a t o  ( L o n d o n :
O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 4 9 ^ , p .  4 2 .
1 3 p a u l  S h o r e y ,  W h a t  P l a t o  S a i d  ( C h i c a g o :  U n i v e r s i t y
o f  C h i c a g o  P r e s s ,  1 9 3 3 ) ,  p .  2 É 7 .
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O u r  e x a m i n a t i o n ,  o f  P l a t o  ' s  w r i t i n g s  s e e m s  t o  s u p p o r t  
t h e  I d e a  t h a t  a l l  o b j e c t s  e x i s t  p r i m a r i l y  a s  f o r m s ,  o r  I d e a s ,  
a n d  o n l y  s e c o n d a r i l y  a s  s e n s e  o b j e c t s .  I n  t h e  " P h l l e b u s "  
P l a t o  I n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  e t e r n a l  g o d  m a d e  t h e  w o r l d  a c c o r d ­
i n g  - t o  a  p r e c o n c e i v e d  p a t t e r n .  I n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  u n i v e r s e  
m a y  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  I d e a  o f  l i v i n g  t h i n g s  o f  w h i c h  I t  I s  a  
c o p y .  I t  w a s  m a d e  t o  c o n t a i n  t h e  f o u r  t y p e s  o f  l i v i n g  t h i n g s  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  f o u r  e l e m e n t s  a n d  I n h e r e n t  I n  t h a t  I d e a ,  
n a m e l y ,  h e a v e n l y  b o d i e s ,  b i r d s ,  f i s h e s  a n d  l a n d  a n i m a l s .  
A g a i n ,  I n  t h e  " P o l l t l c u s , "  P l a t o  s a y s :  " Y e s ,  w e  s t i l l  a f f i r m
t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e s e  e t e r n a l  I d e a s ,  w h i c h  I s  a s  c e r t a i n  a s  
t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  p u r e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  a n d  r i g h t  
o p i n i o n . " ^ 5  H e  a l s o  s a y s  t h a t  o u r  p h i l o s o p h y  m u s t  t a k e  a c ­
c o u n t  o f  t h r e e  t h i n g s :  t h e  I d e a ,  I t s  n a m e s a k e ,  a n d  t h e
s e n s i b l e  c o p y . ^ ^
T w o  m o r e  r e c e n t  t h i n k e r s ,  J o s l a h  R o y c e  a n d  W i l l i a m  
E .  H o c k i n g ,  m a y  b e  q u o t e d  a s  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  I d e a  t h a t  
r e a l i t y  I s  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  m i n d ,  o r  I d e a .  J o s l a h  R o y c e  I s  
c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  m o s t  o u t s t a n d i n g  I d e a l i s t  t h a t  A m e r i c a  h a s  
p r o d u c e d . R o y c e ‘ s  b a s i c  w o r k  I s  T h e  W o r l d  a n d  t h e  I n d l -
^ ^ l a t o ,  " P h l l e b u s , "  T h e  W o r k s  o f  P l a t o , t r a n s .
B .  J o w e t t  ( H e w  Y o r k :  D i a l  P r e s s ,  n .  d . ) ,  p .  3 6 2
^ 5 p i a t o ,  " P o l l t l c u s , "  T h e  W o r k s  o f  P l a t o , t r a n s .
B .  J o w e t t  ( H e w  Y o r k :  D i a l  P r e s s ,  n .  d . ) ,  p .  5 1  D
^ ^ P l a t o ,  " P h a e d o , "  T h e  W o r k s  o f  P l a t o , t r a n s .
B .  J o w e t t  ( H e w  Y o r k :  D i a l  P r e s s ,  n .  d . ) ,  p .  2 5 2 .
W a l t e r  G .  M u e l d e r ,  T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  A m e r i c a n  
P h i l o s o p h y  ( N e w  Y o r k :  H o u g h t o n  M i f f l l n  C o . ,  I 9S 0 ) , p .  & 1 2 .
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vidual. Royee's philosophy seems to reflect not only the 
Impact of German idealism and romanticism, but also the influ­
ence of Peirce and James.
Two focal questions for Royce are: What is our idea?
How can an idea be related to reality? An idea, we are told, 
must be defined in terms of its internal purpose and in terms 
of its eztemal reference. The external function is secon­
dary to the internal meaning, which is always the expression 
of an interest, a desire, or a purpose. Royce explains the 
external function of an idea in these words:
. . . what the idea always aims to find in its object 
is nothing whatever but the idea's own conscious pur­
pose or will, embodied in some more determinate form 
than the idea by itself alone at this instant con­
sciously possesses. When I have an idea of the world,
my idea is a will, and the world of my idea is simply
my own will itself determinâtely involved.18
The external meaning of an idea is the idea's reference be­
yond itself to an object. The internal meaning of an idea is 
the expression in experience of desire, purpose, and voli­
tion, as indicated by these words : "All finite ideas, even
the vaguest are already in one aspect contents of experience, 
imperfectly fulfilling purpose."19 There is thus no opposition 
between the internal and the external meaning of ideas, for 
the validity of an idea is primarily determined by its internal
meaning. It follows then, in Royce's thinking, that the World
l8josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (Hew 
York: The Macmillem Co., 1 9 2 5 ) ,  p .  : $ 2 7 .
19lbid.. p .  3 5 4 .
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a s  I d e a ,  - w h e n  f u l l y  d e v e l o p e d ,  e x p r e s s e s  t h r o u g h .  I t s e l f  t h e  
W o r l d  o f  P a c t .  R o y c e  i s  c a r e f u l  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  p r i v a t e  
w i l l  d o e s  n o t  c r e a t e  n a t u r e ,  b u t  c o n s c i o u s  w i l l  d o e s  l o g i ­
c a l l y  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  o b j e c t s  i n  r e a l i t y  a r e .  H e  s a y s :
" W h a t  i s ,  o r  w h a t  i s  r e a l ,  i s  a s  s u c h  t h e  c o m p l e t e  e m b o d i ­
m e n t ,  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  f o r m  a n d  i n  f i n a l  f u l f i l l m e n t ,  o f  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  m e a n i n g  o f  f i n i t e  i d e a s .
T h e  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  W o r l d  a s  I d e a  d i s c l o s e s  f o u r  
r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a n d  t h e  e x t e r n a l  m e a n i n g  o f  
r e a l i t y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  R o y c e :  ( 1 )  T h e y  a r e  i n s e p a r a b l y  j o i n e d ;
(2) T h e  O t h e r  w h i c h  i s  s o u g h t  i n  k n o w l e d g e  i s  a n  I n d i v i d u a l  
w h i c h  r e q u i r e s  t h e  u n i t y  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  m e a n i n g  ( t h e  W h a t )  
a n d  t h e  e x t e r n a l  m e a n i n g  ( t h e  T h a t ) ;  ( 3 )  T h e  t w o  m e a n i n g s  
a r e  m u t u a l l y  d e t e r m i n i n g ,  f o r  t h e  e x t e r n a l  m e a n i n g s  m u s t  
a n s w e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d  b y  t h e  i n t e r n a l  m e a n i n g s ;  ( 4 )  I n  
t h e  e n d  m e a n i n g s  a r e  supreme. 2 1  T h e  O t h e r ,  w h i c h  k n o w l e d g e  
s e e k s ,  i s  i n  r e a l i t y  t h e  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  i d e a ' s  o u n  e m b o d i e d  
p u r p o s e ,  o r  w i l l .  A  c o m p l e t e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  i d e a  w o u l d  e n d  t h e  
q u e s t  a n d  t h i s  o b j e c t  w o u l d  b e  t h e  r e a l  o b j e c t .  T h u s  R o y c e  
h o l d s  t h a t  t r u t h  a n d  r e a l i t y  a r e  c o m p l e t e  I d e a . 2 2  T h i s  
I d e a ,  h e  t r i e s  t o  s h o w ,  i s  a  S e l f - C o n s c i o u s  K n o w e r . 2 3
H o c k i n g  b a s e d  h i s  i d e a l i s m  o n  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  c r e a ­
t i v e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  h u m a n  m i n d ,  w h i c h  h e  f e l t  g a v e  s u b s t a n c e  t o
2Qlbid. . p .  3 3 9 .  2 1 i t i a , . p .  3 4 .
2 2 M u e l d e r ,  o n .  c i t . , p .  2 1 3 .
23ibid.
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t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  o b j e c t i v e  i d e a l i s m .  W h i l e  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  
t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  n a t u r e  w a s  f i r s t  g i v e n  b y  a n  o u t s i d e  a g e n c y .  
H o o k i n g  r e a s o n e d  t h a t  t h e  m i n d  p r o c e e d s  t o  i n t e r p r e t  a n d  r e ­
p r o d u c e  w h a t  i s  g i v e n  b y  n a t u r e ,  a n d  i n  t h i s  w a y  c h a n g e s  f r o m  
a  p a s s i v e  r e c e p t o r  t o  a n  a c t i v e  c r e a t o r .  T o  h i m  t h i s  i d e a  o f  
m i n d  a s  c r e a t i v e  i s  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  o f  o b j e c t i v e  i d e a l i s m ,  f o r  
h e  s t a t e s :
I t  i s  t h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  e x t e n t  a n d  p o w e r  o f  t h i s  s i l e n t  
a c t i v i t y  w h i c h  a l o n e  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  a u d a c i o u s  h y p o t h e s i s  
o f  o b j e c t i v e  i d e a l i s m  t h a t  a  m i n d  c o u l d  c r e a t e  n a t u r e ,  
t h a t  t h e  r e a l i t y  b e h i n d  a n d  w i t h i n  n a t u r e  c o u l d  b e  m e n t a l . 2 4
T h e  s u p r e m e  m i n d ,  o r  u l t i m a t e  r e a l i t y ,  w o u l d  d i f f e r  
f r o m  t h e  h u m a n  m i n d ,  s a y s  H o c k i n g ,  n o t  m e r e l y  i n  g r e a t n e s s ,  
b u t  a l s o  i n  q u a l i t y .  W h e r e  t h e  h u m a n  m i n d  c a n  c r e a t e  o n l y  
a f t e r  i t  h a s  l e a r n e d  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h e  w o r l d - m i n d  m u s t  b r i n g  
f o r t h  t h e  q u a l i t i e s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  f r o m  i t s e l f ,  w i t h o u t  p r e v i o u s  
p a t t e r n  a n d  m u s t  b e  w h o l l y  a c t i v e ,  n o t  p a r t l y  p a s s i v e . ^ 5
H o c k i n g  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  n a t u r e  c o n s i s t s
i n  i t s  b e i n g  w i l l e d  b y  a  c r e a t i v e  m i n d . ^ G  H e  p r e s e n t s  f u r t h e r
i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  n a t u r e  d e p e n d s  u p o n  a  c r e a t i v e  m i n d  b y  t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p r o p o s i t i o n s :
T h a t  a s  l i f e  c o m e s  o n l y  f r o m  l i f e ;  s o  m i n d  c o m e s  o n l y  
f r o m  m i n d .  . . . T h a t  c a u s a l i t y  i s  p u r p o s i v e .  . .
T h a t  l a w  i s  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  intelligence. 2 7
P r o m  t h e s e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  H o c k i n g  s t a t e s  t h a t  i t  i s  j u s t i f i a b l e
^ ^ H o c k i n g ,  o p .  c i t . .  p .  2 7 3 .
2 5 i b l d . . p .  275. , p .  276.
27ibid..pp. 277-279.
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t o  r e g a r d  t h e  o r d e r  o f  n a t u r e  a s  t h e  l i t e r a l  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  
R e a s o n  i n  n a t u r e .
I n  1710, B i s h o p  B e r k e l e y  t o o k  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  a p p r o a c h  
t o  knowledge, a n d  m a d e  i t  p o s i t i v e ,  s o  t h a t  i t  b e c a m e  t h e  b a s i s  
o f  a  u n i f y i n g  o n t o l o g y .  L i k e  S o c r a t e s ,  B e r k e l e y  a v o i d e d  a  
s u b j e c t i v e  s k e p t i c i s m ,  a r r i v i n g  a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  o b j e c t i v e  
r e a l i t y  t h r o u g h  s u b j e c t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e .  I n  p r e s e n t i n g  h i s  s u b ­
j e c t i v e  p h i l o s o p h y  B e r k e l e y  f o c u s e s  a t t e n t i o n  o n  t w o  a s s u m p ­
t i o n s  .
T h e  f i r s t  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  B e r k e l e y  i s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e ,  o r  
t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  s u b s t a n c e  u n d e r  t h e  
f o r m  o f  s p i r i t .  T h e  s e c o n d  i d e a  p r e s e n t e d  b y  B e r k e l e y  i s  t o  
r e g a r d  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o r d e r  o f  n a t u r e  u n d e r  t h e  f o r m  o f  t h e  m i n d  
o f  G o d .  I n  d i s c u s s i n g  B e r k e l e y ’ s  a p p r o a c h  t o  p h i l o s o p h y ,  P e r r y  
s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t w o  m o t i v e s  a t  w o r k  i n  B e r k e l e y . ^ 8  T h e  
f i r s t  m o t i v e  i s  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  m o t i v e ,  w h i c h  r e s t r i c t s  
r e a l i t y  t o  p e r c e p t i o n s  a n d  t h o u g h t s .  T h e  s e c o n d  m o t i v e  i s  t h e  
m e t a p h y s i c a l - r e l i g i o u s  m o t i v e ,  w h i c h  l e a d s  B e r k e l e y  t o  u l t i ­
m a t e l y  d e f i n e  r e a l i t y  i n  t e r m s  o f  p e r c e i v i n g  a n d  t h i n k i n g  
s p i r i t s .  R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e s e  t w o  m o t i v e s  P e r r y  w r i t e s  :
. . . f r o m  t h e  t i m e  o f  B e r k e l e y  t h e s e  t w o  p r i n c i p l e s ,  
p h e n o m e n a l i s m  a n d  s p i r i t u a l i s m  h a v e  r e m a i n e d  a s  d i s t i n c t  
a n d  a l t e r n a t i n g  p h a s e s  o f  s u b j e c t i v i s m .  T h e  f o r m e r  i s  
i t s  c r i t i c a l  a n d  d i a l e c t i c a l  c o n c e p t i o n ,  t h e  l a t t e r  i t s  
c o n s t r u c t i v e  a n d  p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e p t i o n .  2 9
2 8 R a l p h  B a r t o n  P e r r y .  T h e  A p p r o a c h  t o  P h i l o s o p h y  
( R e w  Y o r k :  C h a r l e s  S c r i b n e r  s  S o n s ,  1 9 0 5 ) ,  p .  2 7 1 .
2 9 l b i d . . p .  272.
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S i n c e  p h e n o m e n a l i s m  a n d  s p i r i t u a l i s m  h a v e  b o t h  f o u n d  c l a s s i c  
e x p r e s s i o n  i n  B e r k e l e y ' s  w r i t i n g s ,  a  b r i e f  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
t h e s e  p h a s e s  o f  h i s  t h i n k i n g  s e e m s  d e s i r a b l e .
B e r k e l e y ' s  p h e n o m e n a l i s m  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  
h u m a n  k n o w l e d g e  a r e  e i t h e r  i d e a s  a c t u a l l y  i m p r i n t e d  o n  t h e  
s e n s e s  o r  a r e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  m e n t a l  a c t i v i t y  o r  m e n t a l  p e r ­
c e p t i o n s . ^ 0  I n  a  c l a s s i c  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  p h e n o m e n a l i s m  B e r k e l e y  
s t a t e s :
T h u s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  a  c e r t a i n  c o l o u r ,  t a s t e ,  s m e l l ,  
f i g u r e  a n d  c o n s i s t e n c y  h a v i n g  b e e n  o b s e r v e d  t o  g o  t o ­
g e t h e r ,  a r e  a c c o u n t e d  o n e  d i s t i n c t  t h i n g ,  s i g n i f i e d  b y  
t h e  n a m e  a p p l e ;  o t h e r  c o l l e c t i o n s  o f  i d e a s  c o n s t i t u t e  a  
s t o n e ,  a  t r e e ,  a  b o o k ,  a n d  t h e  l i k e  s e n s i b l e  t h i n g s :  
w h i c h  a s  t h e y  a r e  p l e a s i n g  o r  d i s a g r e e a b l e  e x c i t e  t h e  
p a s s i o n s  o f  l o v e ,  h a t r e d ,  j o y ,  g r i e f ,  a n d  s o  forth.31
T h i s  r a d i c a l  d o c t r i n e  o f  e p i s t e m o l o g y  m e a n t  t h e  d e n i a l  
b y  B e r k e l e y  o f  a l l  f i n i t e  o b j e c t s  o u t s i d e  t h e  m i n d .  B e r k e l e y  
a p p e a r e d  t o  b e  d e s i r o u s ,  b y  h i s  s u b j e c t i v i s m ,  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
a  c o m m o n - s e n s e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  T h i s  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  
e x p e r i e n c e ,  o r  o f  c o m m o n - s e n s e ,  B e r k e l e y  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  i n n o ­
v a t i o n  i n  p h i l o s o p h y ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  S o p h i s t s  h a d  p r e s e n t e d  a n  
a p p r o a c h  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  s a m e  p r i n c i p l e .  I n  t h e  d i a l o g u e  b e t w e e n  
H y l a s ,  t h e  a d v o c a t e  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  p h i l o s o p h y ,  a n d  P h i l o n o u s ,  
w h o  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  n e w  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  
c o m m o n - s e n s e ,  B e r k e l e y  w r i t e s  i n  d i a l o g u e  f o r m ;
H y l a s s .  Y o u  w e r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  l a s t  n i g h t ' s  c o n v e r s a ­
t i o n ,  a s  o n e  w h o  m a i n t a i n e d  t h e  m o s t  e x t r a v a g a n t  o p i n i o n
3 0 E d w i n  A .  B u r t t  ( e d . ) .  T h e  E n g l i s h  P h i l o s o p h e r s  F r o m  
B a c o n  t o  M i l l  ( H e w  Y o r k :  R a n d o m  H o u s e ,  1 9 3 9 ) ,  P -  5 2 3 .
^ ^ M a r y  C a l k i n s  ( e d . ) ,  B e r k e l e y .  E s s a y s .  P r i n c i p l e s . 
a n d  D i a l o g u e s  ( H e w  Y o r k :  C h a r l e s  S c r i b n e r ' s  S o n s ,  1 9 2 9 ) »  p . 1 2 4 .
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that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that 
there is no such thing as material substance in the 
world. Philonous. That there is no such thing as what 
Philosophers call material substance, I am seriously
persuaded.32
By these words Berkeley indicates that he accepts the extreme 
empirical contention that knowledge applies only to its own 
psychological moment, that its object in no way extends beyond 
that individual situation which we call the state of knowing.55 
However, Berkeley does not conclude his philosophy with a study 
of epistemology. From a phenomenological concept of knowledge, 
Berkeley progresses to his primary purpose, which was to a 
metaphysics of spiritualism.
Berkeley actually uses the problem of knowledge to 
establish a metaphysics. In his epistemology Berkeley argged 
that the essence of things consists of perceptions. In making 
his transition to metaphysics Berkeley introduces a more fun­
damental principle. This new principle is that the essence of 
so-called material objects is not in perceptions, but in per- 
ceivers. The world consists not in perceptions, but in per- 
ceivers. Perceivers are intellectual, or spiritual, in essence. 
Hence the nature of reality is spiritual, not material.
Berkeley states his sweeping proposition in this statement:
. . . all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, 
in a word, all these bodies which compose the mighty 
frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a
mind.54
52(jeorge Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and 
Philonous (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Ô'o., Ï9271 » p. 9.
55perry, The Approach to Philosophy, p. 277.
^^Berkeley, on. cit.. p. 249.
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A t  t h i s  j u n c t u r e  B e r k e l e y  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  l e a n i n g  t o w a r d  
t h e  r e l a t i v i s t i c  s u b j e c t i v i s m  o f  t h e  S o p h i s t s .  B u t ,  l i k e  
S o c r a t e s ,  B e r k e l e y  a v o i d s  t h e  S o p h i s t i c  r e l a t i v i s m  b y  a p p e a l ­
i n g  t o  a  u n i v e r s a l .  B e r k e l e y ' s  r e a s o n i n g  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  n o  
o b j e c t  c a n  e x i s t  e x c e p t  a s  i t  i s  p e r c e i v e d .  H o w e v e r ,  f i n i t e  
m i n d  i s  u n a b l e  t o  p e r c e i v e  a l l  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  m a n  a n d  a l l  
t h e  p h e n o m e n a  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s e .  H e r e  B e r k e l e y  p r e s e n t s  h i s  
c o n c e p t  o f  a  u n i v e r s a l  m i n d ,  w h i c h  d o e s  p e r c e i v e  a l l  t h e  o b ­
j e c t s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  H e  w r i t e s :
W h e n  I  c o n c l u d e ,  n o t  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  n o  r e a l  e x i s t e n c e ,  
b u t  t h a t ,  s e e i n g  t h e y  d e p e n d  n o t  o n  m y  t h o u g h t ,  a n d  
h a v e  a n  e x i s t e n c e  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  b e i n g  p e r c e i v e d  b y  m e ,  
t h e r e  m u s t  b e  s o m e  o t h e r  m i n d  w h e r e i n  t h e y  e x i s t .  A s  
s u r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a s  t h e  s e n s i b l e  w o r l d  r e a l l y  e x i s t s ,  
s o  s u r e  i s  t h e r e  a n  i n f i n i t e  o m n i p r e s e n t  S p i r i t  w h o  
c o n t a i n s  a n d  s u p p o r t s  i t . 3 5
B e r k e l e y  h a s  f i n a l l y  a r r i v e d  a t  h i s  m e t a p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t i v e ,  
t h a t  o f  p r o v i n g  b y  r a t i o n a l  m e a n s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  G o d .  H o w ­
e v e r ,  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  n a t u r e  o f  k n o w l e d g e  p e r ­
s i s t e d  i n  p h i l o s o p h y .  T h i s  p r o b l e m ,  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  t h e  r i s e  
o f  e m p i r i c a l  t h i n k i n g ,  m a d e  B e r k e l e y ' s  s y s t e m  o f  t h o u g h t  u n ­
t e n a b l e  t o  m o s t  t h i n l c e r s  o f  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  I n  t h e  
n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  i d e a l i s m  w a s  m o s t  c o m m o n l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
H e g e l .
H e g e l  i s  r e g a r d e d  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  g r e a t  s y s t e m  b u i l d e r s  
o f  p h i l o s o p h y .  H i s  s y s t e m  o f  i d e a l i s m  d o e s  n o t  s t r e s s  t h e  
u l t i m a t e  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  i d e a s  a s  f o u n d  i n  P l a t o ,  n o r  d o e s  i t  
m a k e  r e a l i t y  s u b j e c t i v e ,  a s  i n  B e r k e l e y .  R a t h e r  H e g e l  t e n d s
^ ^ B e r k e l e y ,  o n .  c i t . .  p .  2 7 6 .
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t o  i m p e r s o n a l i z e  r e a l i t y  w h i l e  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  i t  i n t o  t h e  
n a t u r a l  p r o c e s s .  F o r  H e g e l  n a t u r e  a n d  m i n d ,  o r  r e a s o n ,  a r e  
o n e  n a t u r a l  p r o c e s s .  F o r  H e g e l  n a t u r e  a n d  m i n d ,  o r  r e a s o n ,  
a r e  o n e ,  a n d  f u r t h e r ,  b e i n g  a n d  r e a s o n  a r e  i d e n t i c a l .  T h e  
s a m e  p r o c e s s  t h a t  i s  a t  w o r k  i n  r e a s o n  i s  p r e s e n t  e v e r y w h e r e ,  
w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  w h a t e v e r  i s  r e a l  i s  r a t i o n a l ,  a n d  w h a t ­
e v e r  i s  r a t i o n a l  i s  r e a l . 3 6  T h i s  p o s i t i o n  o f  H e g e l  s e e m s  t o  
i m p l y  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  l o g i c  i n  n a t u r e  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  h i s t o r y  
a n d  t h a t  t h e  u n i v e r s e  i s  b a s i c a l l y  a  l o g i c a l  s y s t e m .  R e a s o n ,  
t o  H e g e l ,  i n c l u d e s  s u b s t a n c e ,  p o w e r ,  a n d  f o r m ,  f o r  h e  s a y s :
R e a s o n  i s  S u b s t a n c e  a s  w e l l  a s  I n f i n i t e  P o w e r ;  i t s  o w n  
I n f i n i t e  M a t e r i a l  u n d e r l y i n g  a l l  t h e  n a t u r a l  a n d  s p i r ­
i t u a l  l i f e  w h i c h  i t  o r i g i n a t e s ,  a s  a l s o  t h e  I n f i n i t e  
F o r m - - % h a t  w h i c h  s e t s  t h i s  M a t e r i a l  i n  m o t i o n .  . . .
R e a s o n  i s  n o t  s o  p o w e r l e s s  a s  t o  b e  i n c a p a b l e  o f  p r o ­
d u c i n g  a n y t h i n g  b u t  a  m e r e  i d e a l ,  a  m e r e  i n t e n t i o n —  
h a v i n g  i t s  p l a c e  o u t s i d e  r e a l i t y ,  n o b o d y  k n o w s  w h e r e ;  
s o m e t h i n g  s e p a r a t e  a n d  a b s t r a c t ,  i n  t h e  h e a d s  o f  h u m a n  
b e i n g s .  I t  i s  t h e  i n f i n i t e  c o m p l e x  o f  t h i n g s ,  t h e i r  
e n t i r e  E s s e n c e  a n d  Truth. 3 7
I n  H e g e l ' s  t h i n k i n g  R e a s o n  s u p p l i e d  i t s  o w n  n o u r i s h m e n t  a n d
w a s  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  i t s  o w n  o p e r a t i o n s .  H o t  o n l y  w a s  R e a s o n ,
t o  H e g e l ,  i t s  o w n  b a s i s  f o r  e x i s t e n c e ,  a n d  a b s o l u t e  f i n a l  a i m ,
b u t  i t  w a s  a l s o  t h e  e n e r g i z i n g  p o w e r  r e a l i z i n g  t h i s  a i m ,
d e v e l o p i n g  i t  n o t  o n l y  i n  t h e  p h e n o m e n a  o f  t h e  N a t u r a l ,  b u t
a l s o  o f  t h e  S p i r i t u a l  U n i v e r s e — t h e  H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  W o r l d . ^ 8
T h i s  r a t i o n a l i s m  o f  H e g e l  m a k e s  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  r e a l i t y
36ihilly, OP. cit., p. 4 6 3 .
w .  F .  H e g e l ,  P h i l o s o p h y  o f  H i s t o r y  ( N e w  Y o r k :
P .  P .  C o l l i e r  a n d  C o . ,  1 9 0 1 ) ,  p p .  5 2 - 5 3 .
38ibid.
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a n  o r g a n i c  w h o l e  a n d  a n  o r g a n i c  p r o c e s s ,  a  p r o c e s s  o f  e v o l u ­
t i o n .  A s  T h i l l y  i n t e r p r e t s  H e g e l ,  e v e r y  s t a g e  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  
c o n t a i n s  a l l  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  s t a g e s  a n d  f o r e s h a d o w s  a l l  t h e  
f u t u r e  o n e s ,  f o r  t h e  w o r l d  a t  e v e r y  s t a g e  i s  b o t h  a  p r o d u c t  
a n d  a  p r o p h e c y ,  w i t h  a l l  t h e  l o w e r  f o r m s  b o t h  n e g a t e d  a n d  i n ­
c l u d e d  i n  t h e  h i g h e r  processes. 3 9  i t  i s  t h e  b u s i n e s s  o f  p h i ­
l o s o p h y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  H e g e l ,  t o  s t u d y  a n d  t o  k n o w  t h e  R e a s o n  
w h i c h  i s  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  r e a l i t y .  S i n c e  r e a l i t y  i s  a t  b o t t o m  
r a t i o n a l ,  a  n e c e s s a r y  p r o c e s s  o f  t h o u g h t s  o r  n o t i o n s ,  i t  c a n  
b e  k n o w n  o n l y  b y  t h o u g h t .  T h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  t o  
u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  l a w s  o r  n e c e s s a r y  f o r m s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  w h i c h  r e a ­
s o n  o p e r a t e s .  L o g i c  a n d  m e t a p h y s i c s ,  t o  H e g e l ,  w o u l d  b e  o n e  
a n d  t h e  s a m e . ^
A s  s t a t e d ,  t o  K e g e l  t h e  w o r l d  i s  n o t  s t a t i c  b u t  i s  a n  
o n - g o i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h o u g h t ,  r e a s o n ,  t h e  I d e a  i s  s o m e t h i n g  
w h i c h  a d v a n c e s  b y  a  p r o c e s s  o f  e v o l u t i o n .  T h i s  p r o c e s s  o f  e v o ­
l u t i o n  i s  a c h i e v e d  b y  a  d i a l e c t i c  i n  w h i c h  t h e  I d e a  a d v a n c e s  
t o  a n  i n f i n i t e  a n t i t h e s i s , a n d  i s  d e s c r i b e d  b y  H e g e l  a s  
f o l l o w s  :
T h e  u n i v e r s a l  I d e a  e x i s t s  t h u s  a s  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  t o t a l i t y  
o f  t h i n g s  o n  t h e  o n e  s i d e ,  a n d  a s  t h e  a b s t r a c t  e s s e n c e  o f  
f r e e  v o l i t i o n  o n  t h e  o t h e r .  T h i s  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  m i n d  
o n  i t s e l f  i s  i n d i v i d u a l  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s — t h e  p o l a r  
o p p o s i t e  o f  t h e  I d e a  i n  i t s  g e n e r a l  f o r m ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  
e x i s t i n g  i n  a b s o l u t e  L i m i t a t i o n .  T h i s  p o l a r  o p p o s i t e  i s  
c o n s e q u e n t l y  l i m i t a t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n ,  f o r  t h e  u n i ­
v e r s a l  a b s o l u t e  b e i n g . 4 2
3 9 i h i l l y ,  OP. c i t . .  p .  4 6 5 .  ^ ^ I b i d .
4 l H e g e l ,  o p .  c i t . , p .  7 2 .  4 2 j b i d .
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The Idea of polarity as developed by Hegel implies that 
contradiction, or opposition, is the root of all life and 
movement, that the principle of contradiction rules the 
world, that everything tends to change, to pass over into its 
opposite. Conversely, without contradiction there would be 
no life, no movement, no growth, and no development. Con­
cerning the principle of contradiction as the governing aspect 
of reality Hegel writes:
In actual existence Progress appears as an advancement 
from the imperfect to the more perfect. . . thus the im­
perfect, as involving its opposite is a contradiction, 
which certainly exists, but which is continually annulled 
and solved; the instinctive movement— the inherent im­
pulse in the life of the s o u l .43
Hegel calls God Idea, meaning the potential universe, the
timeless totality of all the possibilities of evolution.
Hegel's organic idealism was widely accepted in the nineteenth
century and was introduced into American education by William
T. Harris. Most great systems of thought ténd to undergo
modification, or rejection, by succeeding generations. In the
instance of the idealism of Hegel, the modification was the
result of a shift to another form of idealism which was latent,
but never developed, in Hegel's system. This new type of
idealism is called Personalism.
The type of idealism represented by Personalism sug­
gests that reality is a universal society of rational and free 
i n d i v i d u a l s . The fundamental thesis of Personalism can be
43ibid.. p. 108. ■^^Thilly, o p . cit.. p. 470.
^^Muelder, o p . cit.. p. 214.
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b r i e f l y  s t a t e d .  W e r k m e l s t e r  s t a t e s  t h a t  P e r s o n a l i s m  i s  a n  
i d e a l i s m  w h i c h  t a k e s  a s  i t s  p r i m a r y  u n i t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  h i s  
h i g h e s t  e x p r e s s i o n  a s  a n  e t h i c a l  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  p e r s o n a l i t y . 4 6  
A s  a  m e t a p h y s i c a l  t h e o r y  i t  i s  t h e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  r e a l i t y  a s  a  
w o r l d  o f  p e r s o n s  w i t h  a  s u p r e m e  p e r s o n  a t  t h e  h e a d .  P e r s o n ­
a l i t y  i s  i n  e f f e c t  t h e  p r i m a r y  i d e a ,  a n d  n a t u r e  i s  a  d e r i v a ­
t i v e  i d e a .  P e r s o n a l i s m  i s  n o t  o n l y  a  w o r l d  v i e w  h e l d  b y  
i n d i v i d u a l  t h i n k e r s ;  i t  i s  a l s o  a  m o r e  o r  l e s s  d e f i n i t e l y  
o r g a n i z e d  m o v e m e n t .  A t  a  m e e t i n g  h e l d  i n  P h i l a d e l p h i a  o n  
D e c e m b e r  2 6 ,  1 9 4 0 ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h e s e s  w e r e  a c c e p t e d  a s  d e ­
f i n i n g  a n d  o u t l i n i n g  t h e  p e r s o n a l i s t i c  d o c t r i n e :
I .  B a s i c  D e f i n i t i o n
P e r s o n a l i s m  o r  " p e r s o n i s m "  i s  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h e o r y  
t h a t  a  p e r s o n  i s  ( o r  m a n y  p e r s o n s  a r e )  t h e  s u p r e m e  
r e a l i t y ;  i . e . ,  h i g h e s t  i n  v a l u e  a n d  d o m i n a n t  i n  p o w e r .
I I .  P r e m i s e s  U n d e r l y i n g  P e r s o n a l i s m
1 .  T h e r e  i s  e x p e r i e n c e .  T h i s  i s  t h e  o n e  p r i m o r d i a l  a n d  
i n d u b i t a b l e  f a c t .
2 .  E x p e r i e n c e  h a s  a  d i s c o v e r a b l e  m e a n i n g .
I I I .  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P e r s o n a l i s m
1 .  T h e  p e r s o n i s t i c  p r i n c i p l e :  E v e r y  e x p e r i e n c e  b e l o n g s
t o  s o m e  s e l f .
2 .  T h e  e m p i r i c a l  p r i n c i p l e :  A l l  k n w o l e d g e  i s  a n  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  b y  a  s e l f .
3 .  T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  i d e a s  i n  k n o w l e d g e :  W h a t  i s  p r e s e n t
i n  k n o w l e d g e  i s  a l w a y s  c o n s c i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  r e f e r r i n g  
b e y o n d  i t s e l f ;  n o  n o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t  i s  e v e r  p r e s e n t . 4 ?
A m o n g  t h e  P e r s o n a l i s t i c  t h i n k e r s  B o r d e n  P .  B o w n e  a n d  E d g a r  S .
4 6 # .  H .  W e r k m e i s t e r ,  A  H i s t o r y  o f  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  I d e a s  
i n  A m e r i c a  ( N e w  Y o r k :  T h e  R o n a l d  P r e s s  C o . ,  1 9 4 9 ) ,  p .  3 1 8 .
47lbid.. p. 326.
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B r i g h t m a n  a r e  p e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  B o v m e  e x ­
p r e s s e s  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  G o d  i s  i n f i n i t e  a n d  a l l  o t h e r  p e r s o n s  
a r e  f i n i t e .  B r i g h t m a n  s t a t e s  t h a t  a l l  p e r s o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
G o d ,  a r e  f i n i t e .  F i r s t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  B o w n e  i s  p r e s e n t e d ,  
t h e n  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  B r i g h t m a n .
B o w n e  s t r u c t u r e s  h i s  p e r s o n a l i s m  o n  t w o  i d e a s ,  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  c a u s a l i t y .  B o w n e  s t a t e s  
t h a t  a l l  k n o w l e d g e  i s  b a s e d  o n  s o m e  f o r m  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  b e ­
t w e e n  a  p e r s o n  a n d  a  p e r s o n ,  o r  b e t w e e n  a  p e r s o n  a n d  a  n o n ­
p e r s o n a l  o b j e c t . H e  e x p l a i n s  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e s e  w o r d s :
I n  a l l  i n t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h i n g s  t h e  r e a c t i o n  i s  b u t  
a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  a g e n t ' s  o w n  n a t u r e ,  f o r  t h e  m a n i ­
f e s t a t i o n  o f  w h i c h  o t h e r  t h i n g s  b u t  f u r n i s h  t h e  o c c a ­
s i o n .  H e n c e  t h e  m e n t a l  r e a c t i o n  w h i c h  w e  c a l l  k n o w l e d g e  
c a n  b e  l o o k e d  u p o n  o n l y  a s  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  o u r  m e n t a l  
n a t u r e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  p r i n c i p l e s  i m m a n e n t  i n  i t s e l f . ^ 9
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  l e a d  o f  K a n t ,  B o w n e  s t a t e s  t h a t  k n o w l e d g e  i s  n o t  
s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  c a n  b e  i m p o r t e d  r e a d y - m a d e  i n t o  a  p a s s i v e  
m i n d ,  b u t  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  t h e  m i n d  m u s t  a c t i v e l y  c o n s t r u c t  
f o r  i t s e l f .  H e  w r i t e s :  " T h o u g h t s  a r e  n o t  t h i n g s  t o  b e  e x ­
c h a n g e d  o r  h a n d e d  a l o n g .  T h e y  e x i s t  o n l y  t h r o u g h  t h i n k i n g ,  
a n d  t o  p e r c e i v e  a n o t h e r ' s  t h o u g h t  i s  t o  t h i n k  f o r  o u r s e l v e s . " 5 0  
B u t  t h i n k i n g ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  B o w n e ,  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  a p a r t  f r o m  
p e r s o n a l i t y .  R e g a r d i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  e x p e r i e n c e  
i n  t h e  s e n s e  w o r l d ,  t h e  a c t  o f  t h i n k i n g ,  a n d  p e r s o n a l i s m  B o w n e  
w r i t e s :
^ ^ o r d e n  P a r k e r  B o i f n e ,  P e r s o n a l i s m  ( H e w  Y o r k :
H o u g h t o n  M i f f l i n  C o . ,  1 9 0 8 ) ,  p .  '62,
49lbid.. p. 63. SOibid.. p. 65.
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T h e  w o r l d  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  e x i s t s  f o r  u s  o n l y  t h r o u g h  a  
r a t i o n a l  s p i r i t u a l  p r i n c i p l e  b y  w h i c h  w e  r e p r o d u c e  i t  
f o r  o u r  t h o u g h t ,  a n d  i t  h a s  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  a p a r t  f r o m  
u s  o n l y  t h r o u g h  a  r a t i o n a l  s p i r i t u a l  p r i n c i p l e  o n  w h i c h  
i t  d e p e n d s ,  a n d  t h e  r a t i o n a l  n a t u r e  o f  w h i c h  i t  e x ­
p r e s s e s .  5 1
A  s e c o n d  f o u n d a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  B o w n e ' s  p e r s o n ­
a l i s m  i s  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  c a u s a l i t y  i n  t h e  p h y s i c a l  w o r l d .  I n  
B o w n e ' s  t h i n l c i n g  t h e  w o r l d  m a y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  f r o m  t h e  s t a n d ­
p o i n t  o f  c o n t e n t s  a n d  m e a n i n g .  H o w e v e r ,  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  
c o n t e n t s  a n d  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  w o r l d  t h e r e  i s  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
o f  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  i d e a  o f  c a u s a l i t y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  B o w n e .  I n  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  c a u s a l i t y  B o w n e  p r o c e e d s  w i t h  t h e  
s a m e  m e t h o d  o f  r e a s o n i n g  t h a t  h e  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
k n o w l e d g e .  T o  B o w n e  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  t w o  w a y s  o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
t h e  e v e n t s  o f  n a t u r e ,  t h e  m e c h a n i c a l  a n d  t h e  v o l i t i o n a l .
T h e  m e c h a n i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  n a t u r e ,  s a y s  B o u r n e ,  
m a k e s  a l l  e v e n t s  i n  n a t u r e  g r o u n d l e s s  a n d  a l l  e x p e r i e n c e  
c h a o t i c .52 ixL a d d i t i o n ,  a l l  p e r c e p t i o n s  c o u l d  n e v e r  b e  r e ­
l a t e d  t o  a  r e a l  w o r l d  a n d  w o u l d  b e  o n l y  g r o u n d l e s s  p h e n o m e n a  
i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  N e b u l i s m  i s  t h e  r e s u l t . 5 3  
H e  c o n c l u d e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  o f  c a u s a t i o n  c a n n o t  b e  
e l i m i n a t e d  f r o m  p h i l o s o p h y .  A n d  s i n c e  c a u s a l i t y  c a n n o t  b e  
e l i m i n a t e d ,  i t  m u s t  b e  r a t i o n a l l y  e x p l a i n e d ,  f o r  a p a r t  f r o m  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  f i n a l  c a u s a l i t y  i s  p r e p o s t e r o u s . 5 4
B o w n e  t h e n  r e s t s  h i s  c a s e  f o r  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  p e r ­
s o n a l i t y  b y  m a k i n g  a c t i v e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  t h e  b a s i c  f a c t  o f  b o t h
S l f b i d . . p .  1 1 0 .  5 2 i b i d . . p .  1 6 4 .
55lbid.. p. 165. 54%bia,. p. 181.
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k n o v r l e d g e  a n d  c a u s a l i t y  a n d  a r r i v e s  a t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n c l u ­
s i o n :
W h e n  w e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  w o r l d  a s  a n  o b j e c t  o f  k n o w l e d g e ,  
w e  c o m e  t o  p e r s o n a l i s m  a s  t h e  o n l y  t e n a b l e  v i e w .  W h e n  
w e  c o n s i d e r  i t  f r o m  t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  c a u s a l i t y ,  w e  
c o m e  e q u a l l y  t o  p e r s o n a l i s m  a s  t h e  o n l y  t e n a b l e  view. 5 5
A m e r i c a n  p h i l o s o p h e r s  h a v e  b e e n  d i v i d e d  o n  B o i m e ' s  s i g n i f i ­
c a n c e .  H e  h a s  b e e n  a c c u s e d  o f  s u b s t i t u t i n g  f a i t h  f o r  r e a s o n ,  
t h e o l o g y  f o r  p h i l o s o p h y .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  h e  h a s  b e e n  c i t e d  
a s  o n e  o f  t h e  k e e n e s t  o f  A m e r i c a n  metaphysicians. 5 ^
A n o t h e r  o u t s t a n d i n g  p e r s o n a l i s t  i s  E d g a r  S .  B r i g h t m a n .  
T o  B r i g h t m a n  a n y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a l  w o r l d  m u s t  i n c l u d e  
a n d  e x p l a i n  b o t h  p a r t i c u l a r s  a n d  u n i v e r s e l s . 5 7  N a t u r a l i s m  
a t t e m p t s  t o  e x p l a i n  r e a l i t y  i n  t e r m s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  a c c o r d ­
i n g  t o  B r i g h t m a n ,  b y  r e d u c i n g  p a r t i c u l a r s  t o  s o l i d  o b j e c t s  
e x i s t i n g  i n  s p a c e  o r  b y  r e d u c i n g  r e a l i t y  t o  s t a t e s  o f  c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s ,  o r  s e n s a t i o n s . 5 8  I d e a l i s m ,  s a y s  B r i g h t m a n ,  e r r s  
i n  r e g a r d i n g  r e a l i t y  a p a r t  f r o m  a l l  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  a n d  i n  s o m e  
i n s t a n c e s ,  a p a r t  f r o m  m i n d . 5 9  B r i g h t m a n  r e j e c t s  b o t h  m a t e r i a l ­
i s m  a n d  i d e a l i s m  i n  t h e s e  w o r d s :
A t o m i s m  m a k e s  r e a l i t y  g r a n u l a r ,  c r u m m y ,  d i s j o i n t e d ,  w i t h  
n o  r e a l  c o n n e c t i o n s  a n d  l a w s ;  P l a t o n i c  r e a l i s m  m a k e s  
r e a l i t y  o r g a n i c ,  c o n n e c t e d  a n d  r a t i o n a l ,  b u t  u n f o r t u ­
n a t e l y  p r o v i d e s  n o  p l a c e  f o r  a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t s  o r  
e v e n t s .  P e r s o n a l i s m  f i n d s  r o o m  b o t h  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  
f a c t s  o r  e v e n t s .  P e r s o n a l i s m  f i n d s  r o o m  b o t h  f o r  p a r ­
t i c u l a r  f a c t s  a n d  f o r  u n i v e r s e l s  ; f o r  i t  i s  t h e  n a t u r e  
o f  m i n d  t o  b e  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  t h a t  u n i v e r s a l i z e s . S O
5 5 I b i d . , p .  2 1 6 .  o n . c i t . . p .  2 1 4 .
5 7 E d g a r  S .  B r i g h t m a n ,  A n  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  P h i l o s o p h y  
( N e w  Y o r k :  H e n r y  H o l t  a n d  C o . ,  1 9 2 5 ) ,  p .  1 3 7 .
5 8 i b i d .  5 9 l b i d . . p .  1 3 8 .  G O l b i d .
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T h e  u n d e r l y i n g  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h e  a p p r o a c h  o f  B r i g h t ­
m a n  i s  t h a t  r e a l i t y  i s  a c t u a l l y  p e r s o n ,  f o r  h e  s t a t e s :  " T h e
p e r s o n a l i s t i c  t h e o r y  o f  s u b s t a n c e  m a y  b e  s u m m a r i z e d  i n  t h e  
w c r d s  ' s u b s t a n c e  i s  p e r s o n . ' " ^ 1  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  
e v e r y  c o m m o n l y  " s o - c a l l e d "  s u b s t a n c e  i s  a  p e r s o n .  B u t  s u b ­
s t a n c e  i s  p e r s o n  i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  e f f i c i e n t  f i n a l  c a u s e ,  o r  
t h a t  a l l  t h a t  i s  e x i s t s  i n  a  c o m p l e x  u n i t y  o f  a c t i v e  c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s .  W i t h  p e r s o n  a s  s u b s t a n c e  a n d  s u b s t a n c e  a s  p e r ­
s o n ,  i n  a  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  d e g r e e  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  p e r s o n ­
a l i s m  i s  a b l e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  B r i g h t m a n ,  t o  c o m b i n e  a l l  p h a s e s  
o f  e x p e r i e n c e  u l t h  p u r p o s e f u l  e f f i c i e n t  c a u s a t i o n  i n  a n  a l l  
i n c l u s i v e  a n d  i n t e l l i g e n t  s y s t e m . ^ 2
P o u r  t y p e s  o f  i d e a l i s m  h a v e  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  
c h a p t e r .  T h e s e  c l a s s e s  o f  i d e a l i s m  a r e  O b j e c t i v e  I d e a l i s m ,  
S u b j e c t i v e  I d e a l i s m ,  O r g a n i c  I d e a l i s m ,  a n d  P e r s o n a l i s m .  T h e  
c o m m o n  f e a t u r e  o f  a l l  f o u r  t y p e s  i s  t h a t  r e a l i t y  c a n  b e  d e ­
f i n e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  m i n d  o r  s p i r i t .  H a v i n g  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  v a r i o u s  
t y p e s  o f  i d e a l i s m ,  t h e  s t u d y  a t t e m p t s  t o  d i s c u s s  s o m e  c o n c e p t s  
o f  i d e a l i s m  w h i c h  a p p e a r  t o  b e  r e l e v a n t  t o  e d u c a t i o n a l  p h i ­
l o s o p h y .
C o n c e p t s  o f  I d e a l i s m  
F o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  i t  s e e m s  a d v i s a b l e  t o  
d i s c u s s  t h r e e  a r e a s  o f  i d e a l i s t i c  p h i l o s o p h y ,  n a m e l y  i d e a l i s t i c
^ ^ E d g a r  S .  B r i g h t m a n ,  P e r s o n  a n d  R e a l i t y  ( H e w  Y o r k :
T h e  R o n a l d  P r e s s  C o . ,  1 9 5 8 ) ,  p .  1 9 9 .
62Ibid., p. 208.
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e p i s t e m o l o g y , i d e a l i s t i c  a x i o l o g y ,  a n d  t h e  i d e a l i s t i c  c o n c e p t  
o f  s e l f - h o o d .  I d e a l i s t i c  m e t a p h y s i c s  i s  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  t r e a t e d  a t  l e n g t h  i n  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  p a g e s .  T h e  f i r s t  c o n c e p t  o f  i d e a l i s m  t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d  
i s  i d e a l i s t i c  e p i s t e m o l o g y .
T h e  o n e  c o m m o n  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  s c h o o l s  o f  
i d e a l i s m  i s  t h a t  r e a s o n  i s  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  a c h i e v i n g  a  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  r e a l i t y .  T h e  a v e n u e  t o  k n o w l e d g e  i s  n o t ,  a s  
P r o t a g o r a s  m a i n t a i n s ,  t h e  n a t u r a l  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  e l e m e n t  ( t h e  
p i g )  i n  m a n ,  b u t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  ( t h e  g o d )  w i t h i n  h i m ,  t h e  
r e a s o n ,  t h a t  i s  t h e  m e a s u r e  o f  a l l  t h i n g s . P l a t o  a l w a y s  
e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  a n t i t h e s i s  o f  o p i n i o n  a n d  k n o w l e d g e  a s  a g a i n s t  
t h e  f a l s e n e s s  o f  o p i n i o n .  P l a t o  b l u n t l y  s t a t e s  t h a t  a l l  o t h e r  
w i s d o m  e x c e p t  w i s d o m  o f  c o n t e m p l a t i o n ,  o r  r e a s o n ,  i s  m i s l e a d ­
i n g ,  f o r  h e  w r i t e s :  " A l l  o t h e r  k i n d s  o f  w i s d o m  o r  c u n n i n g ,
w h i c h  s e e m  o n l y ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  w i s d o m  o f  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  o r  t h e  
w i s d o m  o f  t h e  a r t s ,  a r e  c o a r s e  a n d  v u l g a r . K n o w l e d g e  d o e s  
n o t  c o m e  f r o m  t h e  s e n s e  w o r l d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  P l a t o  i n  " T h e a e -  
t e t u s , "  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  d i a l o g u e  i s  t o  e x a m i n e  a n d  r e ­
j e c t  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  s e n s e - w o r l d  c a n  f u r n i s h  k n o w l e d g e . ^ 5
T o  P l a t o  t h e r e  i s  n o  s u r e  a n d  e a s y  p a t h w a y  t o  t r u t h .  
T h e  o n l y  p a t h w a y  g o e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  a r d u o u s  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e
5 3 J o h a n n  E .  E r d m a n n ,  A  H i s t o r y  o f  P h i l o s o p h y  ( H e w  
Y o r k :  M a c m i l l a n  a n d  C o . ,  1 8 9 1 ) ,  p .  1 0 1 .
^ ^ P l a t o ,  " T h e a e t e t u s , "  o n .  c i t . . I V ,  3 3 8 .
^ ^ p r a n c i s  M .  G o r n f o r d ,  P l a t o ' s  T h e o r y  o f  K n o w l e d g e  
( L o n d o n :  R o u t l e d g e  a n d  K e g a n  P a u l ,  1 9 3 5 ) ,  p .  2 8 .
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i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e l l e c t  i n  a  S o c r a t i c  d i a l e c t i c ,  e x a m i n i n g  a n d
s i f t i n g  t h e  r e l e v a n t  e v i d e n c e .  O n l y  t h e n  i s  i t  p o s s i b l e  t o
s e e  t r u t h .  T h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e l l e c t  a l o n e  i s  t h e  t e s t  o f
t r u t h .  T h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  d i a l e c t i c a l  m e t h o d  o f  a r r i v i n g  a t
t r u t h  i s  t h e  d i a l o g u e ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  h a b i t  o f  s e e k i n g  t r u t h  b y
m e a n s  o f  q u e s t i o n  a n d  a n s w e r .  W a l t e r  P a t e r  d e s c r i b e s  t h e
P l a t o n i c  d i a l o g u e  i n  t h e s e  w o r d s :
. . .  a  d i a l o g u e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h o s e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,  o r  
" u n i v e r s a l  d e f i n i t i o n s , "  o r  n o t i o n s ,  t h o s e  i d e a s  w h i c h ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  P l a t o ,  a r e  t h e  p r o p e r  o b j e c t s  o f  a l l  r e a l  
k n o w l e d g e :  . . . J u s t i c e ,  B e a u t y ,  P e r f e c t  P o l i t y ,  a n d  
t h e  l i k e ,  i n  o u t l i n e s  o f  e t e r n a l  a n d  a b s o l u t e  c e r t a i n t y ;  
- - t h e y  w e r e  t o  b e  a p p r e h e n d e d  b y  d i a l e c t i c ,  l i t e r a l l y  
b y  a  c i r c u i t o u s  j o u r n e y ,  p r e s e n t e d  b y  P l a t o n i c  d i a l o g u e s  
i n  i t s  m o s t  a c c o m p l i s h e d  l i t e r a r y  form.oo
T h e  P l a t o n i c  d i a l o g u e  e n t i t l e d  t h e  " T h e a e t e t u s "  i s  
e n t i r e l y  d e v o t e d  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  w h a t  i s  k n o w l e d g e ?  T h e  d i a ­
l o g u e  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t w o  p a r t s .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  t h e  i d e a  
i s  d e v e l o p e d  t h a t  s e n s a t i o n ,  t h o u g h  a n  e l e m e n t  i n  k n o w l e d g e  
i s  n o t  k n o w l e d g e  i t s e l f .  I n  P a r t  I  o f  t h e  " T h e a e t e t u s "  P l a t o  
e m p h a s i z e s  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  s e n s e s  c a n n o t  p e r f o r m  a c t s  o f  
c o m p a r i s o n  a n d  j u d g m e n t . ^ ?  N e i t h e r  i s  t r u e  k n o w l e d g e  t o  b e  
c o n f u s e d  w i t h  o p i n i o n ,  o r  m e r e  j u d g m e n t .  I n  P a r t  I I I  o f  t h e  
" T h e a e t e t u s "  P l a t o  d r a w s  h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  r e g a r d i n g  k n o w l e d g e  
i n  t h e s e  w o r d s :
S o c r .  y e s ;  a n d  w h e n  w e  a r e  i n q u i r i n g  a f t e r  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
k n o w l e d g e ,  n o t h i n g  c o u l d  b e  s i l l i e r  t h a n  t o  s a y  t h a t  i t  
i s  c o r r e c t  b e l i e f  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  k n o w l e d g e  o f  d i f ­
f e r e n t n e s s  o r  o f  a n y t h i n g  w h a t e v e r .  S o  T h e a e t e t u s ,
^ % a l t e r  P a t e r ,  P l a t o  a n d  P l a t o n i s m  ( L o n d o n :  M a c ­
m i l l a n  a n d  C o . ,  1 9 1 7 ) ,  p p .  1 7 7 - 1 7 8 .
ô 7 " i h e a e t e t u s , "  P a r t  I ,  1 8 4  D .
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n e i t h e r  p e r c e p t i o n ,  n o r  t u r e  b e l i e f ,  n o r  t h e  a d d i t i o n  
o f  a n  ' a c c o u n t '  t o  t r u e  b e l i e f  c a n  b e  knowledge.68
A  n o t e d  P l a t o  s c h o l a r ,  F r a n c i s  M .  G o r n f o r d ,  s t a t e s  t h a t  f r o m  
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h e  " T h e a e t e t u s "  t h e  P l a t o n i s t  w i l l  d r a w  
t h e  n e c e s s a r y  i n f e r e n c e .  T r u e  k n o w l e d g e  h a s  f o r  i t s  o b j e c t  
t h i n g s  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r — n o t  s e n s i b l e  t h i n g s ,  b u t  i n t e l ­
l i g i b l e  f o r m s  a n d  t r u t h s  a b o u t  t h e m .  S u c h  o b j e c t s  a r e  n e c e s ­
s a r i l y  u n i q u e . T h e y  d o  n o t  b e c o m e  a n d  p e r i s h  o r  c h a n g e  i n  a n y  
r e s p e c t .  H e n c e  w e  c a n  k n o w  t h e m  a n d  e t e r n a l  t r u t h s  a b o u t  
t h e m .
I m m a n u e l  K a n t  i s  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  t h e  
c o n c e p t  o f  k n o w l e d g e  a s  h e l d  b y  i d e a l i s t s .  I m m a n u e l  K a n t ,  a s  
d e s c r i b e d  b y  H o e r n l e ,  w a s  a  c r i t i c a l  i d e a l i s t  w h o  v i r t u a l l y  
i g n o r e d  m e t a p h y s i c s  a n d  a t t e m p t e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  p h i l o s o p h y  a s  
a  s y s t e m  o f  k n o w l e d g e . i n  K a n t ' s  a n a l y s i s  o f  k n o w l e d g e  h e  
d e s c r i b e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  k n o w i n g :
( 1 )  p u r e  s e n s a t i o n  w a s  a  c h a o t i c  p r o c e s s  i n  w h i c h  a l l  k i n d s  
o f  s e n s o r y  s t i m u l a t i o n s  a r e  p a s s i v e l y  r e c e i v e d  b y  m i n d ;  ( 2 )  
t h e  c h a o s  o f  s e n s a t i o n  i s  r e s o l v e d  i n t o  o r d e r l i n e s s  b y  t h e  t w o  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  p e r c e p t i o n ,  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e ,  w h i c h  g r o u p  s e n s o r y  
q u a l i t i e s  i n t o  o b j e c t s  a n d  e v e n t s ;  ( 3 )  f u r t h e r  u n i t y  o f  a  
c o n c e p t u a l  a n d  i d e a t i o n a l  s o r t  i s  a c h i e v e d  b y  s u c h  r a t i o n a l  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  t h e  m i n d  a s  t h e  n e e d  f o r  l i n k i n g  c a u s e s  a n d
G 8 " T h e a e t e t u s , "  P a r t  I I I ,  2 1 0  B .
8 9 c o r n f o r d ,  o n .  c i t . . p p .  1 6 2 - 1 6 3 .
p .  A l f r e d  H o e r n l e ,  I d e a l i s m  a s  a  P h i l o s o p h y  
( H e w  Y o r k :  G e o r g e  H .  D o r a n  C o . , 1 9 2 7 ) ,  p. 1 7 3 .
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effects, et cetera.71 An act of knowledge is thus an act of 
judgment. An act of judgment is an act of synthesis. An act 
of synthesis implies a principle of synthesis. Hoernle sum­
marizes Hant's approach as follows:
. . . nature is not a mere stream of sense-data, but a 
world, a system, a whole ordered according to laws, it 
is not in virtue of mere seeing or hearing or touching 
that we thus know nature, but in virtue of acts of 
judgment affirming the universal relations in which 
sense-data stand to each o t h e r .72
While Kant's approach appeared to solve the problem 
of a common-sense knowledge of nature, its great weakness to
idealists was its inability to find a self or mind behind the
phenomenal world. The critical idealism of Kant has been 
described as a half-way house in which it is always possible 
to retire, but in which it is impossible to stop or to hide.73 
Its ultimate significance was that it formulated explicitly 
the ideal of synthetic philosophy which found its logical 
fulfillment in %egel's absolute.Idealism.
Hegel seems to have in mind Kant's idea of knowledge
as an act of judgment when he says:
The easiest thing of all is to pass judgments on what 
has a solid substantial content; it is more difficult
to do both together and produce the systematic expo­
sition of it.'4
71fiutler, on. cit.. p. 183.
72Hoernle, o p . cit.. p. 184.
73lbid.. p. 307.
7^J. Loewenberg, Hegel Selections (Hew York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929)» p. 5.
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H e g e l ' s  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  - w o r l d  i s  t o  r e g a r d  t h e  
v r o r l d  a s  a  r a t i o n a l  s y s t e m  d e f i n e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  a b s o l u t e .  
R e a s o n ,  t o  H e g e l ,  i s  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  T h e  h i s t o r y  
o f  t h e  w o r l d  p r e s e n t s  a  r a t i o n a l  p r o c e s s .  I n  a n  e x a l t e d  c o n ­
c e p t  o f  r e a s o n  a s  t h e  A b s o l u t e  r e a l i t y  H e g e l  w r i t e s :
O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d .  R e a s o n  i s  t h e  s u b s t a n c e  o f  t h e  U n i ­
v e r s e ;  v i z .  t h a t  b y  w h i c h  a n d  i n  w h i c h  a l l  r e a l i t y  
h a s  i t s  b e i n g  a n d  s u b s i s t e n c e .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i t  
i s  t h e  I n f i n i t e  E n e r g y  o f  t h e  U n i v e r s e .  . . . I t  i s  t h e  
i n f i n i t e  c o m p l e x  o f  t h i n g s ,  t h e i r  e n t i r e  E s s e n c e  a n d
T r u t h . 7 5
B y  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n  H e g e l  b r o u g h t  t h e  e n t i r e  r e a l m  o f
h u m a n  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  t h e  t o t a l  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  w o r l d  i n t o  a
r a t i o n a l  s y s t e m  w h i c h  c o u l d  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  t h r o u g h  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  
o f  d i a l e c t i c a l  l o g i c .
W h i l e  l a t e r  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  i d e a l i s t s  e i t h e r  m o d i f i e d  
o r  r e j e c t e d  t h e  H e g e l i a n  d i a l e c t i c ,  t h e  o n e  g r e a t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
o f  H e g e l  i s  t h a t  r e a l i t y  i s  a p p r e h e n d e d  b y  r e a s o n ,  l a t e r  
i d e a l i s t s  s u c h  a s  M a r y  W .  C a l k i n s ,  J .  E .  C r e i g h t o n ,  J o s i a h  
R o y c e ,  B o r d e n  P .  B o u r n e  a n d  E d g a r  S .  B r i g h t m a n  c a r r i e d  H e g e l ' s  
p h i l o s o p h y  a  s t e p  f u r t h e r ,  e v e n  a s  H e g e l  h a d  e x p a n d e d  K a n t ' s  
c o n c e p t  o f  k n o w l e d g e  t o  i t s  i n e v i t a b l e  c o n c l u s i o n .  I t  w a s  a
n o r m a l  s e q u e n c e  f r o m  K a n t ' s  i d e a  o f  k n o w l e d g e  a s  a n  a c t  o f
j u d g m e n t  t o  H e g e l ' s  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  a n y  a c t  o f  j u d g m e n t  n e c e s ­
s a r i l y  i n v o l v e s  r e a s o n ,  a n d  t h a t  R e a s o n ,  o r  t h e  R a t i o n a l  
P r o c e s s ,  i s  t h e  A b s o l u t e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i t  w a s  a  n o r m a l  s e q u e n c e  
f r o m  H e g e l ' s  r a t i o n a l  A b s o l u t e  t o  P e r s o n a l i s m ,  o r  t h e  n e c e s s i t y
75Hegel, on. cit., p. 52.
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of self-hood as a basis for rationality and purpose. In 
regard to its impact upon educational philosophy the ideal­
istic approach consistently supported the primacy of reason 
as the instrument of knowledge, along with the secondary idea 
that self-hood is essential to rationality and purpose.
The essence of idealism as a philosophy is that sig­
nificant structures of intellectual apprehension are objective­
ly real. Idealism is particularly dependent upon an acceptable 
theory of values. It seems necessary to discuss three aspects 
of idealistic axiology, namely, the autonomy of values, the 
reality of self-hood, and the mental nature of value.
Idealism has traditionally asserted that there are 
certain values embedded in the structure of the universe and 
that the validity or worthfulness of these values does not 
depend upon the mere existence of any fact or situation what­
soever. Prom the idealist point of view, certain values re­
main significant and valid because their worth is intrinsic 
and is not borrowed from any prior existing situations. In 
referring to the independent existence of values, Adams 
remarks t
We are to understand by an objective good, an autono­
mous value, something which is coincident neither with 
any external matter-of-fact situation or decree, nor 
with psychological matter of fact, such as desire, 
pleasure, or feelings of approval.76
If ideals exist independently, they cannot be directly 
related to factual results, or to the dictates of an actual
76George P. Adams, Idealism and the Modem Age (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1919)» p. 13.
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sovereign, or to God, or to civil power. The autonomy of 
ideals suggests that the idea of value as conformity to the 
laws of nature is untrue. For while values are embedded in 
the structure of the universe, they cannot be identified with 
natural processes.
Many Idealists also reject the concept that values are 
related to obedience to the decrees of God.?? It follows that 
values to be objectively existent cannot depend upon individ­
ual desires or wishes, for when a value depends upon individ­
ual desire or preference, it has become subjective, which is 
a denial of its objective status.
Another idea involved in idealistic axiology is that 
values are of necessity related to self-hood, or to person­
ality. Wilbur Urban, a leading exponent of idealistic 
axiology, has stated in positive terms the relationship of 
personality and values:
I hold that there can be no existence without value 
and no value without existence. Reality is neither 
mental or material, but a realm in which thought and 
thing, fact and value, are inseparable.78
In his discussion of values Donald Butler has pointed 
out that there may be an apparent contradiction between the 
idea of the autonomy of values and the relationships of values 
to individual self-hood. The problem, as Butler sees it, is 
to accept a concept of valuational autonomy which does not
??Ibid.. p. 144.
?®George P. Adams and William P. Montague (eds.), 
Oontemnorary American Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1930), II, 375.
81
d e s t r o y  t h e  r e a l i t y  a n d  t h e  u n i q u e n e s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .
B u t l e r  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a  s y n t h e s i s  i s  p o s s i b l e  b y  r e g a r d i n g  
v a l u e s  a s  r o o t e d  i n  e x i s t e n c e  w h i l e  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  b e ­
l i e v i n g  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  a n d  v a l u e  
a r e  c l o s e l y  i d e n t i f i e d . B u t l e r ,  a c c e p t i n g ,  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  
B e r k e l e y ' s  e p i s t e m o l o g y ,  e x p l a i n s  t h e  p o s s i b l e  h a r m o n y  o f  
a u t o n o m o u s  v a l u e s  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i n  t h e s e  w o r d s :
V a l u e  e x i s t s  o n l y  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p e r s o n  w h e n  h e  
w o r k s  o u t  t h o s e  a d j u s t m e n t s  w h i c h  r e a l i z e  v a l u e  f o r  
h i m  a n d w l i e n  h e  h a s  t h e  e m o t i o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e  w h i c h  i s  
t h e  e n j o y m e n t  o f  v a l u e .  H o w e v e r ,  G o d  e x i s t s ,  a n d  i n  
H i m  a l l  v a l u e  r e s i d e s ,  i n  H i m  i s  t h a t  p e r f e c t i o n  i n  
w h i c h  a l l  p o s s i b l e  p o s i t i v e  v a l u e s  a r e  f u l l y  r e a l i z e d
a n d  e n j o y e d . 8 0
V a l u e ,  i n  i d e a l i s m ,  o r i g i n a t e s  b e y o n d  i t s e l f .  T h e  s u p r e m e  
c o n c e r n  o f  i d e a l i s m  i s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  I I .  K .  S m i t h ,  t o  s h o w  
t h a t  e s t h e t i c  a n d  s p i r i t u a l  v a l u e s  h a v e  m o r e  t h a n  a  m e r e l y  
h u m a n  significance. H o w e v e r ,  v a l u e s  h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o n l y  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h a t  a s p e c t  o f  r e a l i t y  k n o w n  a s  t h e  s e l f .
A c c o r d i n g  t o  B r i g h t m a n ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  s i n g l e ,  c o n ­
s i s t e n t  d o c t r i n e  o f  t h e  s e l f  w h i c h  i s  s h a r e d  b y  a l l  i d e a l ­
i s t s . ^ ^  H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  a r e  f o u f  p r o p o s i t i o n s  w h i c h  c o n -  
s p i c i o u s  i d e a l i s t s  h a v e  h e l d .  T h e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  a r e :  ( 1 )  T h e  
s e l f  i s  a  s y s t e m  ( o r g a n i c ) ;  ( 2 )  T h e  s e l f  i s  a  s e l f - e x i s t e n t
7 9 B u t l e r ,  o n .  c i t . .  c f .  196- I 97.
G O l b i d . . p .  197.
® G e r m a n  K .  S m i t h ,  A  O o m m e n t a r y  t o  K a n t ' s  C r i t i q u e  
o f  P u r e  R e a s o n  ( L o n d o n :  M a c m i l l a n ,  I 9I Ü ) ,  p .  1 5 .
^ ^ E d g a r  S .  B r i g h t m a n ,  " T h e  F i n i t e  S e l f , "  C o n t e m ­
p o r a r y  I d e a l i s m  I n  A m e r i c a , e d .  0 .  B a r r e t t  ( N e w  Y o r k :  T h e
M a c m i l l a n  C o m p a n y ,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  p .  1 7 1 .
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u n i t y  ( m o n a d i c ) ;  ( 3 )  T h e  s e l f  i s  c o n s c i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e  
( m e n t a l i s t i c ) ; a n d  ( 4 )  T h e  s e l f  i s  a c t i v e  ( a c t i v i s t i c )
T o  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  s e l f  i s  o r g a n i c  m e a n s  t h a t  e v e r y  
p h a s e  a n d  e v e r y  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  s e l f  i s  s o  i n t e r r e l a t e d  w i t h  
e v e r y  o t h e r  s e l f ,  a n d  w i t h  e v e r y  o t h e r  e v e n t  i n  n a t u r e ,  t h a t  
n o  s i n g l e  e x p e r i e n c e  c a n  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  u n t i l  i t  i s  i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  i t s  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  o r g a n i c  w h o l e .
H e g e l  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  o r g a n i c  n a t u r e  o f  r e a l i t y ,  a n d  o f  t h e  
s e l f ,  i n  a n  a l l - i n c l u s i v e  c o n c e p t :
. . . t h e  u n i v e r s e  i s  a  s i n g l e  s p i r i t ,  o f  w h o m  o r  o f
w h i c h  a l l  a p p e a r a n c e s  a r e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s ;  t h a t  a l l  i t s
m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  f a l l  w i t h i n  a  s i n g l e  e x p e r i e n c e ,  c o m p a c t  
o f  e x p e r i e n c e ;  t h a t  a l l  o f  i t s  l i f e  a n d  a c t i v i t y ,  a n d  
t h a t  o u t s i d e  t h i s  l i v i n g  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e r e  c a n  b e  
n o t h i n g . 8 4
T h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  i d e a l i s m  a l s o  r e g a r d s  t h e  s e l f  a s  a  
s e l f - e x i s t e n t  u n i t y .  A  " t h i n g , "  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  a  " s e l f , "  
a p p e a r s  t o  b e  m a d e  u p  o f  s e p a r a b l e  p a r t s  w h i c h  e n j o y  a n  i n d e ­
p e n d e n t  e x i s t e n c e  b o t h  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
i n t o  t h e  o b j e c t  c a l l e d  a  t h i n g .  B u t  t h e  p a r t s  o f  a  s e l f  e x i s t  
o n l y  i n  t h e  o r g a n i c  u n i t y  o f  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  s e l f  t o  
w h i c h  t h e y  b e l o n g . ^ 5  R e g a r d i n g  t h e  u n i q u e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s e l f  
B r i g h t m a n  c o m m e n t s :
E a c h  s e l f ,  t h e n ,  i s  a  u n i q u e  u n i t y ,  a  u n i t  t h a t  e x i s t s  
o n l y  f o r  i t s e l f  a n d  s h a r e s  i t s  i m m e d i a t e  e x i s t e n c e  w i t h  
n o  o t h e r  s e l f ,  a l t h o u g h  e x p e r i e n c e  s h o w s  t h a t  i t  k n o w s  
a n d  c o m m u n i c a t e s  i f i t h  m a n y  o t h e r  s e l v e s . 8 6
Q ^ i b i d . . p .  1 7 2 .
® ^ Q u o t e d  b y  H o e r n l e ,  I d e a l i s m  a s  a  P h i l o s o p h y , p .  2 6 1 .
Q^Brightman, on. cit.. p. 173. S^Ibid.
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C o n s c i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  o r  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  i s  a n ­
o t h e r  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  i d e a l i s t i c  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  s e l f .  I n  
t r a d i t i o n a l  a n d  s o h o l a s t i c  t h i n k i n g  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  w a s  f r e ­
q u e n t l y  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s o u l ,  e i t h e r  
s u b s t a n t i a l  o r  s p i r i t u a l .  B e r k e l e y ,  a s  i n d i c a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  
c o n c e i v e d  o f  m i n d  a s  a  c e n t e r  o f  b a r e  a c t i v i t i e s .  K a n t  
r e g a r d e d  m i n d  a s  t h e  f o c a l  p o i n t  o f  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  e s s e n t i a l  
i n  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  i n  c o n d u c t ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  m o r a l  l a w .  H e g e l  
r e g a r d e d  m i n d  a s  a  f o c u s  i n  w h i c h  o b j e c t s  m e e t .  T h e  o n e  
c o m m o n  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  m e n t a l i s t i c  c o n c e p t  o f  m i n d  i s  t h a t  
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  e x i s t s  o n l y  a s  a  s e l f ,  s o  t h a t  t o  b e  c o n s c i o u s  
m e a n s  t o  b e  a  s e l f ,  o r  c o n v e r s e l y ,  s e l f h o o d  c o n s i s t s  o f  
c o n s c i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e .
A  f i n a l  q u a l i t y  i n  t h e  i d e a l i s t i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
t h e  s e l f  i s  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  m i n d  a s  a c t i v i t y .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  
B r i g h t m a n ,  i d e a l i s t s  h a v e  g e n e r a l l y  o p p o s e d  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  
m i n d  i s  a  t a b u l a  r a s a  a n d  h a v e  b e e n  c r i t i c a l  o f  a l l  t h e o r i e s  
w h i c h  h a v e  e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  p a s s i v i t y  o f  t h e  s e l f  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t h e  l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s . H o e r n l e  d e s c r i b e s  s e v e r a l  a s p e c t s  
o f  m e n t a l  a c t i v i t y . T h e  b a s i c  a s p e c t  o f  m e n t a l  a c t i v i t y  
i s  p e r c e i v i n g ,  a s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  B e r k e l e y .  A n o t h e r  i n s i g h t  
i n t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  m e n t a l  a c t i v i t y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  i d e a l i s m ,  
i s  t h e  i d e a  o f  K a n t  t h a t  a l l  k n o w l e d g e  i s  t h i n k i n g ,  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  o f  j u d g i n g ,  a n d  t h a t  j u d g i n g  i s  a  s y n t h e t i c  a c t i v i t y  
p o s s i b l e  o n l y  i n  a  s t a t e  o f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  A  t h i r d
87%bid.. p. 175. 88Hoernle, on. cit.. pp. 238-239.
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q u a l i t y  i n v o l v e d  i n  m e n t a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  t h e  d i s c o v e r y ,  o r  t h e  
a c c e p t a n c e ,  o f  u n i v e r s a l  p r i n c i p l e s .  F i n a l l y ,  i d e a l i s t i c  
m e n t a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  p o s s i b l e  o n l y  w h e n  t h e  s e l f  r e l a t e s  t h e  
w h o l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o b l e m  o r  
e v e n t  u n d e r g o i n g  a n a l y s i s .
I n d i v i d u a l  s e l f - h o o d ,  i n v o l v i n g  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  
e x p e r i e n c e ,  i s  a  c a r d i n a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i d e a l i s m .  B e c a u s e  o f  
t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  i d e a l i s m ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  w i d e l y  
a c c e p t e d  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  h u m a n  n a t u r e  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  
t o  n a t u r a l  d e p r a v i t y .  G e n e r a l l y ,  i d e a l i s m  h a s  h e l d  t o  a n  
o p t i m i s t i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  h u m a n  n a t u r e ,  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  r a t i o n a l  p o w e r s  a s  t h e  m a j o r  m e t h o d  o f  
i m p r o v i n g  m a n .
I d e a l i s m  I n  Z d u c a t i o n
I d e a l i s m  a p p e a r s  t o  h a v e  e x e r t e d  a  p r o f o u n d  i n f l u e n c e  
o n  e d u c a t i o n a l  t h e o r y  f r o m  t h e  t i m e  o f  P l a t o .  F o l l o w i n g  P l a t o  
t h e  i d e a l i s t i c  a p p r o a c h  t o  e d u c a t i o n  w a s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  
C h r i s t i a n i t y  a n d  w a s  a n  e d u c a t i o n a l  b u l w a r k  f o r  c e n t u r i e s .
A t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  i d e a l i s m  w a s  s t r o n g l y  
e n t r e n c h e d  i n  A m e r i c a n  t h o u g h t ,  b u t  r a p i d l y  g a v e  w a y  t o  
n a t u r a l i s m .
P l a t o  d e s c r i b e d  t w o  k i n d s  o f  e d u c a t i o n .  T h e  f i r s t  w a s  
e d u c a t i o n  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  a f f a i r s ,  r e c e i v e d  b y  t h e  c r a f t s m e n  
a n d  b u s i n e s s  c l a s s e s .  T h e  s e c o n d  w a s  e d u c a t i o n  f o r  s e r v i c e  
t o  t h e  s t a t e .  T h e  f i r s t  a i m s  a t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  w e a l t h  o r  
b o d i l y  s t r e n g t h ,  o r  m e r e  c l e v e r n e s s  a p a r t  f r o m  i n t e l l i g e n c e
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a n d  j u s t i c e .  T h e  s e c o n d  I s  t h e  o n l y  r e a l  a n d  g e n u i n e  e d u c a ­
t i o n  w h i c h  m a k e s  a  m a n  e a g e r l y  p u r s u e  t h e  i d e a l  p e r f e c t i o n  
o f  c i t i z e n s h i p ,  a n d  t e a c h e s  h i m  t o  r u l e  a n d  t o  o b e y  r i g h t l y . 8 9  
P l a t o  a c c e p t e d  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  e d u c a t i o n  w h i c h  w a s  g e n ­
e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  i n  h i s  d a y .  A  f a m o u s  p a s s a g e  f r o m  t h e  L a w s  
s t a t e s  P l a t o ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  e d u c a t i o n :
H o w ,  I  m e a n  b y  e d u c a t i o n  t h a t  t r a i n i n g  w h i c h  i s  g i v e n  
b y  s u i t a b l e  h a b i t s  t o  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t i n c t s  o f  v i r t u e  i n  
c h i l d r e n ;  w h e n  p l e a s u r e  a n d  f r i e n d s h i p ,  a n d  p a i n ,  a n d  
h a t r e d ,  a r e  r i g h t l y  i m p l a n t e d  i n  s o u l s  n o t  y e t  c a p a b l e  
o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e m ,  a n d  w h o  f i n d  t h e m ,  
a f t e r  t h e y  h a v e  a t t a i n e d  r e a s o n ,  t o  b e  i n  h a r m o n y  w i t h  
h e r .  T h i s  h a r m o n y  o f  t h e  s o u l ,  t a k e n  a s  a  w h o l e  i s  
v i r t u e ;  b u t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  t r a i n i n g  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
p l e a s u r e  a n d  p a i n ,  w h i c h  l e a d s  y o u  a l w a y s  t o  h a t e  w h a t  
y o u  o u g h t  t o  h a t e ,  a n d  l o v e  w h a t  y o u  o u g h t  t o  l o v e ,  
f r o m  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  l i f e  t o  t h e  e n d ,  m a y  b e  s e p a r a t e d  
o f f ;  a n d ,  i n  m y  v i e w ,  w i l l  b e  r i g h t l y  c a l l e d  e d u c a ­
t i o n .  90
I n  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  P l a t o  d e f i n e d  e d u c a t i o n  a s  t h a t  t r a i n i n g  
w h i c h  i s  i n  f u l l  h a r m o n y  w i t h  t h e  r a t i o n a l  l i f e  w h e n  i t  
a p p e a r s .
T h e  f i r s t  o b j e c t i v e  o f  e d u c a t i o n ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  P l a t o ,
w a s  s t a t e  u n i t y ,  o r  s o c i a l  c o h e s i v e n e s s .  T h e  r e l a t i o n  t h a t
e d u c a t i o n  s h o u l d  f o s t e r  b e t w e e n  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l
i s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e m e n t :
P e r  e v e r y  p h y s i c i a n  a n d  e v e r y  s k i l l e d  a r t i s t  d o e s  a l l  
t h i n g s  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  t h e  w h o l e ,  d i r e c t i n g  h i s  e f f o r t  
t o w a r d  t h e  c o m m o n  g o o d ,  e x e c u t i n g  t h e  p a r t  f o r  t h e  s a k e  
o f  t h e  w h o l e ,  a n d  n o t  t h e  w h o l e  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  t h e  
p a r t .91
8 9 p i a t o ,  " L a w s , "  T h e  W o r k s  o f  P l a t o , t r a n s .
B .  J o w e t t  ( H e w  Y o r k :  D i a l  P r e s s ,  n .  d . ) ,  I V ,  603.
90lbid.. 653. gilbid.. 903.
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A  s e c o n d  a n d  m o r e  I m p o r t a n t  o b j e c t i v e  o f  e d u c a t i o n  i n  P l a t o ' s  
t h o u g h t  w a s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  r u l e  o f  r e a s o n  i n  t h e  g r o w i n g  
l i f e  o f  t h e  c h i l d . 9 ^  R e a s o n  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  
s o u l  o f  t h e  c h i l d .  T o  e x a l t  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  a b o v e  t h e  s e n s i ­
b i l i t i e s  a n d  t h e  s o u l  a b o v e  t h e  b o d y ,  b y  a w a k e n i n g  t h e  
r a t i o n a l  f a c u l t y ,  i s  t h e  m o s t  d i s t i n c t i v e  w o r k  o f  education.9 5
T h e  i d e a l i s t i c  e m p h a s i s  o f  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  P l a t o  
w a s  a d o p t e d ,  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  b y  S t o i c i s m . S t o i c i s m  
s e r v e d  a s  a  r e l i g i o n  a s  w e l l  a s  a  p h i l o s o p h y ,  f o r  i t  g a v e  m a n  
a r m o r  w h e n  t h e  w o r l d  w a s  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  e v i l ,  a n d  i t  e n c o u r ­
a g e d  h i m  f o r w a r d  w h e n  t h e  w o r l d  w a s  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  g o o d . 9 5  
I t  t h u s  w a s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  i d e a l i s t i c  t r a d i t i o n  
u n t i l  i d e a l i s m  w a s  i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  C h r i s t i a n i t y .
T h e  C h r i s t i a n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  l i f e  i s  b a s i c a l l y  
i d e a l i s t i c  i n  i t s  o u t l o o k  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  a r e  C h r i s t i a n  r e a l ­
i s t s  a n d  C h r i s t i a n  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s .  T h e  n a t u r e  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  
a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  t h e  T r i n i t y  a n d  i n  m a n  a s  
a  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  c r e a t i v e  p o w e r  o f  G o d  a n d  a s  a n  o b j e c t  o f  
r e d e m p t i v e  c o n c e r n ,  o f  n e c e s s i t y  r e f l e c t s  a n  i d e a l i s t i c  p h i ­
l o s o p h y .  S o  s p e c i f i c  a n d  p r o n o u n c e d  a r e  t h e  h i s t o r i c  c o n c e p t s  
o f  C h r i s t i a n  t h o u g h t  t h a t  i t  a p p e a r s  u n n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h i s
92piato, "Republic," 590.
9 3 i b i d .
9 ^ R o b e r t  R. R u s k ,  T h e  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  B a s i s  o f  E d u ­
c a t i o n  ( R e w  York: H o u g h t o n  M i f f l i n  C o m p a n y ,  19^9), p .  139.
^ ^ G i l b e r t  M u r r a y ,  T h e  S t o i c  P h i l o s o p h y  ( N e w  Y o r k :
G .  P. Putnam's Sons, 1915), p. &7.
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study to discuss or to elaborate the streee on idealistic phi­
losophy as an aspect of the Christian faith. However, since 
the seventeenth-century colonists in America were children of 
the Reformation, it is important to introduce the educational 
thinking stemming from the religious controversy known as the 
Reformation.
With his conception of the spiritual priesthood of 
all believers, it was logical for Luther to regard the edu­
cational system of the church as antiquated and i n s u f f i c i e n t . 96 
In 1516, several years before his final break with the estab­
lished church, Luther stressed the importance of education.
In an emotional appeal Luther remarks :
0 how unjustly we deal with these poor young people who 
are committed to us for direction and instruction! We 
must give a terrible accounting for our neglect to set 
the word of God before them.97
But it was not until 1524 that he addressed his appeal to the
councilman of all German cities, urging them to establish and
to maintain schools. Among the outstanding features of the
educational program suggested by Luther in his appeal to the
councilman^ several are noted as important contributions to
educational practice and theory. Luther regarded the estab- ,
lishment and the support of adequate schools as one of the most
important obligations of the secular authorities, for he asks:
98Albert Steinhaeuser, "Introduction," Works of 
Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1931),IV,
101.
9?Martin Luther, Works of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, I931), II, 151.
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I f  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  d e a r  s i r s ,  t o  e x p e n d  a n n u a l l y  s u c h  
g r e a t  s u m s  f o r  f i r e  a r m s ,  b r i d g e s ,  d a m s ,  a n d  c o u n t l e s s  
s i m i l a r  i t e m s ,  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  a  c i t y  m a y  e n j o y  t e m p o r a l  
p e a c e  a n d  p r o s p e r i t y ,  w h y  s h o u l d  n o t  a t  l e a s t  a s  m u c h  
b e  d e v o t e d  t o  t h e  p o o r ,  n e e d y  y o u t h ,  s o  t h a t  w e  m i g h t  
e n g a g e  o n e  o r  t w o  c o m p e t e n t  m e n  t o  t e a c h  sohool?98
T h o u g h  L u t h e r  h a s  i n  v i e w  p r i m a r i l y  t h e  L a t i n  o r  h i g h e r  
s c h o o l s ,  h e  d o e s  n o t  i g n o r e  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  c o m m o n  o r  p u b l i c  
s c h o o l s ,  a n d  h e  d e s i r e s  t h a t  g i r l s  a s  w e l l  a s  b o y s  b e  e d u ­
c a t e d . 9 9  T h e r e  i s  e v e n  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  o f  c o m p u l s o r y  e d u c a ­
t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  p r o p o s a l  o f  f r e e  s c h o l a r s h i p s  f o r  a d v a n c e d  
p u p i l s .  T h e  p o p u l a r  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  e d u c a t i o n  a r e  s t a t e d  a n d  
r e j e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  a  r e f o r m e r  a n d  t h e  c o n ­
c i s e n e s s  o f  a  t r a i n e d  s c h o o l m a n .  T h o u g h  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  m o t i v e  
i s  d o m i n a n t ,  a n d  l a r g e l y  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  c u r r i c u l u m  s u g g e s t e d ,  
L u t h e r  i s  e m p h a t i c  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  c i v i c ,  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  
b e n e f i t s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  a  l i b e r a l  e d u c a t i o n .  R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  s c h o o l s  a s  p u r g a t o r i e s  i n  w h i c h  p u p i l s  w e r e  
t o r m e n t e d  w i t h  c a s e s  a n d  t e n s e s ,  L u t h e r  a d v o c a t e d  a n  a p p r o a c h  
w h i c h  a f f o r d s  p l e a s u r e  i n  1e a r n i n g .
L u t h e r  n o t  o n l y  r e q u e s t e d  t h e  c i v i l  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  s c h o o l s ,  b u t  h e  a l s o  a d v i s e d  t h e  p a r e n t s  t o  c o ­
o p e r a t e  i n  t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o g r a m  b y  k e e p i n g  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  
i n  s c h o o l ;
T h e r e f o r e  I  h o p e  t h a t  t h e  c i t i z e n s  w i l l  a c k n o w l e d g e  t h e  
f i d e l i t y  a n d  t h e  l o v e  o f  t h e i r  l o r d s  b y  k e e p i n g  t h e i r  
c h i l d r e n  i n  s c h o o l  a n d  h o n e s t l y  h e l p i n g  t o  s u p p o r t  t h i s  
w o r k ,  b e c a u s e  t h e y  s e e  t h a t ,  w i t h o u t  c o s t  t o  t h e m s e l v e s ,
98lbid.. IV, 106. 99ibid.. II, 152.
lOOlbid.. 123.
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t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  a r e  s o  r i c h l y  a n d  d e l i g e n t l y  c a r e d  f o r  
a n d  t h a t  e v e r y t h i n g  i s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e m . 1 0 1
B e c a u s e  o f  h i s  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p r o g r a m  o f  p u b l i c  e d u c a t i o n
L u t h e r  i s  o f t e n  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  i n f l u e n t i a l
m e n  i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  t h e o r y  a n d  p r a c t i c e .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  L u t h e r  t h e  R e f o r m a t i o n  e r a  p r o d u c e d ,  
a m o n g  o t h e r s ,  P h i l i p  M e l a n c t h a n ,  w h o  i n t r o d u c e d  a  d e t a i l e d  
p l a n  f o r  a  s c h o o l  s y s t e m  a s  w e l l  a s  s e v e r a l  w l d e l y - u s e d  t e x t ­
b o o k s ,  a n d  J o h n  S t u r m ,  t h e  o r g a n i z i n g  g e n i u s  o f  C h r i s t i a n  
H u m a n i s m  i n  N o r t h e r n  E u r o p e .  I n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  
g y m n a s i u m  S t u r m  a t t e m p t e d  t o  r e a l i z e  t h r e e  e d u c a t i o n a l  a i m s :  
p i e t y ,  k n o w l e d g e ,  a n d  t h e  a r t  o f  s p e a k i n g .
i f h e n ,  a f t e r  t h e  R e f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  i d e a l ­
i s m  u n i t e d  w i t h  p r a c t i c a l  C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  i t  b e c a m e  i n  m o s t  
i n s t a n c e s  a  k i n d  o f  r e l i g i o u s  m o r a l i s m .  E d u c a t i o n ,  a f t e r  t h e  
R e f o r m a t i o n ,  w a s  r e g a r d e d  b y  m o s t  P r o t e s t a n t s  a s  a n  i d e a l  
w h i c h  w o u l d  p r e p a r e  C h r i s t i a n  m e n  a n d  w o m e n  t o  d i s c h a r g e  a n y  
a n d  a l l  d u t i e s .  B r u b a c h e r  s u m m a r i e s  t h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  p h i ­
l o s o p h i c a l  i d e a l i s m  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  m o r a l i t y  i n  t h e s e  w o r d s :
T h e y  r e a l i z e d  t h e  c l o s e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  c h a r a c t e r  a n d  
r e l i g i o n ,  a n d  a d v o c a t e d  a n  e d u c a t i o n  t h a t  w o u l d  d e v e l o p  
p h y s i c a l ,  m e n t a l ,  a n d  m o r a l  p o w e r s  t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  n o t  
o n l y  p e r s o n a l  s a l v a t i o n  b u t  t h e  m o r a l  r e g e n e r a t i o n  o f  
s o c i e t y .  R e l i g i o n ,  m o r a l i t y ,  a n d  e d u c a t i o n  w e r e  t o  b e  
m a n ' s  m a j o r  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e  " f i x i t i e s  a n d  v e r i t i e s "  o f  
l i f e ;  a n d  t h e y  d e e m e d  i t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e m
s e p a r a t e l y . 1 0 2
l O l l b i d . . p .  1 3 7 .
1 0 2 J o h n  S .  B r u b a c h e r ,  M o d e r n  P h i l o s o p h i e s  o f  E d u c a -  
t i o n  ( C h i c a g o :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C h i c a g o  P r e s s ,  1955), p .  167.
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S i n c e  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  m o t i v e  w a s  a  p r e d o m i n a n t  a s p e c t  
o f  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  i t  w a s  n a t u r a l  t h a t  
t h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  i d e a l i s m  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  
m o r a l i s m  s h o u l d  e x e r t  a  p o w e r f u l  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  
p h i l o s o p h y  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  s c h o o l .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r  
a t t e m p t s  t o  p r e s e n t  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  i m p a c t  
o f  i d e a l i s m  o n  A m e r i c a n  e d u c a t i o n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
p o w e r f u l  c h a l l e n g e  o f  n a t u r a l i s t i c  t h o u g h t  t o  A m e r i c a n  e d u c a ­
t i o n a l  p h i l o s o p h y  b e t w e e n  I 86O - I 96O .
CHAPTER IV
P R A C T I C A L  I D E A L I S M  V E R S U S  S C I E N T I F I C  
U T I L I T A R I A N I S M
A m o n g  t h e  m o s t  p e r s i s t e n t  p r o b l e m s  i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  
h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
w h e t h e r  t h e  c o l l e g e  s h o u l d  r e t a i n  i t s  r e l i g i o u s  f u n c t i o n s  a n d  
a i m s  o r  s h o u l d  i t  b e c o m e  a n  i n c r e a s i n g l y  s e c u l a r  a n d  n o n ­
s e c t a r i a n  i n s t i t u t i o n . ^  I t  s e e m s  d e s i r a b l e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  
a t t e m p t  a  s t u d y  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  e x i s t e d  b e t w e e n  n a t u r a l i s m  
a n d  i d e a l i s m  a s  t h e y  w e r e  e x p r e s s e d  i n  e d u c a t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e  
a n d  t h e o r y  a f t e r  i 8 6 0 .  F o l l o w i n g  t h e  s u r v e y  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  s h c o o l s  o f  t h o u g h t ,  a n  e n d e a v o r  
w i l l  b e  m a d e  t o  n a r r o w  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t o  t w o  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
t h i n k e r s :  J o h n  D e w e y ,  a  n a t u r a l i s t ,  a n d  H e r m a n  H .  H o r n e ,  a n
i d e a l i s t .  T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t o  r e l a t e  t h e  t e n ­
s i o n ,  o r  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  b e t w e e n  n a t u r a l i s m  a n d  i d e a l i s m  i n  
A m e r i c a n  e d u c a t i o n a l  t h o u g h t  i n  t h e  c e n t u r y  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
t o  t h r e e  p h a s e s ,  o r  a r e a s ,  o f  d i s c u s s i o n .
A f t e r  i 8 6 0  a n  a r e a  o f  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  i d e a l i s m  a n d  
n a t u r a l i s m  c e n t e r e d  a b o u t  t h e  s t r u g g l e  b e t w e e n  p r a c t i c a l
1 r . F r e e m a n  B u t t s ,  T h e  C o l l e g e  C h a r t s  I t s  C o u r s e  
( N e w  Y o r k :  M c G r a w - H i l l  C o . ,  1 9 4 9 ) ,  p .  2 0 5 .
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r e l i g i o u s  i d e a l i s m  a n d  t e c h n i c a l ,  u t i l i t a r i a n  n a t u r a l i s m .  T h e  
s e c o n d  a r e a  o f  t e n s i o n  b e t w e a n  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i e s  o f  i d e a l i s m  
a n d  n a t u r a l i s m  s e e m e d  t o  e x i s t  i n  t h e  i n t e r r e l a t e d  a r e a s  o f  
c u r r i c u l a r  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e  t h i r d  a n d  f i n a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  
t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  i d e a l i s m  a n d  n a t u r a l i s m  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t w o  
o p p o s i n g  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a p p r o a c h e s ,  r a t i o n a l  i d e a l i s m  a n d  
p r a g m a t i o  n a t u r a l i s m .
R e l i g i o u s  I d e a l i s m  V e r s u s  S c i e n t i f i c  
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  
T h e  d i s s e n s i o n  i n  e d u c a t i o n a l  p h i l o s o p h y  i n  A m e r i c a  
b e t w e e n  i 8 6 0  a n d  I 9 6 0  w a s  n o t  o n l y  i n t e n s e ,  b u t  a l s o  f a r -  
r e a c h i n g .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l ,  
d e n o m i n a t i o n a l  c o l l e g e  s e e m e d  t o  d o m i n a t e  t h e  s c e n e ,  a n d  b y  
c o n t r a s t  d u r i n g  t h e  l a t t e r  y e a r s  t h e  s e c u l a r  u n i v e r s i t y  h a d  
e f f e c t i v e l y  c h a l l e n g e d  a n d ,  t o  a  g r e a t  d e g r e e ,  h a d  s u p p l a n t e d  
t h e  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n  a s  t h e  l e a d e r  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  p h i l o s ­
o p h y  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h e  c h a l l e n g e  o f  t h e  s e c u l a r  u n i ­
v e r s i t y  t o  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  c o l l e g e  b e c a m e  t h e  a c a d e m i c  b a t t l e ­
g r o u n d  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  b a t t l e  w a s  
m o r e  f r e q u e n t l y  f o u g h t  o n  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  t h e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  o r  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  l e v e l .
T h e  u n d e r l y i n g  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
s t r u g g l e  b e t w e e n  r e l i g i o u s  i d e a l i s m  a n d  s c i e n t i f i c  u t i l i ­
t a r i a n i s m  i s  t w o - f o l d .  F i r s t  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  
a s  d i v e r s e  a s  t h e  g r o u p s  w h i c h  s p o n s o r e d  t h e m .  T h e  d e n o m i ­
n a t i o n s  w e r e  u s u a l l y  m o t i v a t e d  b y  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  a i m s  a n d
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o b j e c t i v e s  w h i c h  t e n d e d  t o  d e g e n e r a t e  i n t o  f a c t i o n a l  r i v a l r y .  
R e g a r d i n g  t h i s  f r e q u e n t  r i v a l r y  a m o n g  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  b o d i e s  o n e  
h i s t o r i a n  m a d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o m m e n t ;  " C o l l e g e s  c a m e  i n  m a n y  
c a s e s  t o  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  a g e n t s  o f  a  t y p e  o f  d e n o m i n a t i o n a l  
i m p e r i a l i s m ,  a n d  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  s e c t a r i a n  a g g r a n d i z e m e n t  a n d  
a g g r e s s i o n . 2  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  d i v e r s i t y  a n d  d u e  t o  t h e i r  
p r a c t i c a l  n a t u r e  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  f a i l e d  t o  d e v e l o p  
a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  e d u c a t i o n  t o  s u s t a i n  t h e i r  
c o l l e g e s .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  t h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  t h a t  w e r e  e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  a f t e r  i 8 6 0  w e r e  f o u n d e d  a l o n g  t h e  l i n e s  o f  t h e  U n i v e r ­
s i t y  o f  I l i c h i g a n  w h i c h  w a s  o r g a n i z e d  t o  m e e t  t h e  a p p a r e n t  
p r a c t i c a l  n e e d s  a n d  t h e  d i v e r s e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  s o c i a l  g r o u p s  a n d  
o f  n o n - s e c t a r i a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l  l e a d e r s .  B e c a u s e  o f  i t s  
u t i l i t a r i a n  n a t u r e  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  w a s  l a t e  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  a n  
e d u c a t i o n a l  p h i l o s o p h y  t h a t  w a s  i n  h a r m o n y  w i t h  i t s  i n h e r e n t  
s t r u c t u r e .  S i n c e  n e i t h e r  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  c o l l e g e s  n o r  t h e  
u n i v e r s i t i e s  h a d  f o r m u l a t e d  a d e q u a t e  p h i l o s o p h i e s  o f  e d u c a ­
t i o n ,  t h e  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  t y p e s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  
n e c e s s i t y  h a d  t o  b e  e x p r e s s e d  i n  p r a c t i c a l  t e r m s .
I n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  r e l i g i o u s  i d e a l i s m  
a n d  s c i e n t i f i c ,  s e c u l a r  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  d i s ­
c u s s  t h r e e  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
g i v e  a  b r i e f  r e s u m e  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  
- e l i g i o u s  c o l l e g e ,  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s t a t e m e n t s  o f
2 B o n a I d  G .  T e w k s b u r y ,  T h e  F o u n d i n g  o f  A m e r i c a n  
C o l l e g e s  a n d  U n i v e r s i t i e s  B e f o r e  t h e  C i v i l  W a r  ( U e w  Y o r k :  
C o l u m b i a  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  p .  7 6 .
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i t s  o b j e c t i v e s .  A l s o  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  s u r v e y  i s  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  
o f  t h e  w e a k n e s s e s  w h i c h  d e v e l o p e d  i n  t h e  d e n o m i n a t i o n a l  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  w h i c h  m a d e  t h e m  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  a t t a c k  b y  s e c u l a r  
i n t e r e s t s .  S e c o n d ,  i t  a p p e a r s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  a  s i m i l a r  h i s ­
t o r i c a l  s k e t c h  b e  p r e s e n t e d  d e p i c t i n g  t h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  u t i l i ­
t a r i a n  u n i v e r s i t y ,  i n c l u d i n g  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  i t s  o b j e c t i v e s  
a n d  o f  i t s  w e a k n e s s e s .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  m a y  b e  a s s u m e d  t h a t  
s u p p o r t e r s  a n d  c h a m p i o n s  o f  b o t h  r e l i g i o u s  i d e a l i s m  a n d  
s c i e n t i f i c  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  s h o u l d  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  s p e a k ,  t h u s  
i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  o p p o s i n g  
c o n c e p t s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  i n  t h e  y e a r s  b e t w e e n  i 8 6 0  a n d  1 8 9 0 .
F o r t u n a t e l y  f o r  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  A m e r i c a n  e d u c a t i o n ,  
t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  e a r l i e s t  s e t t l e r s  w e r e  f a v o r a b l y  i n c l i n e d  
t o  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p u r s u i t s .  S o ,  a  f e w  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  P u r i t a n s  
h a d  f o u n d e d  t h e  t o w n  o f  B o s t o n ,  t h e  G e n e r a l  C o u r t  o f  M a s s a ­
c h u s e t t s  B a y  C o l o n y  c a s u a l l y  p a s s e d  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t  t h a t  
f o u n d e d  H a r v a r d  C o l l e g e .  S a m u e l  E l i o t  M o r i s o n ,  o f f i c i a l  
h i s t o r i a n  o f  H a r v a r d  U n i v e r s i t y ,  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  
a  c o n c i s e  s t a t e m e n t :
. . . a n d  f i n a l l y ,  a l m o s t  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  a  h e a v y  d a y ' s  
b u s i n e s s ,  t h e  C o u r t  p a s s e d  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t  t h a t  
f o u n d e d  H a r v a r d  C o l l e g e :  T h e  C o u r t  a g r e e d  t o  g i v e  4 0 0
p o u n d s  t o w a r d  a  s c h o o l  o r  c o l l e g e ,  h e r e o f  2 0 0  p o u n d s  t o  
b e  p a i d  t h e  n e x t  y e a r ,  a n d  2 0 0  p o u n d s  w h e n  t h e  w o r k  i s  
f i n i s h e d ,  a n d  t h e  n e x t  C o u r t  t o  a p p o i n t  w h e r e  a n d  w h a t
b u i l d i n g . 3
R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  p a s s i n g  c f  t h i s  p i e c e  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  a
3 S a m u e l  E l i o t  M o r i s o n ,  T h e  F o u n d i n g  o f  H a r y a r i  C o l l e g e  
( C a m b r i d g e ,  M a s s . :  H a r v a r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 3 5 ) ,  p . 1 6 8 .
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c o n t e m p o r a r y  w i t e r  s t a t e s :
T h i s  s i m p l e  e n a c t m e n t  m a r k e d  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n  w h i c h  t h r e e  y e a r s  l a t e r  w a s  g i v e n  t h e  n a m e  H a r v a r d  
C o l l e g e , a n d  w h i c h  w a s  d e s t i n e d  t o  b e c o m e  t h e  f o r e r u n n e r  
n o t  o n l y  o f  t h e  e i g h t - h u n d r e d - o d d  l i b e r a l  a r t s  c o l l e g e s  
e x i s t i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  t o d a y .  . . b u t  a l s o  i n d i r e c t l y  o f  
t h e  h u n d r e d s  o f  t e c h n i c a l  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s o h o o l s ,  
w h i c h  t o g e t h e r  a r e  p r e s e n t l y  d i s p e n s i n g  h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  
t o  t h r e e  m i l l i o n  A m e r i c a n s . %
D u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  c o l o n i a l  p e r i o d ,  f r o m  I 620- 1701, t h e  
r e l i g i o u s  p a t t e r n  o f  t h o u g h t  w a s  d o m i n a n t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a m o n g  
t h e  c i v i c  a n d  t h e  a c a d e m i c  l e a d e r s .  U n d e r  t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  
t h e  C o n g r e g a t i o n a l  C h u r c h  i n  H e w  E n g l a n d  a n d  o f  t h e  A n g l i c a n  
C h u r c h  i n  t h e  S o u t h ,  t h e  t h r e e  e a r l i e s t  o f  A m e r i c a n  c o l l e g e s  
w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d .  H a r v a r d  ( I 636) a n d  Y a l e  ( 1 7 0 1 )  w e r e  f o u n d e d  
b y  C o n g r e g a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  U i l l i a m  a n d  i l a r y  w a s  f o u n d e d  i n  
V i r g i n i a  ( I 695) b y  t h e  A n g l i c a n  C h u r c h ,  p r i m a r i l y ,  b u t  n o t  
s o l e l y ,  t o  m e e t  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a n  e d u c a t e d  m i n i s t r y . ^  D u r i n g  
t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  r e v i v a l  w h i c h  w a s  c a l l e d  
t h e  " G r e a t  A w a k e n i n g , "  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a w a k e n i n g  
t h a t  f o l l o w e d ,  a  d e m a n d  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  c o l l e g e s  w a s  c r e a t e d  
b y  d e n o m i n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  S i x  o t h e r  d e n o m i n a t i o n a l  c o l l e g e s  
v r e r e  f o u n d e d  w i t h i n  a  q u a r t e r  o f  a  c e n t u r y .  F o u r  o f  t h e s e  
c o l l e g e s  w e r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  " n u r s e r i e s  o f  m i n i s t e r s , "  w h i l e  t w o  
v r e r e  i n d i r e c t l y  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  r e l i g i o u s  a c t i v i t y  a n d  b y  
r e l i g i o u s  s e n t i m e n t .
T h e  C o l l e g e  o f  H e w  J e r s e y ,  w h i c h  l a t e r  b e c a m e  P r i n c e ­
t o n  U n i v e r s i t y ,  w a s  f o u n d e d  b y  t h e  P r e s b y t e r i a n  C h u r c h ,  1 7 4 6 ;
^ G e o r g e  P .  S c h m i d t ,  T h e  L i b e r a l  A r t s  C o l l e g e  ( H e w  
B ' D u & s w i c k ,  H .  J .  : R u t g e r s  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 7 )  , P *  3 .
^ T e w k s b u r y ,  o n .  c i t . .  p .  58.
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D a r t m o u t h  C o l l e g e  b y  t h e  C o n g r e g a t i o n a l  C h u r c h ,  1 7 6 9 ;  R u t g e r s  
U n i v e r s i t y  b y  t h e  D u t c h  R e f o r m e d  C h u r c h ,  1 7 6 6 ;  B r o w n  U n i v e r ­
s i t y  b y  t h e  B a p t i s t  C h u r c h ,  1 7 6 4 ;  a n d  K i n g s  C o l l e g e ,  l a t e r  t o  
b e c o m e  C o l u m b i a  U n i v e r s i t y ,  w a s  f o u n d e d  i n  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  A n g l i c a n  C h u r c h  i n  1 7 5 4 .  T h e  A n g l i c a n  C h u r c h  w a s  a l s o  
i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n  t h e  o r i g i n ,  i n  1 7 5 5 ,  o f  t h e  C o l l e g e  o f  P h i l a ­
d e l p h i a ,  w h i c h  i n  l a t e r  c e n t u r i e s  b e c a m e  k n o w n  a s  t h e  U n i v e r ­
s i t y  o f  P e n n s y l v a n i a . G
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h i s  b r i e f  r e s u m e  o f  t h e  C o l o n i a l  
p e r i o d  i t  s e e m s  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  a l l  c o l o n i a l  c o l l e g e s  w e r e  
f o u n d e d  m o r e  o r  l e s s  a s  a  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  c h u r c h  a c t i v i t y ,  
a n d  w e r e  d e d i c a t e d  a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  t o  t h e  p r o p a g a t i o n  o f  
t r a d i t i o n a l  f o r m s  o f  r e l i g i o u s  c u l t u r e .  R e g a r d i n g  t h e  f o u n d i n g  
o f  t h e  e a r l y  c o l l e g e s  o n e  h i s t o r i a n  h a s  o b s e r v e d :  " E d u c a t i o n
i n  c o l o n i a l  A m e r i c a  w a s  t h e  c h i l d  o f  r e l i g i o n .  M o r e o v e r ,  
w i t h  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  C o l u m b i a  U n i v e r s i t y  a n d  o f  t h e  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  P e n n s y l v a n i a ,  a l l  t h e  c o l o n i a l  c o l l e g e s  w e r e  
d e s i g n e d  p r i m a r i l y ,  b u t  n o t  s o l e l y ,  a s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
e d u c a t i o n  o f  m i n i s t e r s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  m i n i s t e r i a l  c u r ­
r i c u l u m  p r o v i s i o n  w a s  a l s o  m a d e  f o r  s t u d y  i n  m e d i c i n e  a n d  i n  
l a w .
I n  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
c o l l e g e s  b y  d e n o m i n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n c r e a s e d  p r o l i f i c a l l y . 
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  g r o w i n g  s e c u l a r i s m  o f  t h e  l a t e  e i g h t e e n t h  a n d
G i b i d . . p .  5 9 .
^ T h o m a s  J .  U e r t e n b a k e r ,  P r i n c e t o n .  1 7 4 6 - 1 8 9 6  ( P r i n c e ­
t o n ,  N .  J . : P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 4 6 ) ,  p .  5 .
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t h e  e a r l y  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r i e s  t h e  R e l i g i o u s  R e v i v a l ,  s o m e ­
t i m e s  c a l l e d  " t h e  S e c o n d  G r e a t  A w a k e n i n g "  p a r a l l e l e d  t h e  
c o m m o n  s c h o o l  m o v e m e n t  a n d  t h e  r e n e w e d  m i g r a t i o n  t o  t h e  W e s t .
T h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  w a s  t h u s  a  p e r i o d  i n  w h i c h
d e n o m i n a t i o n s  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  s e c t s  m u l t i p l i e d  r a p i d l y  i n  t h e
U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  E a c h  r e l i g i o u s  g r o u p  e s t a b l i s h e d  s c h o o l s
p e c u l i a r  t o  i t s  i n d i v i d u a l  b e l i e f s  a n d  d o c t r i n e s  i n  o r d e r  t o
d e v e l o p  l e a d e r s  i n  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e  a n d  t o  e x p a n d  t h e
g r o u p  n u m e r i c a l l y .  D e s c r i b i n g  t h e  i n t e n s e  r i v a l r y  a m o n g
r e l i g i o u s  g r o u p s  i n  s t a r t i n g  s c h o o l s  i m m e d i a t e l y  p r i o r  t o
t h e  C i v i l  W a r  o n e  o b s e r v e r  r e p o r t e d :
T h e r e  h a s  a r i s e n  w i t h i n  a  f e w  y e a r s  a n  e a r n e s t ,  n o t  t o  
s a y ,  v i o l e n t  c o m p e t i t i o n  a m o n g  s e v e r a l  r e l i g i o u s  d e n o m ­
i n a t i o n s  i n  r e s p e c t  t o  e d u c a t i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  E a c h  
d e n o m i n a t i o n  s e e m s  a n x i o u s  t o  o u t  d o  t h e  o t h e r  i n  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  c o l l e g e s  a n d  s c h o o l s . °
O f  t h e  t w o  h u n d r e d  a n d  f o r t y - s i x  c o l l e g e s  f o u n d e d  
b e f o r e  t h e  C i v i l  W a r ,  o n l y  s e v e n t e e n  w e r e  s t a t e  s p o n s o r e d  a n d  
o n l y  t h r e e  w e r e  i n d e p e n d e n t . ^  O f  f i v e  h u n d r e d  a n d  e i g h t y -  
e i g h t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  h i g h e r  l e a r n i n g  c r e a t e d  b e t w e e n  1 6 5 3  
a n d  1915» f o u r  h u n d r e d  a n d  n i n e t y - t w o  w e r e  f o u n d e d  b y  r e l i g i o u s  
g r o u p s  a n d  n i n e t y - s i x  b y  t h e  s t a t e .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  r e l i g i o u s  
g r o u p s  c r e a t e d  e i g h t y - t w o  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  c o l l e g e s ,  u n i v e r -
® A .  P e t e r s ,  F i f t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S o c i e t y  f o r  t h e  
P r o m o t i o n  o f  C o l l e g i a t e  a n d  T h e o l o g i c a l  E d u c a t i o n  a t  t h e  
W e s t . 1958. p .  4 5 .
^ R i c h a r d  H o f s d a d t e r ,  T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  S c o n e  o f  
H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  ( N e w  Y o r k :  C o l u m b i a
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  p .  3 0 .
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s i t i e s  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  s c h o o l s  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d .
W h i l e  r e l i g i o u s  m o t i v e s  s e e m e d  t o  b e  p a r a m o u n t  i n  
t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  e a r l y  A m e r i c a n  l i f e ,  t h e  s e c u l a r  m o t i v e  
w a s  e v e r  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  c o l o n i e s .  T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  c o n f l i c t ­
i n g  r e l i g i o u s  a n d  s e c u l a r  m o t i v e s  i n  c o l o n i a l  c u l t u r e  p r o ­
v i d e d  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  G r e a t  A w a k e n i n g  a n d  f o r  t h e  G r e a t  
R e v i v a l  o f  1 8 0 0 ,  B u t  b y  i 8 6 0  i t  w a s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  e a r l i e r  
r e l i g i o u s  m o t i v e s  w e r e  l o s i n g  i n  t h e  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  
s e c u l a r i s m ,  w h i c h  w a s  g a i n i n g  s t r e n g t h  f r o m  m a n y  s o u r c e s ,  
s u c h  a s  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s m ,  a n d  o f  s c i e n t i s m .  T h e  
i n c r e a s e d  s t r e n g t h  o f  s e c u l a r i s t i c  c o n c e p t s  a f t e r  i 8 6 0  w a s  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  e d u c a t i o n .
H a v i n g  i t s  s o u r c e  i n  a  u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n c e p t  o f  l i f e  
a n d  i n  a  n a t u r a l i s t i c  p h i l o s o p h y ,  a  s e c u l a r  c o n c e p t  o f  e d u ­
c a t i o n  a r o s e  w h i c h  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  e n g u l f ,  f o r  a  p e r i o d ,  t h e  
e d u c a t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k  o f  A m e r i c a .  T h e  s e c u l a r  c o n c e p t  o f  
e d u c a t i o n  i s  e m b o d i e d  i n  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  i d e a l .  W i t h  t h e  
e x p a n s i o n  o f  n o n - r e l i g i o u s  c o l l e g e s  a n d  u n i v e r s i t i e s  t h e  t e n ­
s i o n  b e t w e e n  i d e a l i s m  a n d  n a t u r a l i s m  b e c a m e  m o r e  p r o n o u n c e d .  
T h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  I s  t h u s  t h e  n e x t  a r e a  o f  s t u d y  t o  
b e  c o n s i d e r e d .
T h e  g r e a t  e r a  o f  t h e  f o u n d i n g  o f  s t a t e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  
c a m e  a f t e r  t h e  C i v i l  M a r .  B e f o r e  t h e  C i v i l  W a r ,  e d u c a t i o n  w a s
l O w a l t e r  A .  L u n d e n .  T h e  D y n a m i c s  o f  H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n  
( P i t t s b u r g h ,  P e n n . : P i t t s b u r g h  P r i n t i n g  C o m p a n y ,  1 9 3 9 ) ,
p .  1 8 0 .
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a l m o s t  e x c l u s i v e l y  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  d e n o m i n a t i o n s ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  V i r g i n i a ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1 8 2 5 ,  
a t t e m p t e d  t o  p r e s e n t  a  p a t t e r n  o f  n o n - s e c t a r i a n  e d u c a t i o n .
O f  t h e  f i f t e e n  r e l i g i o u s  d e n o m i n a t i o n s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  h i g h e r  
e d u c a t i o n  i n  t h e  p r e - O i v i l  W a r  p e r i o d  t h e  m o s t  a c t i v e  w e r e  
t h e  P r e s b y t e r i a n s ,  M e t h o d i s t s ,  B a p t i s t s ,  O o n g r e g a t i o n a l i s t s ,  
R o m a n  C a t h o l i c s  a n d  E p i s c o p a l i a n s .  A m o n g  t h e s e  g r o u p s  o n e  
h u n d r e d  a n d  s i x t e e n  o u t  o f  t h e  o n e  h u n d r e d  a n d  e i g h t y - t w o  
p e r m a n e n t  c o l l e g e s  w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  b e f o r e  1 8 6 1 . T h e  
o p p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e s e  g r o u p s  t o  t h e  r i s e  o f  u n i v e r s i t i e s  w a s  
v i g o r o u s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  F r e e m a n  B u t t s .  H e  s t a t e s  t h a t  r e l i g i o u s  
g r o u p s  w a g e d  a  c o n t i n u i n g  b a t t l e  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  
l a w s  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e s e  s c h o o l s  a n d  a t t e m p t e d  t o  d i v e r t  f u n d s  
e a r m a r k e d  f o r  t h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  t o  r e l i g i o u s  p u r p o s e s . 1 2
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  c h a n g i n g  c u l t u r e  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
a p p e a r e d  t o  m a k e  t h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  i n e v i t a b l e .  A  
p l u r a l i t y  o f  c a u s e s  e x i s t e d  w h i c h  w e r e  f a v o r a b l e  t o  t h e  g r o w t h  
o f  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e  u n i v e r s i t y .  T h e s e  c a u s e s  a r e  t o  a  
g r e a t  e x t e n t  i n t e r r e l a t e d  a n d  a n y  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c a u s e s  
m a y  a p p e a r  t o  b e  a r b i t r a r y .  B u t  c l a r i t y  o f  p r e s e n t a t i o n  s e e m s  
t o  d e m a n d  s u c h  a  d i s t i n c t i o n .
T h e  f i r s t  c a u s e  f o r  t h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  m a y  
h a v e  b e e n  t h e  w e a k n e s s e s  w i t h i n  t h e  c h u r c h  c o l l e g e s ,  w h i c h  
l e d  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  e d u c a t i o n  t o  a p p r a i s e
llButts, on. cit.. p. 226.
12ibid.. p. 227.
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p r o p e r l y  t h e  p r o b l e m s  s t e m m i n g  f r o m  t h e  s o c i a l  f e r m e n t  o f  
t h e  p o s t - c i v i l  / f a r  p e r i o d .  A  s t i m u l u s  t o w a r d  u n i v e r s i t y  
g r o w t h  o r i g i n a t e d  w i t h  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  d e m a n d s  f o r  t h e  i n ­
c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  n e w  f i e l d s  o f  k n o w l e d g e  s u c h  a s  s c i e n c e  a n d  
m o d e r n  l a n g u a g e s  i n t o  t h e  c u r r i c u l u m  i n  o r d e r  t o  s e r v e  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  a n  e x p a n d i n g  s o c i e t y .  G o v e r n m e n t  l e g i s l a ­
t i o n  g r a n t i n g  s t a t e  s c h o o l s  f a v o r a b l e  e c o n o m i c  a s s i s t a n c e  
w a s  a l s o  a  p r i m e  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y .  
T h e  i m p a c t  o f  s t a t e - s u p p o r t e d  G e r m a n  u n i v e r s i t i e s  a l s o  
a f f o r d e d  a  p o w e r f u l  t h r u s t  t o  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  i d e a l ,  a s  d i d  
t h e  i n a u g u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  e l e c t i v e  s y s t e m  i n  m a n y  s c h o o l s .  T h e  
t h e o r y  o f  e v o l u t i o n  o f f e r e d  a  f r a m e w o r k  w i t h i n  w h i c h  t h e  n e w  
a c a d e m i c  o u t l o o k  c o u l d  e x p r e s s  i t s e l f ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  
a r e a  o f  p s y c h o l o g y  a n d  i n  t h e  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  
g r a d u a l  a c c e p t a n c e  i n  A m e r i c a  o f  a  p r a g m a t i c  p h i l o s o p h y  
s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  c a u s e  f o r  t h e  s e c u l a r  u n i v e r s i t y .  E a c h  o f  
t h e s e  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  b r i e f l y .
# h e n  m o s t  o f  t h e  o l d e r  c o l l e g e s  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  l e a d e r s  
f a i l e d  t o  r e s p o n d  a d e q u a t e l y  t o  t h e  d e m a n d s  o f  t h e  m o r e  
p r a c t i c a l  a n d  s c i e n t i f i c  a g e  a f t e r  t h e  C i v i l  M a r ,  t h e  e d u c a ­
t i o n a l  i n i t i a t i v e  p a s s e d  i n t o  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h o s e  w h o  w e r e  
i n t e n s e l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  u n i v e r s i t i e s .  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  e d u c a t o r s  t o w a r d  
s o c i a l  c h a n g e s  a f t e r  i 8 6 0  o n e  h i s t o r i a n  h a s  s a i d :  " E d u c a t o r s
a f t e r  t h e  C i v i l  M a r  e x h i b i t e d  n o  g r e a t  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  t h e  
f o r c e s  t h a t  w e r e  t r a n s f o r m i n g  A m e r i c a n  l i f e ,  a n d  t h e y  f a i l e d
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to appraise correctly the social conflicts of their day."^5
The refusal of the traditional college to adjust to
the new culture found classic expression in the Western
Review of Cincinnati in 1820 in the following statement:
Should the time ever come when Latin and Greek should 
be banished from our universities, and the study of 
Cicero and Demosthenes, of Homer and Virgil, should be 
considered as unnecessary for the formation of a 
scholar, we should regard mankind as fast s i n k i n g  into 
absolute barbarism, and the gloom of mental darkness 
as likely to increase until it should become uni­
versal.14
With a static curriculum, the religious school had little 
hope of gaining widespread public support. According to 
another writer the sectarian activities of the denominations 
and the privileged positions which some of them Insisted upon 
brought down upon the Church a measure of discredit and 
diverted the energies of many educated men to secular idealism.15
Public Interest in the establishment of state- 
supported college received a new stimulus from the Morrill 
Act of 1862. By the Morrill Act the federal government 
donated public lands, or land-scrlpt, to those states which 
would use the proceeds from their sale for the support of at 
least one college where the leading objective would be to teach 
such branches of learning as were directly related to agri­
culture and the mechanical arts. The Morrill Act reflected
^^Hewton Edwards and Herman Richey, The School in 
tbfi ArnATioam Social Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Go.,
1947), p. 4Î6.
^^Utts, 00. cit.. p. 226.
ISoole, 00. cit.. PL. 13.
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t h e  g r o T v i n g  d e m a n d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c o u n t r y  t h a t  c o l l e g e s  
s h o u l d  e x p a n d  b e y o n d  t h e  l i m i t e d  a n d  r i g i d  c l a s s i c a l  c u r ­
r i c u l u m . ^ ^
V / i t h  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  g a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  
p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  M o r r i l l  A c t ,  n e w  u n i v e r s i t i e s  w e r e  f o u n d e d  
a n d  o l d e r  o n e s  e x p a n d e d .  O n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  s c h o o l s  n o w  c l a s ­
s i f i e d  a s  u n i v e r s i t i e s  a p p e a r e d  s u b s e q u e n t  t o  I 865, a n d  o n e  
h a l f  o f  t h e  c o l l e g e s  w e r e  s t a r t e d  a f t e r  1 8 7 5 . ^ ?  S i n c e  t h e  
u n i v e r s i t i e s  w h i c h  r e c e i v e d  s t a t e  o r  f e d e r a l  a s s i s t a n c e  w e r e  
u n d e r  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  m e e t  t h e  d e m a n d s  o f  s o c i e t y ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  
n a t u r a l  f o r  s u c h  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  b e c o m e  t h e  s e r v a n t  o f  t h e  
s t a t e .  I n  b e c o m i n g  t h e  s e r v a n t  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,  a n d  b y  a c c e p t ­
i n g  i t s  r o l e  a s  a  u t i l i t a r i a n  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  
i n c r e a s e d  t h e  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  i d e a l i s m  a n d  n a t u r a l i s m  i n  
e d u c a t i o n .
A s  t h e  c o l l e g e s  h a d  b e e n  b a s e d  u p o n  t r a n s p l a n t e d  
E n g l i s h  c o n c e p t i o n s ,  t h e  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  m o l d e d  
l a r g e l y  o n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  G e r m a n  u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  w i t h  t h e i r  
e m p h a s i s  o n  p u r e  r e s e a r c h ;  t h e i r  i d e a l  o f  a c a d e m i c  f r e e d o m  w a s  
c o m p l e t e l y  f r e e  f r o m  s e c t a r i a n  i n f l u e n c e ;  a n d  i n  t h e i r  c o n c e p t  
o f  s e r v i c e  t o  t h e  s t a t e ,  t h e  G e r m a n  u n i v e r s i t i e s  h a d  t a k e n  a  
c o m m a n d i n g  p o s i t i o n  a m o n g  t h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  o f  E u r o p e .  S i n c e
l ^ G o m m i s s i o n  o n  F i n a n c i n g  H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n ,  N a t u r e  
a n d  N e e d s  o f  H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n  ( N e w  Y o r k :  C o l u m b i a  U n i -
v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  p .  9 -
J a m e s  l u n d e n ,  T h e  D y n a m i c s  o f  H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n  
( N e w  Y o r k :  M c M i l l a n  C o m p a n y ,  I 93Ô ) ,  p .  1 & 4 .
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A m e r i c a n  u n i v e r s i t i e s  o f f e r e d  l i t t l e  i n  t h e  w a y  o f  g r a d u a t e
w o r k  i m m e d i a t e l y  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  C i v i l  W a r ,  m a n y  A m e r i c a n
s c h o l a r s  w e n t  t o  G e r m a n y  t o  p u r s u e  t h e i r  g r a d u a t e  s t u d i e s .
R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  G e r m a n  e d u c a t i o n  o n  t h e  A m e r i c a n
u n i v e r s i t y  o n e  w r i t e r  s t a t e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ;
A l l  t h e  g r e a t  a r c h i t e c t s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  u n i v e r s i t y ,  
f r o m  T i c k n o r  t o  G i l m a n ,  W h i t e ,  W o o l s e y ,  a n d  H a l l ,  h a d  
b e e n  p r o f o u n d l y  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  d i r e c t  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  t h e  
u n i v e r s i t i e s  o f  G e r m a n y .  O n e  o f  t h e  g r e a t  p i o n e e r s  o f  
t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  i d e a  b e f o r e  t h e  C i v i l  W a r ,  H e n r y  P .
T a p p a n ,  h a d  a t t e m p t e d  d u r i n g  h i s  p r e s i d e n c y  o f  t h e  U n i ­
v e r s i t y  o f  M i c h i g a n  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  G e r m a n  m o d e l  i n  t h e  
m o s t  d i r e c t  w a y . 1 8
A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  G e r m a n  m e t h o d s  o f  
r e s e a r c h  a n d  o f  t h e  r e n e w e d  a t t e m p t s  t o  a p p l y  s c i e n t i f i c  
m e t h o d s  t o  o t h e r  f i e l d s  o f  k n o w l e d g e  b e s i d e s  t h e  n a t u r a l  
s c i e n c e s ,  t h e  c u r r i c u l u m  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  b y  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  
o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  h a d  b e e n  e x p a n d e d  e n o r m o u s l y  b y  t h e  
a d d i t i o n  o f  s u c h  n e w  s c i e n c e s  a s  t h o s e  o f  l a n g u a g e  a n d  
p h i l o l o g y ,  h i s t o r y ,  e c o n o m i c s ,  p o l i t i c s ,  s o c i o l o g y ,  a n t h r o ­
p o l o g y ,  a r c h e o l o g y ,  m u s i c ,  p s y c h o l o g y ,  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  r e ­
l i g i o n .
T h e  m o s t  n o t a b l e  a t t e m p t  t o  o r g a n i z e  a  s t a t e  u n i v e r ­
s i t y  a f t e r  t h e  G e r m a n  m o d e l ,  p r i o r  t o  1 8 7 6 ,  w h e n  J o h n s  H o p k i n s  
U n i v e r s i t y  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  w a s  t h e  a t t e m p t  m a d e  b y  H e n r y  P .  
T a p p a n  d u r i n g  h i s  p r e s i d e n c y  o f  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M i c h i g a n .  
T a p p a n ,  i n s t a l l e d  a s  p r e s i d e n t  i n  1 8 5 2 ,  i n t r o d u c e d  m a n y  f e a -
l ^ H o f s t a d t e r ,  o p .  c i t . . p .  6 2 .
l^Butts, OP. cit.. p. 162.
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tures of the German university into the program at Michigan. 
Among these innovations were the addition of a science cur­
riculum leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science, the 
introduction of the lecture system as a replacement for text­
book recitation, the inauguration of co-education and the 
abolishment of college dormitories.^0 While Tappan did not 
achieve all his aims, he did make the University of Michigan 
a model of educational vigor.
One of the greatest sources of tension between pri­
vate, sectarian schools and public colleges resulted from the 
"Dartmouth College case," in which the state of Mew Hampshire 
sought to reorganize the college as Dartmouth University.
Since Dartmouth College had been organized in 1769 as a school 
to promote missionary work among the Indians, it was regarded 
by its trustees as a private, denominational college. The 
case was first argued in the courts of New Hampshire, where 
the trustees lost their case. But when the trustees carried 
the case to the Supreme Court of the United States the deci­
sion was reversed by Chief Justice Marshall in 1 8 1 9 .  The 
Dartmouth case established the right of a private college to 
retain its status, but it also increased the tension between 
private and secular interests.
Another source of tension between idealism and natural­
ism in the years between i860 and I960 was the increasing
20prederick Eby and Charles Arrowood, The Develop- 
ment of Modern Education (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.',
1941), p. 740.
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impact of the theory of evolution on scientific and educa­
tional thought. Prom the time when Origin of Species 
appeared in 1859» the theories of natural selection and 
mutability of the species created widespread interest in 
scientific investigation. These same theories also engendered 
bitter controversies in the intellectual atmosphere of the 
later nineteenth century. The most significant impact of 
the theory of evolution was upon the traditional, idealistic 
concepts of the origin of the universe and of life, led by 
men like Herbert Spencer, the evolutionary premise was 
applied to the academic areas of ethics, politics, history, 
economics, and the social life in general. The resulting 
intellectual conflict is described in these words:
. . . the authority of religion was challenged in the 
intellectual field, and the authority of the religiously 
sponsored liberal education of a classical and lin­
guistic kind was bound to be challenged by scientific 
studies that clamored for a place of dignity in liberal 
education.21
Running parallel to the growth of the university was 
the rapid expansion of denominational colleges. With both 
types of institutions, the state and the independent uni­
versity, and the sectarian college, manifesting vigor and 
strength, it would be normal that tension between the two 
would become sharp. This tension between idealism and natu­
ralism was expressed in various ways. Referring to the 
opposition between the two philosophies in Michigan, Andrew
23-Butts, on. cit.. p. 163.
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D. White writes:
. . . the worst difficulty by far was the steady oppo­
sition of the small sectarian colleges scattered thrcugh- 
out the state. Each, in its own petty interest, dreaded 
the growth of any institution better than itself; each 
in its religious assemblages, its synods, or conferences 
sought to stir prejudice against the state institution
as %godles8."22
Similar opposition occurred when a bill was introduced 
to the Eew York State Legislature to establish a university 
at Ithaca, Eew York. The first president describes the up­
roar caused by the introduction of the bill as follows:
The introduction of this new bill into the legislature 
was a signal for war. Nearly all the denominational 
colleges girded themselves for the fray, and sent their 
agents to fight us at Albany; they also stirred up the 
secular press, without distinction of party. . . and 
also the religious organs of their various sects in the 
great cities.23
President White continues:
. . . the struggle for our university charter was long 
and severe. The opposition of our twenty sectarian 
colleges, and of active politicians, from every quarter 
of the state where there colleges had been established, 
made our work difficult.24
Religious interests did not confine their opposition 
only to the legislative halls and to the printed page, but in 
many instances, they carried the battle to the campus itself. 
At Ohio State, for example, the religious struggle was di­
rectly involved in the resignation of two of its presidents, 
Edward Orton in 1880 and Walter Q. Scott in 1883. In a dis-
22Nhite, OP. cit.. p. 279.
23lbid., p. 334.
^^Ibid.. p. 334.
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cussion of this resignation a . student in the history of the
university writes that:
One of the causes of President Orton's resignation and 
one which does hot appear on the official records was 
that he was not in sympathy with those who believed that 
some sort of religious exercises should be held daily 
at the college. . . .Holding these sentiments he could 
not consistently and conscientiously conduct,the usual 
chapel exercises common in other c o l l e g e s . 25
President Orton remained adamant, never conducting chapel
services during his term.
It was largely with a view of allying the opposition 
of religious groups that President Orton's successor was 
chosen. She new president was the Hev. Walter Q. Scott, a 
Methodist minister from Easton, Pennsylvania. A short time 
before his election in 1881 a resolution was passed by the 
trustees which stated: "Resolved, that the President and
the Faculty are hereby instructed to arrange for holding 
daily a general meeting of the students in the university 
chapel."2^
The neglect of the new president to provide for the 
daily assemblage of the students resulted in a further reso­
lution calling attention to the failure, with added recom­
mendation that reading the Scriptures and prayers become part 
of the daily services. In November, 1882, the Board of 
Regents expressed its surprise that no action had been taken 
to carry out their instructions. The following March still
25oope, OP. cit.. p. 76.
ZGlbid.. p. 77.
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another such resolution was directed to the president.
Scott failed to comply, and at the June meeting of the hoard 
he was not re-elected as president .27
The chapel situation at Ohio State was a source of 
agitation for several years after Scott's dismissal. When 
William 0. Thompson was elected to presidency in 1899» he 
immediately recommended that daily chapel services he dis­
continued and that a weekly convocation of students and 
faculty he hhld to occupy one recitation period.28 The 
recommendation was accepted, ending a longer and bitter con­
troversy.
Another area in which religious groups exerted pres­
sure on the state universities was in the selection of 
faculty members. This issue was particularly crucial during 
the administration of Henry Tappan at the University of 
Michigan. When Tappan reacted indifferently to their demands 
the clergy took action, which one writer described in these 
words; ”. . .  the clergy were letter writers and lobbyists 
who kept the regents in ferment over Dr. Tappan's alleged in­
difference to their demands."29 The assaults of the clergy 
had little effect on Tappan, with his Prussian idea of educa­
tion. With austere dignity Tappan replied to the demands of 
sectarian groups regarding professorships:
27ibid.. p. 78. 28ibid.. p. 298.
29Kent Sagendorph, Michigan. The Story of the Uni­
versity (New York: E. P. Dutton and Go., 1948), p. 9^ .
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. . .  the idea which has prevailed in the university 
that the professorships should be decided with some 
equality and fairness among different denominations 
was entirely a wrong one; the only proper tests for 
fitness being neither political bias nor sectarian 
affiliations, hut simply good character and intel­
lectual superiority.30
Indiana University, founded in 1820, also experienced sec­
tarian controversies during its early history. Members of the 
Presbyterian and Methodist denominations, in particular, 
struggled to dominate the selection of faculty members.31 
In reviewing the handicaps of the university, eighty years 
after its founding, one writer refers to the following handi­
cap:
. . .  it was hampered by the antagonisms of religious 
sects, whose adverse influence was seen sometimes in 
the management of the institution, but more often in 
the unkind and uncalled for opposition to its manage­
ment and interests.32
By the end of the nineteenth century the religious 
interests had definitely lost their fight to influence or to 
control the universities. The reasons for the emerging in­
dependence of the university were easily discerned. First, 
the legislative acts of state and federal agencies had 
guaranteed the universities ample funds and had provided 
chapters assuring independent operation. As state univer­
sities ^abolished chapel services the hold of religion, at
30Andrew 0. McLaughlin, History of Higher Education 
in Michigan (Washington, D. 0. : Government Printing Office,
iB9i;
3 1 w i l l i a m  L. B r y a n  ( e d . ) ,  I n d i a n a  U n i v e r s i t y .  1820- 
1920 ( B l o o m i n g t o n ,  I n d . :  I n d i a n a  U n i v e r s i t y ,  1921), p .  102.
^^Samuel B. Harding (ed.), Indiana University. 1820- 
1904 (Bloomington, Ind.; Indiana University, 1904), p. 31.
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least directly, was greatly reduced. The appointment of 
faculty members without regard for church relationship was 
also a step in throwing off denominational influence.
Finally, the practical, utilitarian, scientific spirit of 
the age seemed to offer a natural atmosphere in which the 
university could function.
Another area which reflected the tension between 
idealism and naturalism was the area of curricular develop­
ment. Religious and rational idealism advocated one type of 
curriculum, while scientific and pragmatic naturalism sup­
ported a curriculum in harmony with its practical and philo­
sophical objectives. The second area of tension between 
religious idealism and naturalism in curricular development 
begins with the Civil War and ends with World War II. The 
third period is regarded as a period of reassessment, be­
ginning in the years immediately following World War II.
Idealism. Naturalism, and the Curriculum
of Higher Education
The relation between religion and the curriculum of
higher education falls into three clearly defined periods.
The first period dates from the founding of the nine colonial
c o l l e g e s ,  b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  H a r v a r d  i n  I 636.
Referring to the early colleges and-their curriculums
Arnold Nash of the University of Toronto, writes:
These colleges were modelled on the Oxford and Cam­
bridge pattern, suitably modified to accord with the 
demands of a pioneer culture. . . but nevertheless
Ill
they retained a definite Christian orientation.
Their main aim was to educate the leaders, lay and 
clerical, of church-centered communities.33
During this period the colleges were Christian in the sense 
that the members of their governing bodies and teaching 
staffs in the main were professing Christians, while atten­
dance at college chapel or parish church was an almost uni­
versal custom.
The curriculum of the early colonial college was 
traditional and religious, revolving around classical litera­
ture, languages, and moral philosophy. Commenting on the 
colonial curriculum one writer has said:
Our colonial ancestors studied and taught in an atmos- 
• phere of religion which they had inherited from the 
middle ages. . . the ecclesiastical hand was at the 
. helm, and the church formulated and fixed the purpose 
of the different branches.34
All students of the history of higher education in America are
f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e  w e l l - k n o w n  p a s s a g e  i n  I T e w  E n g l a n d  * s  F i r s t
F r u i t s  w h i c h  g i v e s  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  f o u n d i n g  o f  H a r v a r d
College :
After God had carried us safe to Hew England, and we 
had builded our houses, provided necessaries for our 
livelihood, rear'd convenient places for God's worship . 
and settled the Civil Government: one of the next 
things we longed for, and looked after, was to advance 
learning and perpetuate it for posterity; dreading to 
leave an illiterate ministry to the churches, when our 
present ministers shall be in the dust.35
3 3 i r n o l d  S .  H a s h ,  T h e  U n i v e r s i t y  a n d  t h e  M o d e r n  W o r l d  
( H e w  Y o r k :  T h e  M a c m i l l a n  C o . ,  1943)» p. 27Ô.
34oolyer Meriwether, Our Colonial Curriculum. 1607- 
1797 (Washington, D. C. Capitol Publishing Co., 1907), p. 13.
35Quoted by Tewksbury, The Founding of American . 
Colleges and Universities Before the Civil War, p. 62.
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The founding of King's College (Columbia TTniversity)
was also motivated by religious oonoems. The traditional
aim to train ministers was absent, but a more practioal and
broader aim took its place. The aim is stated in these words:
The aim was to teach students to know God in Jesus 
Christ. . . and to train them up in all virtuous 
habits, and all such useful knowledge, as may render 
them creditable to their families and friends, orna­
ments to their country, and useful to the public weal 
in their generation.3o
For better or for worse, the forces of denominational 
and sectarian religion gained a dominance in American life 
that was to remain largely unchallenged until after the Civil 
War. The total impact of religion upon American life, includ­
ing education is illustrated by a statement from a famous 
French traveler who visited America in 1831. Of religion in 
America, Alexis De Tocqueville ;frites:
In the 17. S. the sovereign authority is religious. . . 
there is no country in the whole world in which the 
Christian religion retains a greater influence over.the 
souls of men than in America; religion directs the 
manners of the community, and by regulating domestic 
life, it regulates the state.37
Following the Civil War several forces combined to 
break the control of religion over higher education. First 
was the widespread acceptance of the evolutionary concept of 
the origin of life, resulting in the eventual replacement of 
theology by selence as the foundation of the curriculum of
3^Butts, OP. cit.. p. 67.
37Alexis De Toogueville, American Ittstitutions (New 
York: A. S. Barnes and Co., 1855), p. 308.
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h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o a .
N o t  o a l y  w a s  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  c o a t r o l  o v e r  e d u c a t i o a  
c h a l l e a g e d  b y  s c i e a c e ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p o s i t i o a  
o f  i d e a l i s m  a a d  t h e  " g e a t e e l  t r a d i t i o a "  w a s  a t t a c k e d  b y  t h e  
a e w  a a d  u a i q u e l y  A m e r i c a n ,  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  P r a g m a t i s m .  T h e  
o r i g i n a l  t r a d i t i o a  o f  C a l v i n i s m  i n  A m e r i c a  a a d  t h e  e a r l y  
n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  i n f l u e n c e  o f  G e r m a n  i d e a l i s m  h a d  l e d  m o s t  
A m e r i c a n  t h i n l c e r s  t o  a c c e p t  c o n c e p t s  i n  w h i c h  e v e r y  p e r s o n  
h a d  a  p r e d e t e r m i n e d  p l a c e  a n d  w h e r e  t r u t h  w a s  f i x e d  a n d  
e t e r n a l .  P r a g m a t i s t s  d e n i e d  a l l  t h i s ,  m a k i n g  t h e  w o r l d  
r e l a t i v e  a n d  i n c o m p l e t e . 3 8  T h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  
a l s o  t e n d e d  t o  w e a k e n  t h e  h o l d  o f  r e l i g i o n .
A n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  
r e l i g i o n  f r o m  t h e  c u r r i c u l u m  o f  h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  
C i v i l  V f a r  w a s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  e l e c t i v e  s y s t e m ,  w i t h  
t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n .  L e a d e r s  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  
e l e c t i v e  s y s t e m  a n d  i n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  w e r e  
s u c h  e d u c a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  a s  C h a r l e s  E l i o t  o f  H a r v a r d ,  
F r e d e r i c k  A .  B a r n a r d  o f  C o l u m b i a ,  A n d r e w  D .  W h i t e  o f  C o r n e l l ,  
D a v i d  C .  G i l m a n  o f  J o h n s  H o p k i n s , ' - D a v i d  S t a r r  J o r d a n  o f  
S t a n f o r d ,  a n d  W i l l i a m  R .  H a r p e r  o f  C h i c a g o .  B u t t s  s u m ­
m a r i z e s  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e s e  m e n  b y  s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e y  a c t i v e l y  
t r a n s f o r m e d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  c o l l e g e  e d u c a t i o n .  A m o n g  t h e  
c h a n g e s  m e n t i o n e d  w a s  t h e  e c l i p s e  o f  r e l i g i o n .  B u t t s  w r i t e s :
38Butts, on. cit.. p. 261.
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. . . the religious tone of college education began 
to lose ground to the advancing secular aim to pre­
pare for citizenship or occupation to an increasingly 
secular curriculum.39
P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  e c l i p s e  o f  
r e l i g i o n  f r o m  t h e  c u r r i c u l u m  o f  h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  
C i v i l  i i a r  v r a s  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  d e m a n d s  o f  t h e  n e w  s t a t e  u n i ­
v e r s i t i e s .  T h e  a s t o u n d i n g  g r o w t h  o f  m e c h a n i c a l  t e c h n o l o g y ,  
t h e  r a p i d  e x p a n s i o n  o f  l a r g e - s c a l e  i n d u s t r y ,  a n d  t h e  e x p l o i ­
t a t i o n  o f  t h e  W e s t ,  l i n k e d  t o  t h e  i d e a  o f  p e r s o n a l  a c q u i s i ­
t i v e n e s s ,  g e n e r a t e d  a  u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n c e p t  i n  s o m e  a r e a s  o f  
e d u c a t i o n a l  t h o u g h t .  C h a r l e s  A .  B e a r d  m a k e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
c o m m e n t  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  r o l e  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  
h a l f  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y :  " T r i u m p h a n t  b u s i n e s s  e n t e r ­
p r i s e ,  w i t h  i t s  b i t t e r  s t r u g g l e s  w i t h  o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r ,  g a v e  
t h e  d o m i n a n t  t o n e  t o  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a n d  m o r a l  t e m p e r  o f  
t h e  l a t e r  d e c a d e s . " ^
T h e  g r o w i n g  u n i v e r s i t i e s  s e e m e d  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  
c a l l  f o r  a  p r a c t i c a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  i n  s t a t e s  
p r e d o m i n a n t l y  a g r i c u l t u r a l ,  s u c h  a s  O h i o  a n d  W i s c o n s i n .  I n  
d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  p r o p o s e d  c h a r t e r  f o r  t h e  n e w l y  f o u n d e d  O h i o  
S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  G o v e r n o r  R u t h e r f o r d  H a y e s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  
b y  l a w  t h e  p r o c e e d s  o f  t h e  l a n d  s c r i p t  s h o u l d  b e  a p p r o p r i ­
a t e d  t o  t h e  e n d o w m e n t ,  s u p p o r t ,  a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  a  c o l l e g e ,  
w h e r e  t h e  l e a d i n g  o b j e c t  w a s  t o  t e a c h  s u c h  b r a n c h e s  o f
39ibid.. p. 203.
4 ^ 0 ,  A .  B e a r d  a n d  M .  R .  B e a r d ,  T h e  R i s e  o f  A m e r i c a n  
C i v i l i z a t i o n  ( H e w  Y o r k :  T h e  M a c m i l l a n  C o m p a n y ,  1937)»
p. 31Ô.
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l e a r n l n s  w h i c h  w e r e  r e l a t e d  t o  a g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  t o  t h e  
m e c h a n i c a l  a r t s . ^ l  l a  h a r m o n y  ï f i t h  t h e  g o v e r n o r ' s  w i s h e s ,  
a n  i n t e n s e l y  p r a c t i c a l  c u r r i c u l u m  w a s  a d o p t e d .  T h e  g e n e r a l  
p a t t e r n  o f  c u r r i c u l a r  o f f e r i n g s  w a s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t e n  a r e a s .  
T h e s e  w e r e :  ( 1 )  T h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e ;  ( 2 )  T h e  D e ­
p a r t m e n t  o f  M e c h a n i c  A r t s :  ( 3 )  M a t h e m a t i c s  a n d  P h y s i c s ;
( 4 )  G e n e r a l  a n d  A p p l i e d  C h e m i s t r y ;  ( 5 )  G e o l o g y ,  M i n i n g ,  a n d  
M e t a l l u r g y ;  ( 6 )  Z o o l o g y  a n d  V e t e r i n a r y  S c i e n c e ;  ( 7 )  B o t a n y ,  
H o r t i c u l t u r e  a n d  V e g e t a b l e  P h y s i o l o g y ;  ( 8 )  E n g l i s h  a n d  
l i t e r a t u r e ;  ( 9 )  M o d e r n  a n d  A n c i e n t  L a n g u a g e s ;  ( 1 0 )  P o l i t i c a l  
E c o n o m y  a n d  C i v i l  P o l i t y . ^ 2  S u c h  a  c u r r i c u l u m ,  n o  d o u b t ,  
w a s  c o m p l e t e l y  i n  k e e p i n g  : f i t h  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  u t i l i t y .
A n o t h e r  m i d - w e s t e r n  u n i v e r s i t y ,  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
W i s c o n s i n ,  r e f l e c t s  a  s i m i l a r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r a c ­
t i c a l  c u r r i c u l u m .  A  n a t i v e  s o n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  
o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w o r d s :
T h e  o b j e c t  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y ,  a s  s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g ,  w a s  t o  o f f e r  p r a c t i c a l  c o u r s e s .  . . a n d  
t h e  m o s t  I m p o r t a n t  c r i t e r i o n  i n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
o f  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a n d  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  s t u d y  w a s
u t i l i t a r i a n . 4 3
T h e  s t r e s s  o n  a  u t i l i t a r i a n  c u r r i c u l u m  a p p e a r e d  t o  
b e  o n e  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  n e w  u n i v e r s i t i e s .
E z r a  C o r n e l l ,  t h e  f o u n d e r  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  w h i c h  b e a r s  h i s  
n a m e ,  i n  h i s  o p e n i n g  a d d r e s s  a t  - t h e  i n a u g u r a l  c e r e m o n i e s  o f
41James E. Pollard, History of the Ohio State Uni­
versity (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1952), p. 16.
42Alexis Oope, History of Ohio State University 
(Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1920), p. 102.
43Merle Ourti, T h e  University of Wisconsin (Madison,
' W i s . :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  W i s c o n s i o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 4 9 ) ,  p .  7 5 *
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t h e  u n i v e r s i t y ,  s a i d :
I  h o p e  w e  h a v e  l a i d  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  
w h i c h  s h a l l  c o m b i n e  p r a c t i c a l  w i t h  l i b e r a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  
w h i c h  s h a l l  f i t  t h e  y o u t h  o f  o u r  c o u n t r y  f o r  t h e  p r o ­
f e s s i o n s ,  t h e  f a r m s ,  t h e  m i n e s ,  t h e  m a n u f a c t o r i e s ,  f o r  
t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  o f  s c i e n c e ,  a n d  f o r  m a s t e r i n g  a l l  
t h e  p r a c t i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  o f  l i f e  w i t h  s u c c e s s  a n d
h o n o r . 4 4
T h e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  i t s  f o u n d e r ,  e m b l a z o n e d  o n  t h e  C o r n e l l  U n i ­
v e r s i t y  s e a l ,  b e c a m e  t h e  v r a t c h w o r d  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y :  " I
w o u l d  f o u n d  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  w h i c h  a n y  p e r s o n  c a n  f i n d  
i n s t r u c t i o n  i n  a n y  s u b j e c t . " 4 5
î f h e n  O h i o  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  o p e n e d  i t s  d o o r s  a s  t h e  
O h i o  A g r i c u l t u r a l  a n d  M e c h a n i c a l  C o l l e g e  i n  1 8 7 3  t h e  t h e m e  
o f  i t s  i n a u g u r a t i o n  w a s  a l s o  p r a c t i c a l .  A  p r a c t i c a l  e d u c a ­
t i o n ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  d e d i c a t i o n  a d d r e s s ,  i f a s  o n e  t h a t  
c o u l d  b e  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  a n d  t h e  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f  
e v e r y  d a y  l i f e ,  t h a t  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  i n  d o i n g  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  
w o r l d . 4 G  E v e n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s u b j e c t s ,  w h e n  i n c l u d e d ,  
s h o u l d  s e r v e  a  p r a c t i c a l  p u r p o s e .  T h e  p r a c t i c a l  p u r p o s e  o f  
E n g l i s h  a n d  L o g i c  w a s  s t r e s s e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e f e r e n c e ;
" .  . . i s  n o t  t h e  t r a i n i n g  t h a t  e n a b l e s  u s  t o  d e t e c t  a  f l a w  
i n  a  d e f i n i t i o n  o r  a  f a l l a c y  i n  a n  a r g u m e n t  a s  d i r e c t l y  
p r a c t i c a l  a s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  t e s t  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  i r o n  o r  t h e  
p u r i t y  o f  w h i t e  l e a d ? " ^ ^  T h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  n a t u r e  o f  t h e
4 4 q . D .  V o n  E n g e l e n ,  C o n c e r n i n g  C o r n e l l  ( I t h a c a ,
N e v r  Y o r k :  G e o g r a p h y  S u p p l y  B u r e a u ,  1 9 1 7 ) ,  p .  3 3 7 .
4 5 A n d r e v r  D .  W h i t e ,  A u t o b i o g r a p h y  o f  A n d r e w  D .
W h i t e  ( N e w  Y o r k :  T h e  C e n t u r y  C o m p a , n y ,  1906), p .  300.
46poiiard, o p . cit.. p. 43. , p. 44.
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university was given classical expression in tlie oft- 
repeated statement of President 0offman, of the University 
of Minnesota: "The state universities hold that there is
no intellectual service too undignified for them to per­
form. "48
Apparently the state universities responded to the 
practioal demands of a culture vitally influenced by the 
technological and scientific spurt of the late nineteenth 
century. Some universities, particularly the older ones, did 
retain an appreciation for the more traditional studies. But 
on the whole it seems safe to conclude that in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century the desire to be practical 
and scientific was the prime motive in university education.
Uhen World War II occurred religion in the curriculum 
of higher education was either lightly regarded or completely 
ignored as a whole. Beginning with a complete mastery of the 
educational curriculum in the colonial period, religion ivas 
seriously challenged in the Revolutionary Period, but managed 
to maintain its control over higher education until after the 
Civil War. In the decades following the Civil War higher 
education was almost completely secularized, vrlth the excep­
tion of the church college.
In the decades from 1940-1960 American Colleges 
undertook a more thorough-going revision of their courses of
4 8 H e n r y  P r a t t  F a i r c h i l d  ( e d . ) .  T h e  O b l i g a t i o n  o f  
U n i v e r s i t i e s  t o  t h e  S o c i a l  O r d e r  ( U e w  Y o r k :  F e w  Y o r k
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 3 5 ) ,  p .  2 8 .
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study than had taken place in any similar period of our 
history. One of the recurrent themes in recent years has 
been the problem of religion and of spiritual values in edu­
cation. However, not all educators joined enthusiastically 
in the attempt to reinstate religion in the curriculum of 
higher education. Educators may be said to display three 
attitudes toward the place of religion, or of values in 
higher education; namely; those who are indifferent to re­
ligion in higher education, those who oppose any religious 
instruction in higher education, and those who advocate 
religion in higher education.
Bernard Iddings Bell states emphatically that "the
American University does not in reality care a button about
religion."^9 He continues:
It regards religion not as an experimental technique 
which, along with science and the arts, helps man to 
understand the universe sufficiently so that he can 
live in it vrithout being reduced to boredom or despair.
It looks on religion as one of the minor amusements, 
like china painting or playing the flute, pleasant for 
those who enjoy that sort of thing, but not an intel­
lectual or practical necessity.50
In consequence, Bell says; the university is willing to rele­
gate consideration of religion to a minor, decreasing, hardly 
more than microscopic place in the curriculum.51 This indif­
ference, in the mind of Bell, is not so much due to the
ernard Iddings Bell, Crisis in Education (Hew 
York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1949), p. 152.
SOlbid.. p. 155.
Sllbid.
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American university's forgetfulness of God as to its debased 
conception of man. Its tacit assumption is that man is one 
of the animals and that his happiness, significance and 
greatness can be achieved by providing his animal needs.
Another writer who laments the indifference of the 
university tov/ard religion is Arnold Fash of Oxford Univer­
sity, who defines a university as follows: "It is a place
where a multitude of studies are conducted, with no relation­
ship between them except those of simultaneity and juxtaposi­
tion. "52 As a consequence of this indifference modern man 
has exchanged, says Fash, the intellectual idolatry of 
scholasticism for the intellectual polytheism of scientific 
positivism.53
Fot all ’tirriters agree with Fash and Bell as to the
indifference of the universities to religion. For instance,
•Merriman Cuninggim of Yale irrites:
The secularization of higher education seems to have 
reached its peak around the time of the First World War, 
since then the colleges have recaptured much of their 
lost concern for the religious development of their stu­
dents and have increasingly assumed responsibility for
such nurture.54
Since Bell %frote his statement in 1948 and Cuninggim 
expressed his opinion in 1947, apparently both statements 
cannot be correct. Evidence presented later will indicate 
Bell is unduly pessimistic, for some institutions, including
52iTash, OP. cit.. p. 259. 53ibia., p. 258.
S^^erriman Cuninggim, The Colleges Seek Religion 
(Few Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 153.
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state schools, have established Departments of Religion since” 
1925. However, it is possible that Ouninggim is seeing the 
picture through the background of Hew England, for the present 
status of religion is not as respectable as he indicates. It 
would seem to be true that there has been a renewed interest 
in religion on the part of the state and independent univer­
sities and that the indifference of the first quarter of the 
twentieth century is gradually giving way to a cautious recon­
sideration of religion in higher education.
In contrast to the attitude of indifference to 
religion in higher education is the attitude of active oppo­
sition to the inclusion of religion in the curriculum. Three 
men aptly present the case against religion. These men are 
John Dewey, Sidney Hook and V. T. Thayer.
To Dewey, as the father of the so-called "progressive 
education" movement religion in the usual sense was little 
more than sectarianism, consisting of a special body of be­
liefs and practices having some kind of institutional organi­
zation. 55 Education in a democracy can have nothing to do with 
this body^ of beliefs, according to Dewey. He points out, how­
ever, a difference between 'teligion, a religion, and the 
religion."5^ The adjective "religious" denoted "attitudes 
that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end 
or ideal."57 Thus the "religious attitude" is sanctioned, and
55John Dewey, A Common Faith (Hew Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1934), p. 9.
55ihid.. p. 3. 57ibid.. p. 10.
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progressive education seeks to foster it. But religion in 
the traditional sense is taboo. As a naturalist, Dewey ob­
jects to any attempt to include the supernatural, and his 
use of the term "religious," in contrast with "religion" 
refers only to "the use of natural agencies.
The approach of Dewey to religion has logical con­
sequences in education. The whole process of education 
must be creative rather than transmissive. Learning takes 
place through activity, through participation in life situa­
tion, through the use of the project method. . Teaching con­
sists not of indoctrination but of guidance. Knowledge it­
self is viewed as life experience and is therefore evolution­
ary, with complete trust placed in the scientific method for 
arriving at tentative truth. The ultimate result of this 
philosophy is to eliminate religion from the curriculum. Most 
progressives followed Dewey in their opposition to religion 
in the curriculum.
Another outspoken critic of religion in the curricu­
lum of higher education is V. T. Thayer. Thayer's opposition 
is directed against the idea that religion is essential be­
cause it is the basis of all morality. He writes:
Only the parochial mind continues to ground morality in 
Pfesbyterianism, shall we say, as against Catholicism, 
or in Christianity as against Buddhism. But is it not 
equally provincial to ignore the fact that the basic 
principles of morality are found as well in the daily .
58Ibid.. p. 81.
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practices and conviction of men of no religious faltl%?59
Thayer's opposition is directed at the traditional
approach of teaching religion as a body of doctrine and
against the- 3d.de claims made for religion as the source of
democracy and morality. He admits that the resources for
acquainting young people with the religious institutions of
the community and the faiths men hold are richer than the
schools have realized. He candidly admits the following:
. . . there are professional possibilities of an intel­
lectual character in this field which schools might well 
explore— provided only that a professional attitude is 
strictly maintained.
A third opponent of religion in the program of higher 
education is Sidney Hook, of Hew York ïïniversity. His oppo­
sition is also against the doctrinaire, traditional method of 
teaching religion. He states: " . . .  the demand for the
introduction of required religious and theological study is 
not motivated merely by the desire for the cultural enrich­
ment of the c u r r i c u l u m . H o o k  believes that a study of 
history reveals that religious truths do not have a monopoly 
on the discovery and effective teaching of moral ideals. 
Neither the meaning nor the validity of moral ideals rests on 
supernatural fou ndation.His  conclusion on the matter is
59y. T. Thayer, The Attack Upon the American Sehular 
School (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951;, p. 205.
GOlbid.. p. 225.
^^Sidney Hook, Education for Modem Man (Hew York: 
Dial Press, 1946), p. 107.
^^Ibid.
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summarized in the following words:
To introduce these studies is to make a sharp break with 
the critical methods of inq.uiry followed in other disci­
plines in the curriculum. . . to prescribe these studies 
in a community of many different faiths and revealed 
truths is to revive the insoluble religious controversies 
of the past with all their dangers.
The opposition of Dewey, Thayer, and Hook to religious 
studies in the curriculum of higher education reflects basic 
educational philosophies, rather than an overt antagonism to 
religion. Thayer accepts the validity of the Christian faith, 
but feels that it is aggressive in an attempt to impose sec­
tarian concepts into the realm of education. Dewey is a 
naturalist who rejects any religion within a supernatural 
framework, and thinks religion, as commonly understood, is 
superfluous in the educational process. Hook denies the claims 
of religion as the uniq.ue source of morals and democracy, 
accepting instead a pluralistic concept of the origin of morals 
and of democratic ideals. He also feels that reintroducing 
religion into education would engender strife.
The third attitude toward the place of religion in the 
curriculum of higher education embodies the conviction that 
religion is an integral part of the educational process. Since 
this group is aggressive in dealing with the problem, there is 
a prolific output of literature advocating religion as an 
academic discipline. Some insist on the inclusion of religion 
because it is part of the cultural heritage of our nation.
G^Ibid.. p. 110.
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Others feel religion should be a part of the academic core 
because it contributes to a "liberal" or general education. 
Still others state that religion is essential for an under­
standing of the world.
One of the most positive spokesman on the side of 
religion is Robert Olich of Harvard University who states: 
"Those who hold that religion is no longer important should at 
least present the role of religion as one which played a 
unifying part in shaping that conception of the dignity of 
man on which our civil liberties still rest."G4 jo Ulich the 
problem of understanding and appreciating our cultural heri­
tage is vital, for he continues:
So far as we know, never has a culture survived that has 
severed itself from its original roots. We are today in 
this danger, for one of the roots of our culture is the 
Judaic-Christian form of religion, which so many of us 
no longer understand.65
A c c o r d i n g  t o  U l i c h ,  i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n v e y  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f
t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r a l  h e r i t a g e  i f  r e l i g i o n  i s  o m i t t e d .
J a c q u e s  M a r i t a n  a n d  J o h n  I I .  M o o r e  r e p r e s e n t  t h o s e  w h o  
f e e l  t h a t  r e l i g i o n  i s  a n  e s s e n t i a l  i n  a  s o u n d  l i b e r a l  o r  
g e n e r a l  e d u c a t i o n  p r o g r a m .  M o o r e  r e f l e c t s  t h i s  c o n c e p t  i n  
t h e s e  w o r d s :
I t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  e d u c a t i o n  t o  b e  e i t h e r  l i b e r a l  o r  
g e n e r a l  u n l e s s  i t  p u t s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n c e r n s  a t  t h e  
c e n t e r  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  f o r  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  s i m p l y  t h e
'^^‘Robert Ulich, Religious Perspectives of College 
Teachers (Hew Haven; Hazen Foundation, 1959), p. 12.
65ibid.. p. 15.
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generalizing function and ideas are the means by which .. 
we achieve general understanding.oo
To this writer the ultimate goal of liberal general education 
is today as it has been for centuries, the harmonious develop­
ment of all our powers. And at bottom this is a moral and 
spiritual undertaking.^7
Jacques Maritan agrees in essence '«ri.th the above 
statement. He states that man cannot progress in his own 
specific.life, either intellectually or morally, without being 
helped by collective experience previously accumulated and 
preserved, and by a regular transmission of acquired knowl­
e d g e . ^8 The purpose of transmitting knowledge is to develop 
the individual. In this development religion is necessary. 
Maritan continues:
If the aim of education is the helping and guiding of 
man toward his own human achievements, education cannot 
escape the problems and entanglements of philosophy, for 
it.supposes by its very nature a philosophy of man.o9
An educator in a state university department of edu­
cation also supports the place of religion in general educa­
tion. Everett J. Kircher, writing in Progressive Education, 
makes a strong case for religion. To Kircher the effective 
teaching of religion as one of the liberal studies has this
^^John M. Moore, The Place of Moral and Religious 
Values in Programs of General Education (Hew Haven: Yale
University Press, 1943), p. 21.
67Ibid.
^^Jacques Maritan, Education at the Crossroads (Hew 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 2.
69Ibid.. p. 4.
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in common vrith all vital teaching, that new dimensions are 
built to the understanding."^*^ Only by including religion, 
says this educator from Ohio State University, can the uni­
versity attain a judicious balance in its effort to learning 
in all the major concerns of a culture. He writes:
. . .  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e  t h e  g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
o u r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  h i g h e r  l e a r n i n g  a r e  s e r v i n g  o u r  
c u l t u r e  i n  g e n e r a l  a n d  o u r  s t u d e n t s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w i t h  
s o m e  d e g r e e  o f  a d e q u a c y  i n  e v e r y  m a j o r  a r e a  e x c e p t  
r e l i g i o n . 7 1
To include religion, in Kircher's opinion, would make religion 
a respectable discipline and also reduce and transform the 
parochialism of most present-day religious knowledge.
There is much to support the contentions of these 
writers, according to Ward Madden, who states that traditional 
religious outlooks represent judgments based upon ages of 
religious experience. They command the loyalties of millions 
of persons. Rather than start with a clean slate, it seems 
better to make use of the generations of experience and 
loyalties which may be used as springboards toward a religious 
way of life appropriate to the scientific, democratic and 
organismic outlook of our age.?^
Others, such as the classical thinkers, would accord 
religion a place in the academic program similar to any other
" ^ E v e r e t t  J .  K i r c h e r ,  " R e l i g i o n  a n d  t h e  L i b e r a l  U n i ­
v e r s i t y , "  P r o g r e s s i v e  E d u c a t i o n . X ^ I I I  ( J u l y  1 ,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  9 7 .
7 i p i d . .  p .  9 9 .
^%ard Madden, Religious Values in Education (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1951)» P. 5.
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discipline.or interest. It would be included, but only in 
its intellectual aspect. Great religious thought, as repre­
sented in the Bible and other great books, together with the 
history of its development, would be included. But to the 
classicist religion as an attitude toward the whole of life, 
as worship, as activity is outside the responsibility of the 
college and enters into its program incidentally, if at all.?^
The list of writers advocating a place for religion 
in ^gher education is almost endless. Wallace Bonham, for 
twenty years dean of Harvard Business School, states: " . . .  
the omission of any real emphasis in American colleges on the 
essentials of religion. . . is a national calamity. Hels 
Ferre, author and teacher writes: "The integrity of education
demands that it scrutinize the claim of religion to be a 
legitimate subject for public instruction.Christian Gauss, 
dean emeritus of Princeton University, states that it is 
impossible for the undergraduate to understand the cultures of 
other nations without a knowledge of r e l i g i o n .
In summary, there appears to be an Increasing and per­
sistent demand for a place for religion in higher education. 
Some declare that the national heritage must of necessity in-
730uninggim, on. cit.. p. 108.
^^wallace B. Bonham, Education for Responsible Living 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 116.
" ^ % e l s  F e r r e ,  C h r i s t i a n  F a i t h  a n d  H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n  
( H e w  Y o r k ;  H a r p e r  a n d  B r o t h e r s ,  1954), p .  9.
7 6 c h r i s t i a n  G a u s s ,  T h e  T e a c h i n g  o f  R e l i g i o n  i n  A m e r i ­
c a n  H i g h e r  E d u c a t i o n  ( H e w  Y o r k :  R o n a l d  P r e s s ,  1951), P *  17«
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elude religion as an authentic academic area. Still others 
feel that religion is important in a comprehensive and 
authentic understanding of world cultures. The advocates 
of religion rank among the outstanding scholars and thinkers 
of the nation.
To complete the historical survey of the tension 
between idealism and naturalism in education in the United 
States between i860 and I960, it seems essential to discuss 
briefly two contrasting philosophies which influenced edu­
cational thought in the last century. These two opposing 
approaches to philosophy are rational idealism and prag­
matic naturalism.
Rational Idealism Versus Pragmatic Naturalism
By the beginning of the twentieth century the conflict 
between idealism and naturalism had been transferred from the 
practical and utilitarian approach to intellectual and 
academic consideration. The university, with its stress on 
the practical, scientific and non-authoritarian approach to 
education had gained a secure foothold in American culture 
and no longer felt threatened, to any serious degree, by 
religious interests. On the other hand the denominational, 
or religious-type institution, was by tradition an essential 
part of the national life, and thus felt no need to make any 
concessions to the newer educational institution, the uni­
versity. Since neither the religious institution nor the 
secular university could interfere with the development and
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growth, of its counter-part, the struggle was transferred to 
the philosophical area. This philosophical struggle eventually 
crystalized into tension between rational idealism and prag­
matic naturalism.
It appears to be sound to assert that at the beginning
of the twentieth century practical religious idealism was
over-shadowed, in education at least, by a rational idealism
which reflected religious concepts. George P. Adams, writing
in 1919, comments:
The practical attitude and organization of human life 
which eventuates in the idea system of idealism is, 
historically, bound up with certain of the more pro­
found traits of religion. Not that religion, as an 
historical fact and institution, exhibits in unmixed 
form the substance and texture of idealism. Yet it 
had none so sufficiently to warrant our saying that 
idealism is the theological framework for religion.77
The shift in emphasis from a practical Christian 
idealism to a rational religious idealism was influenced, to 
a great degree, by the growing propularity of German philos­
ophy in the United States, particularly following the Civil 
War. The most important factors in bringing German influence 
to America were the exodus of American studenls to Germany for 
graduate study and the reverse flow of German scholars to 
American universities. Since idealism was the dominant phi­
losophy in Germany in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, it was natural that the interchange of scholars should
77George P. Adams, Idealism and the Modern Age 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), p. l3.
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result in the importation of philosophical idealism into the 
United States.
The first deliberate step to establish philosophical
idealism in formal American education was made in St. Louis,
Missouri. In 1866 William T. Harris founded the St. Louis
Philosophical Society and in 1867 the Journal of Speculative
Philosophy vjas launched. According to Donald Butler, in the
pages of "the Journal" Hegel was made to speak English over
a period of twenty-six years of publication, 1867-1893.
Referring to the place of Harris in educational thought
Butler continues;
Inspiration of many in the St. Louis group, founder and 
editor of the first philosophical journal in this 
country, one of the most important national leaders in 
education, and popular lecturer, William T. Harris, it 
can justly be said, was the fountainhead of the Ameri­
can idealist movement.79
Harris became an enthusiastic follower of Hegel and 
put the Hegelian philosophy to work in everyday life. Harris 
writes; "Even the hunting of wild turkeys or squirrels was 
the occasion for the use of philosophy, and we use it to 
solve all problems connected with school-teaching and school- 
management. Two works of Hegel impressed him more deeply 
than all other books; the Logic and the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History. Harris echoes his complete acceptance
f^Butler, OP. cit.. p. 159. ^^Ibid.
®^Quoted by Neil 0. McOluskey, Public Schools and 
Moral Education (New York: Oolumbia University Press, 1958)',
p. 109.
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of Hegelian idealism in the following statement, referring to
his reaction to Hegel's Logict
The mental atmosphere of the hook has a q.uieting and 
soothing effect on the student. All the collisions and 
petty details of terrestrial affairs seem to fall away, 
and one gazes, as it were, into their eternal archetypes, 
and sees the essence of the conflict, the problem 
reduced to its lowest terms.°1
Hegel had put a master key to the universe in the talented 
hands of Harris, and ïfith this key he hoped to unlock the door 
to enlightenment, first to St. Louis, and ultimately to the 
entire nation. Harris adopts the Hegelian definition of edu­
cation as the process through which the individual man becomes 
ethical.82 However, the school was only one of five insti­
tutions which developed the free, ethical person. In addition 
to the school there was the family, civil society, the state, 
and the church. Harris felt that it was impossible for the 
school alone to give the education which the five institutions 
together could give. The school was, to Harris, one of the 
agencies which should contribute to developing ethically 
responsible citizens. At one time or another he challenged 
the tenets, in whole or in part, of Rousseau, Pestalozzi,
Spencer, Herbart, Froebel, Darwin, Parker, Stearns, the McMurrys, 
James, and D e w e y . Harris remains as one of the great repre­
sentatives of idealism in American educational theory, serving 
as United States Commissioner of Education from 1887-1909.
Gllbid.. p. 111. 82ibia,, p. 120.
85ibid.. p. 128.
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A second representative of idealism in educational 
philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century was 
William 0. Bagley. Bagley .states that in order to study the 
concrete problems of education, a guiding principle is needed 
that will cover every case that is presented.®^ Although an 
idealist in education, Bagley accepts the experiential 
approach to learning, for he states that fundamentally the 
possibility of education depends upon the capacity of the 
organism to profit by past experiences. He defines education 
as the acquirement of experiences that will serve to modify 
inherited adjustments.Thus the capacity to profit by 
individual experience is the principle which Bagley feels is 
applicable to every phase of the educative process.
Formal education, or directed experience in the schools, 
is essential in that it provides the opportunity to assimilate 
racial experience as well, as the occasion for individual 
experience. Bagley defines the school as an institution for 
turning environmental forces to a definite and conscious end.
It is at the point of specifying the ends and objectives of 
education that Bagley places himself in the idealistic tradi­
tion, for he writes:
It is safe to assert that the main aim in education is to 
instill ideals that will function as judgments, and that, 
in one sense at least, the subject-matter of instructors 
must be totally subservient to this aim. The classical
8^William 0. Bagley, The Educative Process (Hew York: 
The Macmillan Oo., 1922), p. 3.
8 5 i b i d .
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e d u c a t i o n ,  o f  t h e  p a s t  u n d o u b t e d l y  h a d  l i t t l e  w o r t h  i n  
s o  f a r  a s  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  v a l u e  o f  i t s  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  
w a s  c o n c e r n e d ;  b u t  i t  h a s  i m m e a s u r a b l e  w o r t h  i n  s o  f a r  
a s  t h e  i d e a l s  t h a t  i t  i n s t i l l e d  w e r e  concerned.8 6
B a g l e y  a p p e a r e d  t o  a p p r o a c h  e d u c a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  e x p e r i e n t i a l
side in regard to method, but the aims and outcomes desired
were specifically idealistic.
The values, or ideals of education are divided into 
five classes by Bagley: "(a) the utilitarian, (b) conven­
tional, (c) preparatory, (d) theoretical), (e) sentimental."87 
The utilitarian value of knowledge implies that its direct 
application may serve in the solution of the problems and 
situations that life presents. Conventional values are those 
which a person needs to be acceptable in his social environ­
ment. Preparatory values are those facts and principles which 
serve as a basis for the acquisition of other facts and prin­
ciples. Theoretical values are items of knowledge that have 
little or no significance in the practical affairs of life, 
but which may be necessary to a system of knowledge. Senti­
mental values are those which one acquires to satisfy his 
curiosity or his emotional needs.
W i l l i a m  T .  H a r r i s  a n d  W i l l i a m  0 .  B a g l e y  a r e  t y p i c a l  
a n d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  i d e a l i s t i c  s c h o o l  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  
p h i l o s o p h y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y .  H o w ­
e v e r ,  t h e  m o s t  a r t i c u l a t e  s p o k e s m a n  f o r  t h e  c a u s e  o f  e d u c a ­
t i o n a l  i d e a l i s m  w a s  H e r m a n  H a r r e l l  H o r n e ,  w h o m  w e  s h a l l
86ibid.. p. 220. 87ibid.. p. 225.
88ibid.. pp. 225-231.
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consider in detail in a later chapter. Idealism suffered a 
decline after the first World War and pragmatic naturalism , 
appears to have been the dominant educational philosophy be­
tween 1915-1945.
In the early years of the twentieth century idealism 
began to enter a period of eclipse. As rational idealism 
declined a new approach called "pragmatism" was td.dely 
acclaimed. Unlike idealism, which had become somewhat detached 
from educational philosophy, pragmatism was popularized in the 
field of education by such outstanding educational theorists 
as John Dewey, William H. Kilpatrick, George S. Counts, and 
Boyd H. Bode. It is now generally recognized that American 
pragmatism had its origin in the theory of meaning which 
Peirce derived from his study of the procedures of experi­
mental science. All the leading pragmatists, moreover, have 
affirmed the view of William James that the essence of prag­
matism is not a doctrine but a m e t h o d . T h e  pragmatic atti­
tude and the pragmatic method may be summarized in the follow­
ing words:
A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all 
upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional 
philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and in­
sufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori 
reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and 
pretended absolutes and origins. He turns toward con­
creteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action 
and towards power. That means the empiricist temper 
regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up.90
89ohilds, on. cit.. p. 23.
90joe Park (ed.). The Philosonhv of Education (Hew 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), p. 61. •
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Next to John Dewey, whom we shall discuss later, one 
of the most influential advocates of pragmatism was William 
Kilpatrick. Kilpatrick was profcundly influenced hy Dewey 
and became one of the outstanding exponents of Dewey's edu­
cational theories. Kilpatrick's attack on the traditional 
school system centered on its bock-centered approach, which 
he criticizes as follows:
Education in the school sense came to mean learning the 
contents of books, t-rith what this could offer,' and this 
only. And the believers in this type of school had great 
faith in such memorizing. . . .  So deeply and widely did 
this kind of education take hold that today most people 
. . . find it difficult to conceive of any other kind of 
education for school or college.91
Kilpatrick equates the bookish approach with the Chris­
tian religion, suggesting that Christianity adopted from the 
Greeks at Alexandria the idea of learning as master of book 
content, for he icrites:
Later, when Christianity had formulated an authoritarian 
written creed, the same type of school was used to teach 
the written word. . . . The schools of the Protestant 
Reformation continued the same type of school, stressing 
specifically their new religious outlook. . . .  In these 
ways the Alexandrian type of education for acquiring the 
content of the written word became universal throughout
Christendom.92
Turning from the content-centered approach of tradi­
tional education Kilpatrick states that all human learning,
^^William Kilpatrick, Philosonhv of Education (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1951 )V ]p. 223.
92lbid.
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of whatever degree or kind, must go on‘within human experience.93 
According to Kilpatrick the process of experiencing, or learn­
ing, implies organism and environment, for life everywhere is 
a continual interactive process between organism and environ­
ment. 9^ learning is defined by Kilpatrick as follows: "learn­
ing is the tendency of any part or phase of what one has lived 
30 to remain with the learner as to come back pertinently into 
further experience."95 #ith the behavioral pattern of learning 
in mind Kilpatrick suggests three characteristics essential to 
any experimental, and acceptable, system of education:
1. Education must primarily seek character and 
behavior, all-round character of a kind to lead 
to proper behavior.
2. learning, the key constituent of education, must be 
understood in behavioral terms.
3. The concomitant learnings, especially as accumu­
lated through successive experiences, must be taken 
fully into account in all guided or directed
learning.96
Kilpatrick's o\m term for his educational program is 
"the project method." To him the project method was acceptable 
because it involved wholehearted purposeful activity proceeding 
in a social environment.97 In his emphasis on the purposeful
93william H. Kilpatrick, "The Experimentalist Out­
look, " The Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for 
the Study of Education (Ohicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1942), Part I,p. 40.
9'^ Ibid.. p. 41.
S^Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 239.
SGlbid.. pp. 226-227.
97william H. Kilpatrick, The Project Method (Hew York: 
Columbia University Press, 1921), p. 3.
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act Kilpatrick vras influenced by experimental studies in the 
psychology of human behavior and learning, and by the new 
outlook in philosophy associated with pragmatism.93 The 
project method, as proposed by Kilpatrick was the only valid 
approach to education in a democratic culture in which the 
experimental sciences were becoming dominant. By this method, 
the method of involving the learner in purposeful activity, 
the character so essential to an on-going democracy would be 
developed.
George S. Counts is another outstanding educational 
philosopher who structured his thinking in à pragmatic, evo­
lutionary, naturalistic framework. Counts, like Kilpatrick, 
was in full accord vrith the attempt of the pragmatists to 
develop a philosophy in harmony with evolutionary principles, 
with the attitudes and the methods of experimental inquiry, 
and with the values of d e m o c r a c y . 99 Counts joins in the con­
demnation of the book-centered Alexandrian educational 
approach, which he calls "the vestibule idea of education."10® 
In condemning traditional education Counts remarks very 
critically:
We cannot be too critical of any school procedure which 
lacks present significance and is justified solely on 
the grounds of remote future utility. Life during the
93ohilds, OP. cit.. pp. 1 9 2 - 1 9 3 .
99ibid.. p. 216.
l O ^ G e o r g e  S .  C o u n t s ,  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  E d u c a t i o n  ( B o s t o n :  
H o u g h t o n  M i f f l i n  a n d  C o m p a n y ,  1 9 2 4 ) ,  p .  1 7 0 .
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period of guardianship is not suspended or postponed.
It has its own problems and values which a wise system 
of education can never neglect.101
Counts is in agreement with pragmatic concepts that
learning takes place by the interaction of the organism with
the environment. However, Counts feels that both traditional
education and much pragmatic education placed too much
emphasis on individual development. To Counts the important
aspect was not the physical or biological environment, but
the social matrim in which one functioned, for he writes:
If an educational movement, or any other movement, calls 
itself progressive, it must have orientation; it must 
possess direction. The word itself implies moving for­
ward , and moving forward can have little meaning in the 
absence of clearly defined purposes. . . . The weaknesses 
of Progressive Education thus lies in the fact that it 
has elaborated no theory of social welfare, unless it 
be that of anarchy or extreme i n d i v i d u a l i s m . 102
The primary objective of education to Counts was 
adaptability to social change. Hith almost prophetic fervor 
Counts describes the need to educate people for the new civ­
ilisation:
. . .  a new civilization is rising in America and 
throughout the earth--a civilization that is coming to 
be called industrial— a civilization so strange in its 
forms, so vast in its reaches, so complex in its 
patterns, and so mighty in its energies that thought­
ful men and women fear that the control of its opera­
tion is beyond the powers of its creator.103
lOllbid.. p. 172.
g. Counts, Dare the Schools Build a Hew 
Social Order? (Hew York: The John Day Co., 1932), pp. 6-7.
103ceorge 3. Counts, Education and American Civili­
zation (Hew York: Columbia University Press, 1952)', p. 137.
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To Oounts education is responsible for producing citizens 
equipped to participate intelligently in the constantly 
changing cultural pattern.
A third and final representative discussed briefly 
as typical of pragmatic naturalism is Boyd H. Bode. Bode 
attacks idealistic educational philosophy sharply and vig­
orously.. Academic philosophy, according to Bode has tended 
to perpetuate the Platonic notion that man is a citizen of 
two worlds. Since the world of ideas is the true goal of 
knowledge in Platonic thinking, education would direct men 
into harmony r^itli such objective reality. But such a con­
cept of knowledge leads to a dualism which is objectionable 
to Bode. To Bode the idea of two worlds, the world of mind 
and the world of sense-experience, is aristocratic in its 
origin, and therefore incompatible with democracy. Referring 
to the Greek ideal of self-development by a knowledge of 
objective forms, or ideas. Bode writes:
Self-perfection or harmonious development is supposed to 
be achieved by acting in accordance wi-th an inner prin­
ciple, but is in fact derived from the principle of 
aristocracy, and it traces back to the model set by the
Greeks.104
Bode thus regards the classicist as the old-time aristocrat 
doing his. turn on a twentieth century stage. According to 
Bode, the influence of this concept of "two-worldism" was 
not confined to the sphere of academic philosophy. Its
104jgoya H. Bode, How We learn (Boston: D. 0.
Heath and Co., 1 9 4 0 ) ,  p. 5S.
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p a t t e r n  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  w a s  a d o p t e d ,  h e  s a y s ,  b y  C h r i s t i a n  
t h e o l o g y  a n d  t h u s  m a n a g e d  t o  k e e p  i t s e l f  i n  a  d o m i n a n t  p o s i ­
t i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  a l l  t h e  s u c c e e d i n g  c e n t u r i e s ,  w i t h  t h e  
r e s u l t  t h a t  i t  b e c a m e  f i r m l y  e m b e d d e d  i n  W e s t e r n  culture. ^ ^ 5  
T w o  d e v e l o p m e n t s  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  h a v e  s e r i o u s l y  
c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  " t w o - w o r l d "  a p p r o a c h ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Bode. 1 0 6  
O n e  o f  t h e s e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  i s  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  m e t h o d ,  
t h e  s e c o n d  i s  t h e  a d v a n c e  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  i d e a l .
H a v i n g  r e j e c t e d  b o t h  c l a s s i c a l - a n d  C h r i s t i a n  c o n c e p t s  
o f  e d u c a t i o n  B o d e  p r e s e n t s  h i s  o i n i  p r a g m a t i c  n a t u r a l i s t i c  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  e d u c a t i o n .  B u t  B o d e ' s  i d e a s  d i f f e r  f r o m  
t h o s e  o f  K i l p a t r i c k  a n d  C o u n t s .  K i l p a t r i c k  m a k e s  c h a r a c t e r  
d e v e l o p m e n t  t h r o u g h  p u r p o s e f u l  a c t i v i t y  t h e  a r m  o f  e d u c a t i o n .  
C o u n t s  r e g a r d e d  s o c i a l  a d a p t a b i l i t y  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  o b j e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  e d u c a t i v e  p r o c e s s .  B o d e ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a k e s  t h e  c o n t i n u a l  
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  g o a l  o f  e d u c a ­
t i o n .  1 ^ ' ^
T h e  f o c a l  p o i n t  o f  B o d e ' s  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  h i s  t h e o r y  
o f  t h e  m i n d .  T o  B o d e  t h e  m i n d  i s  n o t  a  t h i n g — w h e t h e r  a  s u b ­
s t a n c e  o r  a  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  m e n t a l  s t a t e s — b u t  a  f u n c t i o n ,  a n d  
i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
M i n d ,  t h e n ,  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  s y m b o l i z i n g  o r  f o r e ­
c a s t i n g ,  o r ,  a s  w e  s o m e t i m e s  s a y ,  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o r  
f o r e s e e i n g .  . . . T h i s  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  m i n d ,  w i t h  i t s
H .  B u r k h a r d t  ( e d . ) .  T h e  C l e a v a g e  i n  O u r  C u l t u r e  
( B o s t o n :  T h e  B e a c o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  p .  1 3 .
l ^ ^ O h i l d s ,  OP. c i t . ,  p. 251.
lOTsode, OP. c i t . , p .  2 5 4 .  _ (
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emphasis on adaption is an integral part of pragmatic 
philosophy. The term "experience" is a name for situa­
tions in which this function called mind is in some 
sense operative.108
The exercise of mind as a function to Bode v/as directly 
related to the transformation and reconstruction of the ex­
periential situation.109 Further, this process of recon­
struction goes on inevitably. The school does not invent 
it, but undertakes to speed it up and to give it direction.
The tliree pragmatic thinlcers discussed— Kilpatrick, 
Oounts, and Bode— all agreed that the theory of evolution, 
the progress of experimental science, and the nature of demo­
cratic society had made traditional education obsolete and 
called for the widespread acceptance of a new educational 
approach based on naturalistic principles.
In this cliapter the discussion has centered on the 
tension between idealism and naturalism in education in the 
century between I86O-I96O. The tension between these two 
opposing approaohes to eduoation appear to have found expres­
sion in tliree ways. First there ocourred the struggle between 
practical religious idealism and scientific utilitarianism.
At this level the struggle erupted into actual warfare as 
the church college fought the rise of the utilitarian uni­
versity and as the university in turn challenged the tradi­
tional church shliool.
lOSlbid.. p. 225.
109lbid.. p. 255.
, 1 4 2
At the beginning of the twentieth century the uni­
versity was securely established, and the religious school 
was strongly entrenched. So the tension between idealism and 
naturalism vzas transferred from the practical area to the 
area of academic philosophy and to the area of curricular 
revision. Spokesmen for both sides of these areas were 
presented.
In the first three chapters the dissertation has 
attempted to present the development of idealism and natu­
ralism, with the subsequent tension which arose when these 
conflicting philosophies became a vital part of American ed­
ucational philosophy. The remainder of the dissertation will 
be devoted to a particularized discussion of the men gen­
erally regarded as the greatest exponents of the two systems, 
John Bew-ey an educational naturalist, and H. H. Horne, an 
educational idealist.
CHAPTER V
THE PERSPECTIVE OP NATÜRALISM 
IE JOHN DEffET
Alfred N. Whitehead classes John Dewey with Augustine, 
Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and with Auguste Comte as 
men who made philosophic thought relevant to the needs of 
their own day. By this, Whitehead meant that Dewey disclosed 
great ideas relevant to the functioning of the social system 
in which he lived.^ While Dewey is popularly associated with 
distinct educational theories, it seems essential to point out 
that he was a profound philosopher with a commanding knowledge 
of the historical development of philosophy. However, it is 
generally admitted that Dewey's greatest impact and his widest 
influence were in the field of education. George R. Geiger 
calls John Dewey America's most influential and controversial 
educational thinker.^ Neil G. McCluskey states that John 
Dewey has in some measure touched every stone in the modern
Ipaul A. Schilpp (ed.). The Philosophy of John Dewev 
(Chicago; Northwestern University, 1939), p. 477.
^George R. Geiger, John Dewev In Perspective (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 195^), p. v.
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American educational structure.5 Robert L, Kelly states that 
Dewey was destined, on the side of philosophic theory, to be 
the greatest American guarantor of liberty in the educational 
process.^ Among the almost endless tributes to John Dewey 
and his influence on American educational thought the acme 
of praise is rendered by his close associate, William H. 
Kilpatrick:
Pestolozzi had prepared the ground. Froebel and Herbart 
had helped. Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, William T.
Harris, Stanley Hall, Francis W. Parkey, and others 
carried America further along the Pestolozzi road. But 
one thing was lacking. Ho one of these men, nor all 
combined, had given an adequate theory for a thorough­
going democratic, science-respecting education. This 
Professor Dewey has done.5
Dewey entered the educational world at a time uniquely 
favorable to his democratic pragmatic concepts of philosophy 
and of education. An old order was passing, and the new order 
welcomed a spokesman who could express in academic, even 
pedantic language, the restless spirit of the industrial, 
scientific, democratic age.
Dewey represents naturalism unlimited. In his natu­
ralism Dewey approached every philosophical problem— meta­
physical, epistemological, axiological, logical and 
aesthetical— with the aim of presenting a historical, logical 
and scientific rationale for man and his environment. In
^Heil G. McOluskey, Public Schools and American Q u ­
estion (Hew York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 177.
Robert L. Kelly, Thp Amflrican Colleges and the 
Social Order (Hew York: The Macmillan Co., 1940), p. 76.
^William Heard Kilpatrick," "Apprentice Citizens," 
Saturday Review. XXXII (October 22, 1949), p. 12.
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advancing his naturalistic position Dewey attempts to dis­
credit traditional philosophical and formal educational 
approaches as untenable In the scientific, Industrailzed, 
and urbanized twentieth century.
In this chapter the attempt Is made to present a 
summary of Dewey's general philosophical Interpretation of 
the areas of metaphysics, eplstemology, axiology, logic and 
the nature of man. Following the discussion of Dewey's 
basic philosophical concepts, the discussion shifts to the 
specific application of his naturalistic Ideas to educational 
theory In the next chapter.
Metaphysical Concepts of Dewey 
Evolutionary and biological concepts appear to be the 
basis of Dewey's philosophy. Born In 1859 In Burlington, 
Vermont, of parents following traditional religious patterns, 
Dewey gradually shifted his thinking from Idealism and abso­
lutism to experlmentallsm. While still an undergraduate stu­
dent at the University of Vermont he began to express 
dissatisfaction with the closed and rigid systems of philo­
sophical and religious thinking prevalent In his day. 
Referring to the classic of traditional religious philosophy, 
Butler's Analogy. Dewey stated: " . . .  with Its cold logic
and acute analysis It was . . . In a reversed way, a factor
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In developing scepticism.
On the other hand, a book expressing the naturalism 
of Thomas Huxley appeared to have a strange fascination for 
him, for he writes that it aroused the following feeling in 
him:
. . .  a sense of interdependence and interrelated unity 
that gave form to intellectual stirrings that had 
previously been inchoate, and created a type or model 
of a view of things to which material in any field 
ought to conform.!
While taking graduate work at Johns Hopkins Univer­
sity, his philosophical interests were attracted by the writ­
ings of Hegel. It seems that the great magnet in Hegel's 
thinking, for Dewey at least, was the suggested solution to 
the problems involved in traditional dualistic concepts, for 
he writes:
Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and 
spirit, the divine and the human, was. . . no mere 
intellectual formula; it operated as an immense re­
lease, a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human culture, 
of institutions and arts, involved the . . . dissolution 
of hard and fast dividing walls.°
During the twenty years following his graduation from 
Johns Hopkins University Dewey appeared to find an idealistic 
position completely unacceptable, while finding the concepts 
of naturalistic thinking as expressed by such leading thinkers 
as Charles S. Peirce, William James, and George H. Mead more
^John Dewey, "Prom Absolutism to Experimentalism," 
Contemporary American Philosonhv. Personal Statements, ed. 
George P. Adams and W. P. Mentague (Hew lork: Macmillan
Co., 1930), II, 22.
7n i d .. p. 13. Qlbid.. p. 19.
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and more satisfactory. His philosophical pilgrimage thus led 
Dewey to a position which he called "instrumentalism" or 
"ezperimentalism."9 The following discussion is an attempt 
to present the idea of metaphysics as expressed in Dewey's 
experimental philosophy. However, since it is impossible to 
understand Dewey's metaphysical ideas apart from his philo­
sophical method, it is necessary to first discuss Dewey's 
approach to the problem of metaphysics.
There are, according to Dewey, two approaches to the 
goal of philosophy.^® The first approach begins with experi­
ence, and by means of its distinguishing features and dis­
tinctive trends, investigates the world of experience. The 
second method begins with a priori.or with refined selective 
methods and works back to the primary facts of life. Dewey 
accepts the first method or approach; for to him the method 
of beginning with an a priori premise results in the use of 
the accepted principles of the day as the foundations of a 
system of interpretation. When these principles are rejected 
by a succeeding generation, Dewey points out, the system of 
interpretation also fails because it has been structured, not 
on experience, but on a priori premises of interpretation.
The crux of Dewey's position is that experience is 
not the subject-matter of philosophy but is the method of
lOjohn Dewey, Expérience and Nature (Chicago: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1926), p. 2.
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philosophy. That is, it is "denotative" rather than 
"designativ e.T he  value of experienoe for philosophy is 
that it asserts the finality and comprehensiveness of the 
method of pointing, of finding, of showing, and the necessity 
of seeing what is pointed to, accepting what is found in good 
faith and without discount. To begin to analyze experience 
with ultimate concepts is "to begin with loaded dice," for 
the philosopher achieves the result he is desirous of
achieving.12
Dewey believes that the empirical approach, as indi­
cated by denotative classification, eliminates both the 
problems of realism and idealism and the problem of rational 
thought as opposed to sensuous knowledge. It also prevents 
one from accepting as original, primitive, and simple, dis­
tinctions that have become familiar to us.13 The great 
advantage of empiricism, in Dewey's thinking, is that the 
empirical approach protects one from the philosophic fallacy, 
the conversion of eventual function into antecedent existence.
With experience as his method, Dewey rejects all but 
a fragment of the ideas of classical philosophy. Such things 
as the Platonic division into ideal archetypes and physical 
events are outside of experience^ as are the Aristotelian 
division of reality into form, actuality, matter, and poten­
tiality. Kant's division of reality into the noumenal,
lljbid.. p. 10. 12lbid.. p. 16.
13lbid.. p. 30.
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things-ln-themselves, in contrast with natural objects as 
phenomenal, cannot be found in experience; hence these divis­
ions are rejected. The dualiim of appearance and reality, 
of idealism and realism are similarly disposed of as non- 
exp eriential.
The only fragment gleaned from classical thinking by 
Dewey is the concept of flux proposed by Heraclitus and 
Bergson. But even here experience modifies the "flux" of 
nature into the "precarious" of experience. Experience con­
sists of the precarious and the stable. Here one finds the 
only ultimate reality. Ontology is dismissed as a fabrication 
of detached philosophers. Dialectical truth also fails to 
pass the scrutiny of experience. Prom the traditional point 
of view, there is no metaphysics. From Dewey's point of view 
experience offers the only grou^ id for a scientific meta­
physics. In this regard he observes:
Anthropologists have shown incontrovertible the part 
played by the precarious aspect of the world in gen­
erating religion with its ceremonies, rites, cults, 
myths, and magic, and it has shown the pervasive 
penetration of these affairs into morals, law, art, and
industry.14
Dewey argues that classical philosophy, by which he 
means both Greek and Christian philosophies, has used meta­
physics as a substitute for custom as the source and guarantor 
of higher moral and social values.15 Because philosophy was
14lbid.. p. 41.
15John Dewey, Reconstruction In Philosophy (Hew York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 19^0), p. if.
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a substitute for custom, according to Dewey, it approached its 
task in a biased manner, aiming to conserve values inherent 
in tradition. He writes: "It became the work of philosophy 
to justify on rational grounds the spirit, though not the form, 
of accepted beliefs and traditional c u s t o m s . Dewey rejects 
the classical distinctions between "Being" and "Becoming."
Hewould include both the stable and the unstable as integral 
aspects of experience. This inclusion banishes the mixture 
of the problematic with the assured and the complete, of the 
division of existence into the natural and the supernatural; 
any and all dualistic concepts are rejected. The union of 
the hazardous and the stable, of the incomplete and the re­
current, is the condition of all experienced satisfaction as 
truly as predicaments and problems.
Empiricism is the only philosophy which is able to
harmonize the precarious and the stable, as Dewey says:
A philosophy which accepts the denotative or empirical 
method accepts at full value the fact that reflective 
thinking transforms confusion, ambiguity and dis­
crepancy into illumination, definiteness and con­
sistency.1?
Empiricism also points to the contextual situation in which 
thinking occurs. It notes that the starting point is actually 
problematic, and that the problematic phase is a part of an 
actual situation. In this problem situation, thinking is 
deprived of all ontological meaning; thought is no different
l^ibid.. p. 18.
^^Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 39.
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In kind from the use of natural materials and energies. 
Reflection occurs only in a problem situation. Thought and 
reason are not specific powers, but natural procedures 
employed to solve problems arising from a mixture of the 
precarious and the stable in life.
Dewey rejected all concepts of a supernatural Being.
To Dewey, belief in an ultimate Being was impossible be­
cause of the conflict of such a belief with science.
Relevant to the point, he asks;
Is not the belief In the single, final, and ultimate 
an Intellectual product of that feudal organization 
which Is disappearing historically and of that belief 
In a bounded, ordered cosmos. . . which has dis­
appeared from natural science?18
Dewey appears to assume that the crisis In contemporary culture.
Including a belief In an ultimate Being called God, arises from
a division of authority. Scientific Inquiry seems to tell one
thing, tdille traditional beliefs about ends and Ideals that
have authority over conduct tell something quite different.
To Dewey the problem of method Is all Important, for he states:
What Is not realized. . . although It Is more definitely 
seen by the fundamentalists than by liberals, is that 
the issue does not concern this or that particular Item 
of belief, but centers In the question of method.19
The Introduction of scientific method would replace 
feudallstlc, rigid concepts with democratic, scientific con­
cepts. The acceptance of scientific method as a basis for
1_8
John Dewey, A nommnn Faith (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1954), p. 9.
19lbld.. p. 32.
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belief would also be the occasion for a new concept of
authority. In dealing with the problem of authority, Dewey
does not advocate the rejection of authority as such, but
rather the introduction of a scientifically based authority,
which is conducive to change. He writes;
We need an authority that, unlike the older forms in 
which it operated, is capable of directing change.
In the older forms of authority cooperative, orderly 
change are conspicuous by their a b s e n c e . 20
While Dewey feels that the acceptance of scientific 
method eliminates the concept of God as a transcendent Being, 
he does accept the use of value symbols which point to common 
elements in experience. The implications of using symbols is, 
to Dewey, far-reaching. Such usage of symbols provides a view 
of "God" which is the polar opposite of the traditional view. 
In traditional, or even in liberal religion, the word "God" 
refers to a particular Being. But to Dewey the word denotes 
"the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and ac­
tion."21 From this point of view the term "God" means the 
ideal ends that, at a given time and place, one acknowledges 
as having authority over his volition and emotion, the values 
to which one is supremely devoted.
The Deweyan concept of God admittedly stands in 
opposition to the doctrine of religion that "God" designates 
some kind of Being having prior and therefore non-ideal
20John Dewey, Problems of Men (New York: Philosophi­
cal Library, 1946), p. 101.
2lDewey, A Common Faith, p. 42.
153
existence. In religion, the Supreme Being has moral and 
spiritual attributes which are thought of as properties of a 
particular existence and are thought to be of religious value 
because of the embodiment of an existent Being. Here, in 
Dewey's thought, is the ultimate issue as to the difference 
between a religion and the religious as a function of experi­
ence.
The idea of God as the unity of ideals that prompt 
to action and arouse loyalty is also connected with all the 
natural forces and conditions that promote the growth of the 
ideal and that further its realizations. For there are forces 
in nature and in society, according to Dewey, that generate 
and support the ideals. These ideals are further unified by 
the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is 
this active relationship between the ideal and the actual 
that Dewey calls "God."
The object of faith to Dewey, then, is not a trans­
cendent Being with given and immutable qualities which possess 
value as they are apprehended by man. Rather, the object of 
faith exists in the unity of ideals, and in the possibility 
of growth and change, which incite devotion and excite to 
activity. In such an approach Dewey seems to think that faith 
is not eliminated by the change in intellectual climate 
resulting from the acceptance of scientific method. Historic 
religions may be affected, but the religious values of common 
experience remain.
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Classical philosophy had accepted a closed world, a
world consisting internally of a limited number of fixed
forms, and having definite boundaries externally. The early
empiricists had accepted a mechanical, orderly, fixed world
also. Dewey believes that the world of modern science has
shown the world to be an open world. On this he comments:
The world of modern science is an open world, a world 
varying indefinitely without possibility of assignable 
limit in its internal make-up, a world stretching be­
yond any assignable bounds externally.22
Dewey's world is an open world, an infinitely varie­
gated world. And change rather than fixity is the measure of 
reality, for change is omnipresent. The laws by which the 
modern man of science operates, according to Dewey, are the 
laws of motion, of generation, and of consequence. The man of 
scientific temper does not try to define or to delimit some­
thing remaining constant in change. He tries to describe a 
constant order of change. However, the word "constant" must 
be defined, for Dewey states:
. . . while the word "constant" appears in both state­
ments, the meaning of the word is not the same. In one 
case, we are dealing with something constant in exis­
tence, physical or metaphysical; in the other case, with 
something constant in function and operation. One is a 
form of independent being; the other is a formula of 
description and a calculation of interdependent changes.23
To Dewey nature did not consist of the totality of 
ob&$ctive ideas or external objects. Neither was nature to
^^Dewey, Heconstruction In Philosophy, p. 54.
23ibid.. p. 61.
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Dewey merely a process. But every natural object was an
event continuous in space and time with other events, to be
known only by experimental inquiries which would exhibit a
multitude of complicated, obscure, and minute r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 24
In rejecting the concept of fixed unchangeable types and
species in favor of a philosophy of experience Dewey writes:
. . . there was a time when men believed that each 
object in the external world carried its nature stamped 
upon it as a form, and that intelligence consisted in 
simply inspecting and reading off an intrinsic, self­
enclosed complete nature. The scientific revolution 
brought a change in this point of view.25
By the use of scientific method operating in the area 
of experience Dewey attempts to resolve the ancient problems 
of matter-spirit, temporal and permanent, particular and uni­
versal, To Dewey the notion that the universe is split into 
two separate and disconnected realms of existence, one physi­
cal and the other psychical presented the acme of incred­
ibility.^^ nature was one, a unified, continuing whole, and 
as such offered the possibility of precise knowledge.
Eplstemology of Dewey
Dewey's eplstemology seems to be a logical outgrowth 
of his metaphysics. Since experience as method negates the 
metaphysical reality of objects, experience as method should
^^John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1922), p. 5&«
25ibid.
^^Dewey, 'Ryps-rience and Nature, p. 268.
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be used in the area of eplstemology. In his early writings 
Dewey regarded experience primarily as biological, arriving 
at a concept of knowledge based on the interaction of natu­
ral events and natural objects. However, in his later 
writings Dewey seemed to regard experience from the stand­
point of physics, leading him to develop the idea of knowl­
edge as a transaction, with no distinction between the knower 
and the object known. In the following discussion the idea 
of interaction is presented extensively, while the discus­
sion of the idea of knowledge as transaction is limited. In 
discussing Dewey's naturalistic concepts of eplstemology it 
appears to be necessary to present his ideas of the nature of 
knowledge, of the function of mind, of the knowing process, 
and his interpretation of reason, or intelligence.
Dewey approaches the problem of the nature of knowl­
edge by stating that the development of a psychology based 
upon biology had made possible a new scientific formulation 
of the nature of k n o w l e d g e .^7 in the new psychology which 
Dewey accepts, knowledge is not something separate and self- 
sufficing, but is involved in the process by which life is 
sustained and evolved. Knowledge is relegated to a derived 
position, secondary in o r i g i n . Criticizing traditional 
concepts of knowledge as spectator concepts,Dewey observes:
^7pewey, Reconstruction In Philosophy, p. 84.
28lbid.. p. 87.
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But in truth, historic intellectualisa,, the spectator 
view of knowledge, is a purely compensatory doctrine 
which men of an intellectual turn have built up to 
console themselves for the actual and social impotency 
of the calling of thought to which they are devoted.29
With this biological approach to knowledge Dewey 
claims that the true nature of knowledge is operative and 
practical. From the operational and practical point of view, 
the structures and the objects which science and philosophy 
set up in contrast to the things and events of daily experi­
ence do not constitute a realm apart in which rational con­
templation may rest satisfied. The practical approach to 
knowledge makes, instead, the events of daily experience the 
selected obstacles, the material means and ideal methods of 
giving direction to changes which are inevitable. Regarding 
the impact of the practical approach to knowledge, Dewey 
writes :
When the practice of knowledge ceased to be dialectical 
and became experimental knowing became preoccupied with 
changes, auid the test of knowledge became the ability 
to bring about certain changes.30
To Dewey mind is not an organ, nor an entity, nor a 
distinct part of the physical organism. Rather mind is a 
characteristic way of inter-activity.^^ The mind, like per­
sonality and selfhood, consists of eventual functions that 
emerge with complexly organized inter-actions, organic and 
s o c i a l . 52 There are individual minds, but not individuals
29ibid.. p. 117. 30ibid.. p. 121.
3lDewey, Experience and Nature, p. 292.
32ibid.. p. 208.
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with, minds, according to Dewey, for experience, being social, 
cannot be confined to particular isolated events or persons. 
In describing mind as the complex response of the organic 
totality to its environment, Dewey writes : "Mind as
individualized could be recognized in other than a pejorative 
sense only when its variations were social, utilized in 
generating greater social security and fullness of life."^^ 
The social context in which mind functions is the basis for 
the Deweyan distinction between a bodily, or a psychic self, 
with a mind and mind as individual.
To Dewey the basic mistake of traditional philosophy 
was the acceptance of the Greek-Ohristian idea of the sep­
arate existence of a "soul" or "mind." Even when philosophy 
revolted against the Christian tradition, it still retained 
the mistaken idea of the mind as a distinct entity, according 
to D e w e y . T h e  philosophical dualism making a distinction 
between mind and body was disastrous, in Dewey's thinking, 
for he states:
. . . philosophical dualism is but a formulated recogni­
tion of an impasse in life; an impotence in interaction, 
inabilily to make effective transition, limitation of 
power to regulate and thereby to understand.35
Dewey attempted to solve the problems of philosophic dualism
by regarding life and mind as aspects of the highly complex
and extensive interaction of events. By regarding life,
33ibid.. p. 215. 34ibid.. p. 224.
35ibid.. p. 242.
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mind, the soul, and the self as Interaction in social and
natural events the psychophysical phenomena and higher mental
phenomena could be admitted to their full empirical r e a l i t y .56
Dewey's position regarding the mind is well summarized in
the following statement:
To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in 
the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the 
cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which 
haunt philosophy. And when thus seen, they will be 
seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box, but as 
events in history, in a moving, growing, never finished 
process.37
In consistency with his concept of the mind as a
function of the interacting organism, Dewey developed a theory
of knowing and of knowledge called instrumentalism. Dewey
describes instrumentalism as follows:
Instrumentalism is an attempt to establish a precise 
logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences 
in their various forms, by considering primarily how 
thought functions in the experimental determinations of 
future consequences.38
Prom this point of view knowledge is reality making a 
particular and specific change in itself. The instrumental 
approach of Dewey rejected the classical logical approach 
which regarded qualitative determinations as fixed properties 
of objects.59 According to Dewey the classical approach to 
knowledge reduced the knowing process to either intuition or 
to the mechanical enumeration of items or properties. In
56ibid.. p. 266. 57ibid.. p. 295.
58John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: 
Minton, Balch, and Co., 1951), p. 26.
59ibid.. p. 94.
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Dewey's instrumentalism all propositions are symbolic, and the 
meaning of any proposition is ascertained by going beyond it, 
by naing the proposition as a clue to discovery of a quali­
tative situation, in which certain qualities are experienced.
When the process of knowing centers in experience
rather than in existential objects, thinking and reasoning
become matters of desire and interest. Reasoning is affective,
not intellectual activity. Regarding the affective nature of
thought, Dewey writes;
. . .  an organism has certain basic needs which cannot 
be supplied without activity that modifies the sur­
roundings; that when the organism is in any way dis­
turbed in its "equilibration" with its environment, 
its needs show themselves as restless, craving, desiring 
activity which persists until the acts thus induced have 
brought about a new integration of the organism and its 
relation to the environment.40
Since the process of knowing depends upon the inter­
action of an organism with its environment, the process begins 
with sensation. However, the senses are stimuli to action, 
not gateways of k n o w i n g . A l l  sensations became urgent, net 
cognitive in quality, because the sensation marks an inter­
ruption in a course of action previously entered upon.^^ 
Sensations Ahus act as pivots in readjusting behavior, and are 
provocations, incitements, challenges to an act of inquiry 
which terminates in knowledge.43 Sensations are the-beginning
4°Ibid.. p. 119.
4^Dewey, Reconstruction In Philosophy, p. 87.
42lbid.. p. 88. 43ibid.. p. 90.
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of knowledge, but only In the sense that the experienced shock 
of change is the necessary stimulus to the investigating and 
comparing which eventually produces knowledge.
By making reason a phase of the generic function of 
creating a new relationship between organisms and the condi­
tions of life, Dewey appears to make thinking, or reason 
similar to other organic functions, subject to the control 
of need, desires, and progressive satisfactions. The raw 
material of thought all comes from the past. Past experi­
ences are retained so that they may be recalled and used when 
there is a need to use them in attaining the new and 
determined by the needs and desires of the affective nature. 
However, the retention of the past is not intellectual, 
according to Dewey. Retention is a matter of organic modi­
fications, of change and disposition, attitude and habit.44 
The whole purpose of the retention of the past is the devel­
opment of a new environment as the condition of sustaining a 
new and more fully integrated self.
Dewey rejects reason as a faculty, separate from 
experience, which arrives at a knowledge of a superior realm 
of universal truths by means of contemplation. He also rejects 
the Kantian idea of mind as a faculty that introduces gen­
erality and regularity into experience as the unnecessary 
creation of men addicted to traditional formalism and elabo­
rate terminology.45 Bather scornfully Dewey declares that
44ibid.. p. 119. 45ibid.. p. 95.
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reason as employed by historic rationalism has tended to care­
lessness, to conceit, to irresponsibility and to rigidity, in 
short, to absolutism.^
Reason, as described by Dewey, is the result of a 
fine balance of instinct, or impulse, and habit. Rejecting 
the concepts of distinct and separate instincts which are the 
expression of an entity within the self called mind, soul, 
or consciousness, Dewey states that an instinct is simply an 
impulse to activity.47 Further, impulse, when it asserts it­
self deliberately against an existing custom, is the beginning 
of individuality in mind. When impulses become organized in 
dealing with a situation, habit is formed. However, habits 
as organized activities are secondary and acquired, not native 
and original. They are outgrowths of unlearned activities 
which are part of man's endowment at birth.48 All thinking, 
knowing or reasoning, flow out of habit, in Dewey's episte- 
mology, for he states:
Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, 
imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving, and rea- 
songing that is done. Consciousness, whether as a 
stream or as special sensations and images, expresses 
functions of habits, phenomena of their formation, 
operation, their interruption and reorganization.49
Reason, then, is experiential intelligence, conceived 
in a scientific fashion, used in the creation of social arts 
and is always subject to the test of experience. In agree-
4^Ibid.. p. 97.
4?Dewey, Human Mature and Conduct, p. 94.
48lbid.. p. 89. 49ibid.. p. 177.
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meat with ihls concept of mind and of reasoning, Dewey makes 
intelligence a matter of practical adjustment. Intelli­
gence, to Dewey, is a practical aspect of the needs and the 
possibilities of the different situations in which one is re­
quired to perform some activity. The ability to envisage 
things in terms of the adjustments and of the adaptations 
they make possible or hinder is intelligence, according to 
Dewey,50 who states his position as follows:
One objective test of the presence or absence of in­
telligence is influence upon behavior. No capacity 
to make adjustments means no intelligence. Conduct 
evincing management of complex and novel conditions 
means a high degree of reason.51
Prom this statement it appears that Dewey feels 'that intelli­
gence is not something possessed once for all. It is in 
constant process of forming, and its retention requires con­
stant alertness in observing consequences, an open-minded 
will to learn and courage in re-adjustment.52
Apparently because of the rise of new concepts in 
science, particularly in physics, Dewey changed from the bio­
logical concept of interaction to the physical concept of 
transaction. In his idea of transaction Dewey states that 
there can be no known apart from a knowing and no knowing 
apart from a known. Knowledge involves a transaction between 
the knower and the known in which there is no separation.53
50Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 41.
5 1 l b i d . . p. 41.
52])ewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 97.
53John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, Knowing and the 
Known (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1940), p. 120.
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Dewey summarizes his idea of transaction in the following 
statement:
Transaction: where systems of description and naming
are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, 
without final attribution to "elements or other pre­
sumptively detachable or independent "entities,"
"essences,"ror "realities." and without isolation of 
presumptively detachable relations" from such de­
tachable "elements."54
In his eplstemology Dewey illustrates his basic con­
cept that experience is the only reality. When experience 
presents new and different approaches, these novel approaches 
must shape the concept of knowledge.
T^inifTpiY of Dewey
In the area of values, as in the areas of metaphysics 
and eplstemology, Dewey structures his concepts in a natu­
ralistic framework. In applying naturalistic principles to 
values, Dewey rejects both supernatural origins of values and 
traditional philosophical beliefs about value. To Dewey 
values originate within social relationships, and have meaning 
only as they contribute to man's adjustment to his environ­
ment. In this discussion of values, first attention is given 
to Dewey's rejection of supernatural and traditional values, 
followed by an exposition of his naturalistic values.
Dewey levels three charges at the traditional practice 
of associating values with the supernatural. First, he 
claims that the churches have lagged behind in most important
54ibid.. p. 108.
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social movements, directing their attack on individual vices 
instead of economic and political injustices and oppression. 
Second, he claims that by stressing relation to the super­
natural traditional religion has tended to depreciate natu­
ral social values and relations. Further, he states that 
traditionally natural relations are not merely depreciated, 
but have been regarded as dangerous rivals of higher v a l u e s . 55
Not only does Dewey reject all supernatural ideas of 
values, but he also disdains the rational approach to value 
apprehension by traditional philosophy, as indicated by the 
statement ;
The philosopher erects a realm of values in which to 
place all the precious things which are extruded from 
natural existence because of isolations artificially 
introduced.56
The traditional philosophical approach to the study of values 
raised three insurmountable problems, according to Dewey. 
First, is the world of value that of ultimate and transcedent 
Being from which the existence of the world is a derivation 
or a fall? Or is it a manifestation of human subjectivity, 
a factor somehow miraculously supervening upon an order com­
plete and closed in physical structure? Or are detached sub­
sistences as "real" as are physical events, but having no 
temporal dates and spatial locations, and yet at times and 
places miraculously united with existence?57 Dewey's idea
55])ewey, A Common Faith, p. 45.
5^Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 394.
57ibid.. p. 394.
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of progress in man's development calls for a rejection of both 
traditional religion and traditional philosophy.
In adopting a naturalistic concept of value two 
things are essential, according to Dewey. First, one must 
surrender *he identification of natural ends with good and 
perfection. Second, one must abandon the notion of a pre­
determined limited number of ends arranged in an order of 
increasing comprehensiveness and finality. This abandonment 
recognizes that limits, closures, and ends are experimentally 
and dynamically determined. It involves the idea of a moving 
adjustment of various energy-systems in their cooperative 
and competitive interactions, not something belonging to them 
of their own right.5®
To Dewey, history reveals there are three stages of 
growth. In the first stage, human relationships were thought 
to be so infected with the evils of corrupt human nature as 
to require redemption from external and supernatural forces.
In the next stage, what is significant in these relations is 
found to be akin to values esteemed distinctly religious.
Dewey believes that some liberal theologians have arrived at 
this stage. The third stage, of which Dewey was a conscious 
prophet, would realize that the values prized in the various 
traditional religions are, in fact, idealizations of things 
characteristic of natural association, which have been pro-
58lbid.. p. 395.
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jected Into a supernatural realm for safe-keeping and sanc­
tion. In summarizing his conclusions about the social basis 
of traditional values, Dewey states:
The values of natural human Intercourse and mutual 
dependence are cpen and public, capable of verifica­
tion by the methods through which all natural facts 
are established. By means of the same experimental 
methods, they are capable of experience.39
Dewey felt that the acceptance of the social origin of values
would emancipate mankind from crippling traditions and release
the Inherent powers of mankind for the progress of the human
race.
Dewey observed that both traditional religion and 
traditional philosophy had accepted the Idea that ultimate 
values are a matter of special revelation and are embodied In 
life by means radically different from the arts of action that 
deal with lower and lesser ends. According to the religious 
and philosophic tradition of Europe, the valid status of all 
the highest values, the good, the true, and the beautiful, was 
bound up with their being properties of an ultimate and 
supreme Being, namely God. All went well, says Dewey, as long 
as what passed for natural science gave no offense to this 
conception. Trouble began when science ceased to disclose In 
the objects of knowledge the possession of any such properties.
M o d e m  thought started, according to Dewey, with the 
accentuation of the gulf between values which are Intrinsic 
to the real, and hence not dependent upon action, and those
59Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 73.
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which are the objects of practical activity. Dewey further
states that modem philosophy has contributed so little in
bringing about an integration of what is known about the
world and the direction of conduct because it persists in the
belief that knowledge is concerned with the disclosure of the
characteristics of antecedent existences and essences. In
discussing the failure of both traditional and modern philosp
ophy, he writes:
If the validity of beliefs and judgments about values is 
dependent upon the consequences of action undertaken in 
their behalf, and if the assumed association of values 
with knowledge capable of being demonstrated apart from 
activity is abandoned, then the problem of the intrin­
sic relaticn of science to value is wholly artificial.
It is replaced by a group of practical problems.60
As a result of the claims of science on the one hand 
and the assertions of religion and philosophy on the other, 
most people live in a state of divided confusion. Practi­
cally, says Dewey, people are frenetically absorbed in mun­
dane affairs in ways which, if they were formulated for 
intellectual acceptance, would be repudiated as low and 
unworthy. Emotionally and theoretically people give assent 
to principles and creeds which are no longer actively opera­
tive in life. This confusion regarding the status of values 
produces, usually, one of two results. There is an irrational 
acceptance of enjoyments experienced irrespective of their 
method of operation, or there is a rejection of values apart
60John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: 
Minton, Balch and Oo.,
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from activity. The essential difference Is that difference 
between a mind which beholds or grasps things from outside 
the world of things, physical and social, and one which Is a 
participant, Interacting with other things and knowing them.
From the naturalistic point of view, all modes of
human association are affected with a public Interest, and
full realization of this Interest Is equivalent to a sense of
significance that Is religious In Its function. To Dewey,
this type of socialized religious function appears to be
the basis of human advance, for he writes:
Were men and women actuated throughout the length and 
breadth of human relations with the faith and ardor 
that have at times marked historic religions and the 
consequences would be Incalcuable.ol
Ultimately, Dewey feels that there are only three
possible courses of action possible to modern man In the area
of value. One may give up the whole struggle as hopeless.
Or he may choose dependence upon the supernatural. The
latter position Is both Inconsistent and unscientific. The
third alternative Is the use of natural agencies, which to
Dewey, Is the only Intelligent approach. He says:
In the human community are all the elements for a re­
ligious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, 
or face. Such a faith has always been Implicitly the 
common faith of mankind. It remains to make It explicitly 
and militant.
The end result of Dewey's approach to value concepts 
appears to be a substitution of method for given content.
^^Dewey, A anmmmi Faith, p. 81. ^% b l d .. p. 8 7.
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One of the later chapters of The Quest For Qafta^i^tv is
entitled "The Supremacy of Method." And a contemporary
interpreter of Dewey, Henry W. Stuart, makes the following
comment on Dewey's elevation of method:
Thus experimental inquiry, or method, is the locus 
within which, or the supreme principle by which, con­
ceptions of philosophy that are really significant can 
be understood. It is in this sense that method— that 
is to say, the method of experimental inquiry— is 
supreme.
That the interpretation suggested by Stuart correctly 
states this position is substantiated by the statement of 
Dewey: " . . .  the value of any cognitive conclusion depends
upon the method by which it is reached, so that the per­
fecting of method, the perfecting of intelligence, is the 
supreme value."^4 Dewey is aware that such an extreme 
emphasis on method is directly opposite traditional doctrines 
which associate value with the existence of a transcendent 
Being:
The essential difference is that between a mind which 
beholds or grasps objects from outside the world of 
things, physical and social, and one which is a par­
ticipant, interacting with other things and knowing 
them, provided the interaction is regulated in a de­
finable way.°5
Because of his pragmatic approach, Dewey would deny 
that there is any predestined course values should follow. 
Instead, human experience, consciously guided by ideas,
^^schlipp, on. cit.. p. 295.
^^Dewey, The Quest For Certainty, p. 200.
GSibid.
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evolves Its own standards and measures and each new experi­
ence presents an opportunity for new ideas and fresh ideals. 
The contrast between "given" values and pragmatic values is 
illustrated in the following statement:
Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive 
belief as to what is right and what is wrong, for then 
there is no occasion for reflection. It emerges when 
men are confronted with situations in which different 
desires promise opposed goods and in which incompatible 
courses of action seem to be morally justified. . . 
when an individual is tempted to do something which he 
is convinced is wrong the occasion is not one of moral
theory.oo
In the area of value apprehension, as in the area of
the object of faith, Dewey appears to struggle to retain
values, but attempts to place value content on a pragmatic
basis. He writes:
To frame a theory of knowledge which makes it necessary 
to deny the validity of moral ideas, or else to refer 
them to some other and separate kind of universe from 
that of common sense and science, is both provincial 
and arbitrary.o7
By the inclusion of the pragmatic concept of value in 
his philosophy, Dewey seems to feel that he is avoiding two 
weaknesses inherent in contemporary culture. One weakness is 
the assumption on the part of traditionalists that values have 
objective status. The second weakness is the opinion of the 
skeptic or agnostic that modern life has no place for value 
concepts. By relating value content to scientific method,
66john Dewey, Ethics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1908), p. 174.
67john Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: 
(Minton, Balch and Company, 1931), p. 43.
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Dewey hopes to retain the benefits derived from an apprecia­
tion of values, and at the same time to make values scien­
tifically tenable.
Logic of Dewey
Since Dewey's philosophy is completely and aggressively 
naturalistic, it would follow that instrumental and experi­
mental logic is naturalistic. Dewey's logic presents a logic 
of natural events which function on a meaning level rather than 
an abstract logic of a separate, transcendent order. Dewey's 
logical theory is an elaboration of the thesis that the only 
way to secure rational continuity is to recognize it when it 
is detected as an empirical fact of ordinary experience.
Dewey speaks of "the existential matrix of inquiry," by which 
he means that the origin of logic is biological, that it con­
sists of natural events.^® Regarding the biological basis of 
logic Dewey writes:
When biological functions are recognized to be indis­
pensable constituents of inquiry, logic does not need to 
get enmeshed in the intricacies of different theories 
regarding the relations of mind and body. It suffices to 
accept the undeniable fact that they are necessary fac­
tors in inquiry, and then consider how they operate in 
its conduct.o9
Logic, then, to Dewey, appears to be a theory of 
experiential naturalistic subject matter. Dewey states that 
the areas of art and law aptly illustrate the fact that new
®®John Dewey, Logic; The Theory of Inquiry (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 195S), p. 23.
GSlbid.
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formal properties accrue to subject matter in virtue cf its 
subjection to certain types of operation. He would apply the 
same principle to logic. Regarding the operational nature of 
legal conceptions and its extension to the area of logic,
Dewey writes:
However hypothetical may be the conception that logical 
forms accrue to existential materials in virtue of the 
control exercised over inquiries in order that they may 
fulfill their end, the conception is descriptive of 
something that verifiably exists. The development of 
forms in consequence of operations is an established 
fact in some fields; it is not invented ad hoc in rela­
tion to logical f o r m s .70
From this point of view expressed above, it is evident that
logical inquiry is as accessible to objective study as are any
other modes of behavior. Logic is thus a pattern of inquiry,
and inquiry is defined as follows:
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of 
an indeterminate situation into one that is so determi­
nate in its constituent distinctions and relations as 
to convert the elements of the original situation into 
a unified whole.71
Logic is transferred by Dewey from a consideration of abstract 
ideas to an analysis of concrete events in nature. Nature 
undergoes inquiry when natural events act upon human organisms
in specified ways. By reason of this interaction of organisms
within the processes of natural operation natural events be­
have differently, acquire new properties, become subject to a 
measure of control. When control, or inquiry, is imposed on 
a natural event the properties involved in the event reveal
TOlbid.. p. 102. 71lbid.. pp. 104-105.
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hidden structural relations among themselves. The immediate 
problem in any situation, according to Dewey, is the kind of 
responses the organism shall make.?^
The function of logic, according to Dewey, is to detect 
the representations of other things that may follow fromna 
given event. The objective method by which things point to 
other things Dewey defines as the primary relation of infer­
ence. Inference is the sign-significance relation.73 Infer­
ences are drawn from existential situations, not from abstract 
ideas. In consistency with his total philosophy Dewey centers 
the origin of logical inquiry in a problem solving situation.
In Dewey's system of thought judgment may be identified 
as the settled outcome of inquiry. Judgment has direct exis­
tential i m p o r t .74 ^ literal instance of judgment in the sense 
defined by Dewey is provided by the judgment of a court of law 
in settling some issue which, up to that point, has been in 
controversy. The settlement or judgment is the outcome of 
inquiry conducted in the court-hearings. In describing logic 
as the function of forming judgments Dewey states:
The final settlement arrived at is a settlement. The 
case is disposed of; the disposition takes effect in 
existential consequences. The sentence or proposition 
is not an end in itself but a decisive directive to 
future activities. The consequences of these activities 
bring about an existential determination of the prior 
situation which was indeterminate as to its issue.75
7 2 i b i d .. p. 107. 7 5 i b i d . . pp. 51, 56.
7 4 i b i d .. p. 120. 7 5 i b i d .. p. 121.
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By the naturalistic, existential concept of logic,
Dewey converts problematic subject matter into an object of 
knowledge. To Dewey, an object and an object of knowledge 
are basically the same thing, both are subject to discovery 
and invention by scientific method. Dewey makes inquiry 
experimental. Another function of logic, for Dewey, is to 
formulate and to generalize the conditions under which inquiry 
can operate.
All logical forms arise within the operation of inquiry 
and are concerned with control of inquiry, so that it 
may yield warranted assertions. This means that the 
forms originate in operations of i n q u i r y . 76
The Nature of Man 
In addition to a consideration of Dewey's metaphysics, 
his epistemology, his concepts of axiology and logic it seems 
necessary to consider briefly his idea of the nature of man, 
since it is closely related to his educational theory. Dewey 
regards as anacronistic the concept that man has a nature 
which is rational and spiritual in essence. To Dewey, both 
the old metaphysical and the traditional theological philos­
ophies reflected the social conditions in which they were 
formula ted. ^7^  When these traditional approaches are forced 
on contemporary culture, says Dewey, confusion and conflict 
result. According to empirical philosophy, which Dewey 
accepts, science provides the only means available for learning
T^ibid.. p. 130.
7?Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 155*
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about men.
Dewey regards man as part of a total natural process 
rather than an individual who lives in isolation. According 
to Dewey, all men live in association with other individuals 
and with nature, for he writes: "Individuals who are not
bound together in associations, whether domestic, economic, 
religious, political, artistic or educational, are mon­
strosities."78 So-called human nature is merely another 
aspect of the larger framework of the natural process. Prom 
Dewey's point of view personality, selfhood, and subjectivity 
are eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized 
interactions, orgeuiic and s o c i a l . 79
In regard to the condition of natural man Dewey re­
jects the idea of innate depravity as well as the concept of
innate goodness. The mistake, he claims, is to associate 
human nature with any external moral realm.®® When man's 
activity is separated from external attempts to control it, 
then conduct becomes an interaction between elements of 
human nature and the environment, natural and social:®^
When we look at the problem as one of an adjustment to 
be intelligently attained, the issue shifts from within 
personality to an engineering issue, the establishment 
of arts of education and social guidance.®2
7®Joseph Ratner, Intelligence in the Modern World 
(Dew York: Random House, 1931), p. 410.
79i)ewey, Exnerlenoe and Nature, p. 208.
SODewey, HumaTi Wature and Conduct, p. 9.
®llbid.. p. 10. ®2lbid.
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According to Dewey, human nature is not a mystical 
essence with immutable, invarying qualities or character­
istics. Instead, human nature is the totality of individual 
interaction with natural events and natural processes. Man 
is a responding organism, not an inert, passive creature who 
«Aits for objective and external forces to move him. Out of 
the matrix of natural events and social processes personality 
is developed and takes form:
To learn to be human is to develop through the give and 
take of communication an effective sense of being an 
individually distinctive member of a community; one who 
understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and 
methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of 
organic powers into human resources and values.83
Since man is a functioning organism in nature, there 
is no need to furnish him with incentives to activity. How­
ever, there is, in Dewey's approach, every need to induce man 
to guide his actions by intelligent perceptions of its re­
sults. Man's activities arise from impulses which interact 
with the environment. Such impulses as the medley of impulses 
listed under the caption of the bellflgerant impulse may lead 
to war or to a fight against disease:
Social conditions rather than an old and unchangeable 
Adeua have generated wars; the ineradicable impulses 
that are utilized in them are capable of being drafted 
into many other channels.84
War is thus seen to be a function of social institutions, not
of iriiat is natively fixed in human constitution. What is
^^Eatner, on. cit.. p. 389.
8^Dewey, Human Wature and Conduct, p. 113.
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needed, says Dewey, is a general social re-organization which 
will redistribute forces, immunize, divert, and nullify wrong 
i m p u l s e s . The principle used to illustrate the social 
origin of warfare can be applied to every aspect of man's 
activity, according to Dewey.
With the concept of selfhood arising from the inter­
action of an organism with natural and social processes, it 
follows that upon everything that is legitimately character­
istic of human nature, society has laid a f i n g e r . 86 gut this 
dees not imply that the individual is engulfed by society.
For society is not an abstraction, but an aggregate of inter* 
acting organisms. Dewey states that society does not stand 
over against the individual any more than the alphabet stands 
over against the letters composing it.8? From natural events 
and social processes, which are basically one, man derives 
his significance. This idea is revealed in the statement:
But individuals are always closely geared to other 
individuals, and biological factors--their influence in 
no way being depreciated— act by contributing to the 
normal or abnormal interaction between i n d i v i d u a l s . 88
To Dewey, individual significance is possible only within the
framework of society.
Carrying the idea of the natural and the social 
origin of individuality to its ultimate conclusion, Dewey 
states that man is not governed by reason, but by habit.
85ibid.. p. 115. 88gchilpp, op. cit.. p. 348.
87ibid.. p. 347. Q8xbid.. p. 348.
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Social institutions and social expectations shape and 
crystallize impulses into dominant habits.^9 Man is a crea­
ture of habit, not of reason, nor even of instinct.90 The 
individual lives by habit when a predisposition to ways or to 
modes of response is acquired. Habit, as Dewey defines it, 
is a particular sensitivity or accessibility to certain 
classes of stimuli.
To Dewey habits are the basic condition of intel­
lectual efficiency.91 Habits are essential for intellectual 
effectiveness because they restrict the scope of the opera­
tion of intellect and direct its activities, thus preventing 
aimlessness. Dewey's position is stated precisely in these 
words: "Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing,
imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that
is done."92
Since human nature, according to Dewey, arrives at 
distinctive selfhood by interacting with natural events and 
social processes, it follows that such human nature is 
dynamic rather than static. Finding significance in the 
process of interaction, human nature retains meaning only by 
remaining flexible enough to continue the process of inter­
action as new environmental situations arise.
In order to approach the study of Dewey's educational
®9pewey. Hitman Mature and Conduct, p. 122.
90ibid.. p. 125. 91ibid.. p. 172.
92ibid.. p. 177.
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philosophy it seemed necessary to present a brief exposition 
of his metaphysics, his epistemology, his logic, his axiology, 
his concept of the nature of man. Each of the various facets 
of Dewey's philosophy is consistently naturalistic, focal­
izing in the theme of the interaction of an organism with 
its environment. Substituting method for traditional phi­
losophy, Dewey establishes a metaphysics based on scientific 
experiment. Growing out of this methodological metaphysics 
Dewey arrives at a theory of knowledge in which empirical 
inquiry is the only acceptable epistemology. Dewey's logic 
and his axiology are both expressed in functional terms of 
problem-solving instrumentalism. Human nature was, to 
Dewey, the resftlt of intelligent habituation produced by the 
process of interaction.
The problem of the following discussion is to ascertain 
how Dewey applied his naturalistic theory of interaction in 
the area of education.
CHAPTER VI 
EPUOATIOHAL PERSPECTIVE OP JOHE DEtfET
When John Dewey accepted a position as an instructor 
in philosophy at the University of Michigan in 1884 he was 
committed to Hegelian idealism, which nurtured his hostility 
to dualism of every sort and left him dubious as to the 
validity of all such dichotomies as those between education 
or culture and society or life.l In 1894 Dewey moved to the 
University of Chicago, where he opened his experimental school 
in 1896. Growing out of a practical, prggmatic approach to 
educational problems, Dewey's first educational treatise 
appeared in 1899 under the title The School and Society. 
Seventeen years later, in 1916, Dewey elaborated his position 
in Democracy and Education. Between 1916 and 1952 Dewey wrote 
prolifically, constantly criticizing traditional education 
and continually presenting his own suggestions for the im­
provement of American education.
In presenting Dewey's educational philosophy it seems 
sufficient to limit the discussion to four aspects: (1) his
concept of philosophy and education; (2) his idea of the aims
^Sidney Hook, John Dewey. An Intellectual Portrait 
(Hew York: Macmillan Co., 1939), p. 13.
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and the objectives of education; (3) his curricular pattern; 
(4) his idea of educational methodology.
Philosophy and Education 
To Dewey, philosophy is thinking what the known de­
mands of us— what responsive attitude it exacts.2 Philosophy 
is an idea of what is possible, not a record of accomplished 
fact. Its value, says Dewey, lies not in furnishing solutions 
but in defining difficulties and in suggesting methods for 
dealing with them. Philosophic problems arise, according to 
Dewey, because of widely felt difficulties in social practice.
Where a system becomes influential, its connection with 
a conflict of interests calling for some program of 
social adjustment may be discovered. At this point, the 
intimate connection between philosophy and education 
appears.3
Dewey proceeds to identify education and philosophy. Abstract
philosophy is rejected as mere verbalism, sentiment, or dogma.
If a theory makes no difference in educational endeavor, it
is artificial, in Dewey's thinking.
If we are willing to conceive education as the process 
of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and 
emotional, toward native and fellow men, philosophy may 
even be defined as the general theory of education.
Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic, or verbal, or 
a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbi­
trary dogma, its auditing of past experience and its 
program of values must take effect in conduct.4
A philosophy is effective in producing public agitation, prop-
^John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Mac­
millan Go., 1939), p. 381.
3lbid. ^Ibid.. p. 383.
183
aganda, legislation and administrative action in the degree 
that it becomes educative.
It is precisely at the point of divorce between phi­
losophy and education that Dewey launched his attack on the 
educational system of the early twentieth century. Hot only 
did Dewey attack the educational system of the first decades 
of the twentieth century, but he also declared it to be a 
failure, for he writes: "It is time to take stock and to
consider why and how the existing educational system has 
failed to meet the needs of the present and the immanent 
future."5 A little later Dewey criticizes current educa­
tional practices even more sharply in these words:
The system is a system only by courtesy. In fact, it 
is more like a patchwork, and a patchwork whose pro­
cesses do not form a pattern. It is a patchwork of the 
old and the new; of unreconstructed survivals of the 
past and of things introduced because of new conditions. 
This statement applies equally to the things taught, the 
ways they are taught, and the social control of the edu­
cational system, and its administration. There are too 
many studies and too many courses of study, and the 
result is confusion.o
Dewey states that one reason the existing educational 
system has failed is the educational tradition itself, which 
in the elementary stages is dedicated to the promotion of 
literacy and in the higher levels is controlled by the con­
cern for the transmission of symbols, such as mathematics and
5john Dewey, Education and the Social Order (Hew 
York: League for Industrial Democracy, 19 34), p. 3«
Gjohn Dewey, "Education and Our Society," The Forum. 
XOIII (June 1, 1935), 333.
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and languages.^ Dewey admits that in an advanced culture 
much of the experience of the group is of necessity expressed 
in symbols* While admitting the value of cultural symbols, 
Dewey rejects the theory that the transmission of academic 
symbols is the fundamental task of education. When the sym­
bol is made primary, education is divorced from life and be­
comes artificial, according to Dewey.
. . . the tragic weakness of the present school is that 
it endeavors to prepare future members of the social 
order in a medium in which the conditions of the social 
spirit are eminently wanting.°
Another reason for the failure of existing educational 
patterns, Dewey states. Is the failure of the schools to 
recognize and to adapt to the new social conditions resulting 
from the industrial revolution and the consequent passing of 
pioneer culture. In a primitive culture there was always 
something which was to be done, and a real necessity that 
#ach member of the community or household do his own part 
faithfully and in cooperation with others. In this environ­
ment of social solution to pressing problems the child learned 
discipline, character-building attitudes, and a sense of social 
obligation. Further, educational purposes were realized in 
the close and intimate acquaintance with nature at first 
hand, with real things and materials, and with the actual 
processes of their manipulation for desired ends. Referring to
?Ibld.. p. 3.
8John Dewey, The School and Society (Chicago; Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1900), p. lè.
185
the educational benefits of a pioneer culture, Dewey comments:
In all this there was continual training of observation, 
of Ingenuity, constructive Imagination, of logical 
thought, and of the sense of reality acquired through 
first-hand contact with actualities. The educative 
forces of the domestic spinning and weaving, of the saw­
mill, the gristmill, the copper shop, and the blacksmith 
forge, were continuously operative.9
With the passing of a pioneer culture, with Its 
natural educative environment, society had accepted an arti­
ficial, Imposed approach to education. In Dewey's thinking. 
Dewey felt that the dilemma In education had occurred because 
the old values of the pioneer system had been lost In tradi­
tional education. To restore the natural educational 
advantages of pioneer culture Dewey would suggest radical 
action, by the remark:
There Is only one way out of the existing educational 
confusion and drift. That way Is the definite substi­
tution of a social purpose, controlling methods of 
teaching and discipline. . . for the traditional In­
dividualistic aim. And, In the schools, as In society 
generally, that change will signify more genuine develop­
ment of Individuality for the mass of Individuals. For,
In the first place. It signifies the substitution of 
methods of Inquiry and mutual consideration and discus­
sion for the methods of Imposition and Inculcation.10
In Education and Experience Dewey suggests a series of 
alternative positions In which he contrasts traditional edu­
cation with «Eperlence centered education.Traditional 
education Involves Imposition from above while the newer edu-
9 l b l d .. p. 8 .
lO^ewey, Education and the Social Order, p. 8.
John Dewey, Education and Erperlence (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1938), pp. 5-6.
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cation envolvee expression and the cultivation of individ­
uality; the older education stressed learning from texts and 
from teachers, while the new education stressed learning by 
experience; one system promoted the acquisition of isolated 
skills and techniques by drill and repetition, while the 
proposed system encourages the development of skills by 
direct participation in activity; one hoped to prepare pupils 
for the remote future, while the other points to the oppor­
tunities of the present; the older approach revolved around 
static aims, while the new approach is involved in acquain­
tance with a changing world.
It should be pointed out that Dewey's ideas are not
entirely negative, for he writes;
A philosophy which proceeds on the basis of rejection, 
of sheer opposition, will. . . tend to suppose that be­
cause the old education was based on ready made organi­
zation, therefore it suffices to reject organization 
in toto. instead of striving to discover what it means 
and how it is to be attained on the basis of experience 
. . . .  When external authority is rejected, it does not 
follow that all authority should be rejected, but that 
there is need to search for a more effective source of 
authority.12
Having rejected the traditional philosophy of educa­
tion Dewey proceeds to replace it with an educational philos­
ophy based on experience. The experiential basis of Dewey's 
educational theory is indicated by his definition of educa­
tion: "It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experi­
ence which adds to the meaning of experience, and which
12ibid.. pp.7-8.
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Increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experi­
ence. An activity which brings education or instruction 
with it Is a natural event which makes one aware of some of 
the connections which had been previously Imperceptible,
The key to Dewey's educational philosophy is "experi­
ence." But, as Geiger points out, the following elements need 
to be kept in mind when considering Dewey's use of the term 
experience; (1) The word "experience" designates a special 
kind of existence, related to existence or to nature as part 
is to whole; (2) Dewey always regards experience as a process 
rather than as a thing, as an organic transaction rather than 
as the contents of a container; (3) since experience extends 
from the trivial, causal, and the blind to the incadescence 
which illuminates everything men prize, it involves discrim­
ination, choice, meaning, and quality. Selectivity must 
always play a part in helping to achieve the richness, com­
pleteness and consummation of experience which Dewey regards 
as the only authentic moral direction.
It is the point of selectivity and discrimination 
which connects experience and education for Dewey. Indis­
criminate experience as such does not necessarily involve edu­
cation. On the contrary, an experience is miseducative if it 
has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of 
further experience. Out of discriminating experience, to
15Dewey, Philosophy of Education, pp. 89-90.
^^George R. Geiger, John Dewey In Perspective (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 194-195.
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Dewey, arises the expression and development of individuality 
which alone can justify the aims and objectives of the edu­
cative process.15
Alms and Objectives cf Education
Dewey offers the following criteria by which to $udge
the educational value of an activity:
We say that the kind of experience to which the work of 
the schools should contribute is one marked by executive 
competency in the management of resources and obstacles 
encountered; by sociability, or interest in the direct 
companionship of others; by aesthetic taste or capacity 
to appreciate artistic excellence in at least seme of 
its classic forms; by trained intellectual method, of 
interest in some mode of scientific achievement; and by 
sensitiveness tc the right and claims of others—  
conscientiousness.!"
Dewey's educational aims are as wide as the range of 
natural events and human interests. His objectives for edu­
cation include the social, the moral, the intellectual, the 
aesthetic and the utilitarian.
The general aim of education in Dewey's philosophy is 
to enable individuals to continue their education. Another 
way of stating the educational aim of Dewey is that the ob­
ject and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth.!? 
Educational aims arise from the activity so inherent in bio­
logical or social activity. Dewey stresses the point that edu­
cational aims should not be imposed upon the educative process
!5Dewey, Philosophy of Education, p. 13.
!^Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 285-286.
!?Ibid.. p. 117.
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from without. Stressing the importance of natural activity
as the logical process by which to arrive at educational
aims, Dewey states:
To talk about an educational aim when approximately each 
act of a pupil is dictated by the teacherj when the only 
order in the sequence of his acts is that which comes 
from the assignment of lessons and the giving of direc­
tions by another, is to talk nonsense. It is equally 
fatal to an aim to permit capricious or discontinuous 
action in the name of spontaneous self-expression. An 
aim implies an orderly and ordered activity, one in 
which the order consists in the progressive completing
of a process.18
A precise, yet general, criteria of establishing cor­
rect aims is suggested by Dewey.1^ First, the aim set up must 
be an outgrowth of existing conditions and must point to 
directed activity in arriving at desired results. Second, 
the educational aim should be flexible. It must be capable 
of alteration to meet circumstances. The aim. is thus experi­
mental and is constantly adjusted as it is tested in action. 
Finally, the aim must always represent a freeing of activities. 
Dewey uses the term "end in view," as it suggests the termi­
nation or conclusion of some process in which activities are 
directed to the solution of a problem.
Using the above criteria for the evaluation of edu­
cational aims, the following discussion attempts to present 
three objectives of education which appear to be prominent in 
Dewey's educational theory. These three aims are the growth 
of social efficiency, the attainment of moral patterns of
iGlbid.. pp. 118-119. ISlbid.. p. 121.
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response and the development of judgment.
Although Dewey's educational philosophy is con­
sistently and relentlessly naturalistic, it is most generally 
known for its emphasis on the social. Many consider Dewey's 
social interpretation of education his most distinctive con­
tribution to educational theory.20 jq Dewey it was essential 
to combine an all-prevading naturalism with an all-inclusive 
regard for the distinctly human, or social. His naturalism 
required Dewey to accept without reservation the concept of 
continuity between man and the rest of nature. But his 
interpretation of man's role in the natural process also re­
quired that he recognize the extraordinary differences that 
mark off the activities and the achievements of human beings 
from those of other biological forms.21 The social environ­
ment in which man operates provides the natural bridge from 
behavior that is organic to behavior that is distinctly 
human.22
A society, says Dewey, is a number of people held 
together because they are working along common lines in a 
common spirit, and with reference to common a l m s . 25 The 
common needs and aims of a given society require an expanding
20paul A. Schilpp, The Philosophy nf Jnhn Dewey 
(Chicago; Northwestern University, 1939), p. 435.
2lDewey, Logic, p. 43.
22schilpp, OP. cit.. p. 436.
25pewey, School and Society, p. 11.
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interchange of thought and a growing sense of unity, according
to Dewey. Dewey criticizes traditional education for its lack
of social stimulus, as indicated by the following words:
The radical reason that the present school cannot organize 
itself as a natural social unit is because just this ele­
ment of common and productive activity is absent. . . . 
There is no obvious social motive for the acquirement of 
mere learning, there is no clear social g&in in success 
thereat.24
Dewey regards the school as an institution erected by 
society to do a certain specific work, to exercise a certain 
specific function in maintaining the life and in advancing the 
welfare of society.25 Within the school as a social institu­
tion the child is regarded as a social being who should not 
be isolated from natural social prowesses. The social nature 
of the school is emphasized in the following statement of 
Dewey :
The child is one, and he must either live his social 
life as an integral unified being, or suffer loss and 
create friction. . . .  We must take the child as a mem­
ber of society in the broadest sense, and demand for and 
from the schools whatever is necessary to enable the 
child intelligently to recognize all his social relations 
and take his part in sustaining them.26
Education is considered social, in Dewey's thinking, 
for several i,asons. The first reason is that meanings are 
properties of a kind of behavior which appears only in a 
society in which language had made voluntary communication 
possible. This process of linguistic communication transformed
24jbid.. pp. 12-13.
25John Dewey, Moral Principles In Education (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909), p. 7.
26ibid.. pp. 8-9.
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the natural environment into a cultural environment and in so 
doing created the realm of meanings.27 Since the realm cf 
meanings and values is created and conserved by the organized 
life of society, the materials of education— -its content and 
purposes— are social in nature.28
A second reason for Dewey's belief that education is 
primarily a social process is that the child leams the be­
haviors which are characteristic of person-hood by partici­
pation in the activities and meanings of society. To Dewey 
a being whose activities are associated with others has a 
social environment. Regarding the molding force of environ­
ment Dewey writes: "What he does and what he can do depends
upon the expectations, demands, approvals and condemnations 
of others."29 Thus it is society, Dewey claims, which func­
tions as the great educative fcrce because of its established 
modes of action and thought which pattern the behavior of the 
child.
Dewey further claims that education should be inter­
preted as a social process because the establishment of the 
aims and the objectives of education requires study of the 
child in connection with the conditions and institutions of 
which he is a part. All education, as Dewey sees it, is 
achieved indirectly, through the environment.30 The point of
27Dewey, Experience and Mature, p. 168.
28gchlipp, OP. cit.. p. 437.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education.p. 14. ^Ojbid.
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difference in education, he comments, is whether we permit 
chance environments to do the work, or whether we design 
environments for specific educative purposes.
Another reason for Dewey's stress on the social 
nature of education is his belief that society insures its 
continuance by the means of education. Education is par­
ticularly essential to insure the continuance of democracy, 
according to Dewey:
Only as the coming generation leams in the schools to 
understand the social forces that are at work, the di­
rections and the cross-directions in which they are 
moving, the consequences that they are producing. . . 
only as the schools provide this understanding, have 
we any assurance that they are meeting the challenge 
which is put to them by democracy.51
Regarded from a social point of view, education affords a 
continual opportunity for the reassessment of the patterns of 
life developing within a given society. Dewey is especially 
anxious that democracy be continually re-evaluated, for he 
writes: "The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democ­
racy, must be continually explored afresh; it has to be 
constantly discovered, and rediscovered, remade, and 
reorganized."52
Finally, Dewey contends that education should be 
regarded as a social process because these who pass through 
the institution called the school will become members of a 
society in which they will be called upon to participate.
5lDewey, Problems of Men, p. 48.
32lbid.. p. 47.
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Among the desired social aims of education are the ability to 
exercise the responsibility of citizenship, the ability to 
fulfill family obligations, the development of beneficial 
vocational skills, the appreciation of cultural values, and 
the realization of leadership qualities.33
Another aim of the educational process, according to 
Dewey, is the development of patterns of conduct which may 
be regarded as moral. However, it is necessary to state two 
things regarding Dewey's interpretation of moral. The funda­
mental idea of Dewey in regard to morality is that morals do 
not consist of ideas or standards of conduct imposed from 
without, but are behavioral directives gained from experience. 
The second foundational concept of Dewey in his approach to 
morality is that, since moral behavioral habits are derived 
from experience, such patterns of morals are never static, but 
are dynamic, or open-ended.
Dewey makes a distinction between moral ideas and 
ideas about morality. To Dewey moral ideas are ideas of any 
sort which take effect in conduct and improve it, making it 
better than it would be otherwise. Conversely, he describes 
immoral ideas as any ideas which result in making behavior 
worse than it would be without the idea. Hon-moral ideas are 
those ideas or pieces of information which leave conduct 
uninfluenced for either the better or the w o r s e .34 Dewey
33Dewey, Moral Prinainimg In Education, pp. 9-10.
34])ewey, The Moral Purpose of the School, p. 1.
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writes that ideas about morality may be morally indifferent 
or immoral or moral: "There is nothing in the nature of
ideas about morality, of information about honesty or purity 
or kindness which automatically transmits such ideas into good 
character or good donduot."55 Since changing behavior, or the 
modification of conduct, is the essence of education, then it 
follows that any idea or experience which moves conduct toward 
a desired goal is moral. It also follows, in Dewey's think­
ing, that the moral purpose, thus defined, becomes the universal 
and dominant purpose in education:
The business of the educator is to see that the greatest 
possible number of ideas acquired by children and youth 
are acquired in such a vital way that they become moving 
ideas, motive forces in the guidance of conduct.*"
In the process of the realization of the desired moral 
ends of education it is impossible, as Dewey sees it, to keep 
direct moral considerations constantly predominant. He thinks 
that moral education is practically hopeless when the goal of 
character development is linked to the acquisition of knowl­
edge which has nothing to do with character. Dewey states 
that morality is induced by direct instruction only in authori­
tarian situations. He states that such an approach is not 
possible in a democracy:
. . . direct instructions in morals has been effective 
only in social groups where it was a part of the 
authoritative control of the many by the few. Hot the 
teaching as such but the reenforcement of it by the 
whole regime of which it was incident made it effective.
35ibid. 36jbid.
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To attempt to get similar results from lessons about 
morals in a democratic society is to rely upon senti­
mental magi0.37
But from the experiential approach of Dewey it is 
both desirable and possible to aim at making the methods of 
learning, of acquiring intellectual power, and of assimilating 
subject-matter such that they will make behavior more en­
lightened, more consistent, more vigorous than they would be 
otherwise. In keeping with his social approach to education 
Dewey states that the child ought to have the same motives 
for right doing and to be judged by the same standards that 
exist in the social environment.
In addition to developing social efficiency and achiev­
ing moral patterns of response Dewey places the development of 
reflective thinking, or judgment, as one of the foremost edu­
cational aims. Thinking, according to Dewey, is defined as 
that operation in which present facts suggest other facts in 
such a way as to induce belief in what is suggested on the 
ground of real relations in the things themselves.38 Dewey 
repeats a familiar theme when he states that thinking is not 
an activity which may be artificially imposed from without by 
exhortation or moralizing. He also distinguishes reflective 
thinking from discontinuous daydreams and from disconnected 
beliefs. The demand for the solution of a perplexity is the 
steadying and guiding factor in the entire process of reflec­
tion. In this way, says Dewey, the nature of the problem fixes
37pewey, Democracy Education, p. All.
38pewey, How We Think, p. 12.
197
the end of thought, and the end controls the process of .
thinking.59
The development of reflective thinking is important 
for three reasons, according to Dewey.^ First, it eman­
cipates people from merely impulsive and merely routine activ­
ity. Stated in pcsitive terms, thinking enables the individ­
ual to direct his activities with foresight and to plan with 
ends-in-view, or with known purposes. A second advantage of 
the development of reflective thinking is that it makes 
possible systematic preparations and inventions. By the 
processes of thought man develops and arranges artificial 
signs to remind him in advance of consequences and of ways of 
securing and avoiding them. Finally, reflective thinking 
enriches physical events and objects by conferring upon them 
a different status and value from those which they possess to 
a being that does not reflect. The first two values mentioned 
are of a practical kind, resulting in increased power of 
control. The third value is an enrichment value apart from 
cnntrol.
Dewey is empirical and naturalistic in advancing the 
derivative role of thought and in positing the dependence of 
thought upon non-logical subject matter. To Dewey thought is 
an agency for reconstituting experience. Thought as cn agency 
of reconstructing experience is essential because every 
living creature is in constant interaction with its surround-
59ibid.. p. 15. ^ Ibid.. pp. 17-19.
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ings. It Is engaged in a process of give and take, of doing
something to objects around it and in return receiving
impressions and stimuli from its environment. The point at
which thinking begins, Dewey says, is the point of curiosity
aroused in the organism by the process of interaction.
Speaking of curiosity as the source of thinking Dewey says:
But we also have tendencies that are forward-reaching 
and out-reaching, that go out to make new contacts, 
that seek new objects, that strive to vary old objects, 
that revel, as it were, in experiences for their own 
sake and so are ceaselessly active in enlarging the range 
of experience. These various tendencies are summed up 
in curiosity.41
However, curiosity, in Dewey's thinking, must trans­
cend the organic and social level to the reflective, or to 
the intellectual level. On the intellectual level curiosity 
is transformed into interest in finding out for oneself the 
answers to questions and the solutions to problems aroused by 
contact with persons and with things. Thinking then, is 
developed by a scientific, natural process. First the indi­
vidual experiences, or is confronted by a situation which 
arouses curiosity or which presents a felt difficulty. The 
second step in developing .thinking, or judgment, is to analyze 
or to investigate the nature of the perplexity. Another step 
is taken in developing discriminating judgment, or intel­
ligence, when the individual begins to conjecture and to 
invent hypothetical explanations for the problematic features 
revealed by observation. A further level of thinking occurs
4lrbid.. p. 36.
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when particular hypothesis are selected and tested, and the 
problem is solved. By the approach of problem solving 
Dewey proposed that thinking, or intelligence, is no more 
and no less than the ability to discover solutions to the 
inevitable problems which arise as an organism functions in 
a natural and a social environment. Because of the natural, 
practical method of developing thinking as an instrument of 
problem solving Dewey's approach has been called instru­
mentalism.
The educational aims which appear to be paramount to 
Dewey are social efficiency, moral habits or attitudes, and 
the development of intelligence. Since Dewey felt that tra­
ditional education either ignored or was greatly deficient in 
achieving these educational goals, he proposed a drastic re­
vision of the curriculum. In a new and more scientifically 
slanted curricular pattern, Dewey thought the aims of edu­
cation could be developed more satisfactorily and more ef­
ficiently.
Curricular Pattern
The curriculum, as Dewey proposed, would be experi­
ence-centered and scientifically oriented. Regarding the 
need for a new concept of the curriculum Dewey writes; " . . .  
new methods of inquiry and reflection have become for the edu­
cated man the final arbiter of all questions of fact.
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existence, and Intellectual assent."42 in discussing the 
importance of the curriculum Dewey seemed to place priority 
on three things: (1) the social nature of the curriculum;
(2) the curriculum as an outgrowth of natural activity;
(3) and the problem-solving aspect of the curriculum.
To Dewey, the first great step toward better edu­
cation, as far as subject matter and method were concerned 
was to construct an educational system that informed students 
about the present state of society in a way that enabled them 
to understand the conditions and forces at work.43 Social 
change seemed to make educational change natural and desir­
able.
The modification going on in the method and curriculum 
of education is as much a product of the changed social 
situation, and as much an effort to meet the needs of 
the new society that is forming, as are changes in 
modes of industry and c o m m e r c e .44
The social context of Dewey's curricular approach is a natu­
ral consequence of his concept of mind. For the mind cannot 
be regarded, says Dewey, as an individual, monopolistic 
possession, but represents the outworkings of the endeavor 
and thought of humanity, and that social needs and aims have 
been most potent in shaping it.45
The radical change from a pioneer culture, where 
learning took place naturally In connection with the struggle
42John Dewey, "The Liberation of Modern Religion," 
Yale Review. XXIII (November 4, 1934), 152.
43pewey, Education and the Social Order, p. 10. 
44])ewey, School and Society, p. 4. * P* 91.
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for survival, to an urbanized mode of living called for 
equally radical changes in education, according to Dewey.
The basic problem of education, to Dewey, was the problem 
of retaining the values innate in pioneer life by introducing 
into the curriculum occupations which exact personal respon­
sibilities and which train the child in relation to the 
physical realities of life. In Dewey's approach the emphasis 
is shifted from subject matter as content to subject matter 
consisting primarily of meanings which supply content to 
existing social life.^
Of basic importance in Dewey's curricular pattern are 
play and work. However, he is incisive in stating that work 
and play are not to be introduced for entertainment or simply 
as time-consuming devices, but are to be used for intel­
lectual and social purposes.
The problem of the educator is to engage pupils in these 
activities in such ways that manual skill and technical 
efficiency are gained and immediate satisfaction found 
in the work, together with later usefulness, these things 
shall be subordinated to education— that is, to intel­
lectual results and the forming of a socialized dis­
position.47
To Dewey any curricular programs which simply resulted in the 
reproduction of ready-made models or in muscular dexterity 
were as ineffective as traditional educational procedures. 
Play is introduced into education in the hope that it will 
lead to more activity. Activities, as they become more com-
4^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 226.
47ibid.. p. 231.
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plicated, gala added meaning by greater attention to specific 
results achieved and thus become work. In an ideal situa­
tion, which Dewey proposed, both work and play are equally 
free and intrinsically motivated. Work, to Dewey, is simply 
an activity which consciously includes a regard for conse­
quences as a part of itself. Work, when permeated with the 
play attitude, has attained the level of art.48
In Dewey's curriculum history and geography are the 
information studies par excellence for schools.49 History 
and geography, he claims, enrich and liberate the more direct 
and personal contacts of life by furnishing their context, 
their background and outlook. Geography is important because 
it emphasizes the physical setting in which experience occurs. 
History is important because it stresses the social activ­
ities in which the individual operates. Both history and 
geography are areas of study which lead to natural learning 
activity:
Nature is the medium of social occurrences. It furnishes
original stimuli; it supplies obstacles and resources.
Civilization is the progressive mastery of its varied
energies.50
The principle of study in both geography and history is to 
trace the process of its development, to follow it through 
the successive stages of growth. By tracing back current 
problems or processes to their origin the student gains an 
understanding of the present and is able to manipulate,
48ibid.. p. 242. 49ibid.. p. 246.
50lbid.. p. 247.
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controlp or modify present and future developments.
Science also occupies a prominent place in Dewey's 
concept of curricular studies. By science Dewey means that 
knowledge which is the outcome of methods of observation, 
reflection and testing which are deliberately adopted to 
secure a settled, assured subject matter.51 Science also 
involves an intelligent and persistent endeavor to revise 
current beliefs, to eliminate error, and to assure greater 
accuracy. Science, to Dewey, is the perfecting of knowing. 
Science marks the emancipation of mind from devotion to 
customary purposes and makes possible the systematic pursuit 
of new ends. It is the agency of progress in action, the 
chief means of perfecting control of means of action. It is 
the sole instrumentality of conscious as distinct from acci­
dental progress.52
While science is the chief instrumentality of 
progress, Dewey does not subject everything to science. Man 
is always central in Dewey's thinking. Science is man's best 
method for perfecting man. Dewey, like Jefferson, would put 
his faith in man as a social being, not in science. Quoting 
Jefferson, he said: " . . .  the well-being of France depends
not on the state of science, not matter how exalted it may be 
in a select band of enlightened men, but on the condition of 
the general m i n d . "53
51lbid.. p. 256. 52ibid.. p. 266.
33John Dewey, "Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic 
Faith," The Virginia Quarterly Review. XVI (5o.ll, 1940), 2.
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In addition to geography, history, and science Dewey 
would include in the curriculum activities that would lead 
to an appreciation of values, the ability to use leisure time 
beneficially, skill in the art of communication, and some 
degree of vocational achievement. Any area of investigation 
that could develop social efficiency, and arouse a natural 
understanding of nature and a degree of control of natural 
processes could be included in Dewey's curricular plan.
Educational Methodology
Directly related to the experience-centered curriculum 
of Dewey there is a parallel experience-centered method by 
which the pupil is directed in his learning process. In his 
methodology, as in his concept of the curriculum, Dewey re­
jects the traditional approach in favor of methods which are 
in harmony with natural processes. The traditional idea that 
mind and the world of things and persons are two separate and 
independent realms carries with it the conclusion that method 
and subject matter are separate affairs, according to Dewey. 
Prom the traditional point of view, says Dewey, subject matter 
becomes a ready-made systematized classification of the facts 
and principles of the world of nature and of m a n . 54 Further, 
as Dewey interprets the traditional approach, method consists 
of the various ways in which this antecedent subject matter 
may be presented to and impressed upon the mind, or it con-
54])ewey, Democracy f&uoation. p. 193.
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slats of a consideration of the ways in which the mind may be 
externally brought to bear upon the matter so as to facilitate 
its acquisition and possession. Since any dualism is unac­
ceptable, and since thinking is of the nature of problem 
solving activity in his theory, Dewey rejects the split between 
content and method.
But since thinking is a directed movement of subject 
matter to a completing issue, and since mind is the 
deliberate and intentional phase of the process, the 
notion of any such split is radically false.55
To Dewey, method is never something outside of the 
material. Method to him means the arrangement of subject matter 
which makes it most effective in use. Method is simply an 
effective treatment of material with a minimum of waste of 
time and energy. Again, method is not antithetical to subject 
matter, but is the effective direction of subject matter to 
desired results. Dewey states that method as the effective 
direction of subject matter to desired ends has four advan­
tages over traditional methods.55 First, in traditional 
methods there is a neglect of the concrete situations of ezr. 
perience, while in Dewey's approach the method is derived from 
observation of what happens, with a view to seeing that it 
happens better next time. Again, traditional methods produce 
a false concept of discipline and of interest, while the 
natural approach elicits interest and produces discipline 
because the material under consideration constitutes a problem
55ibid.. p. 194. 56ibid.. pp. 197-198.
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which, involve8 the spontaneous interest of the pupil. Further, 
in traditional education learning is made a direct gnd a con­
scious end in itself. In Dewey's thinking learning should be 
the result of an impulse to utilize the factors present in a 
situation to achieve a desirable goal. Finally, in traditional 
methodology methods tend to become reduced to a cut and dried 
routine, consisting of a series of mechanical steps to be 
mastered. In contrast to the static routine in learning 
Dewey proposes methods which are flexible.
Method, then, is to Dewey the method of an art, of 
action intelligently directed by ends. There can be no spe­
cific method of teaching any more than there can be specific 
methods of painting a work of art or of the diagnosis of a 
disease by a physician. Both the artist and the physician 
bring to the situation an expert knowledge of the background, 
the general structure of the situation, and a knowledge of 
objects or of instruments to be used. But each project or 
case is an individualized experience.
Dewey transfers the artist concept to methodology, 
stating there are certain general principles which are in­
cluded:
They are the features of the reflective situation: 
problem, collection and analysis of data, projection 
and elaboration of suggestions or ideas, experimental 
application and testing; the resulting conclusion or 
judgment.57
While there are general features to his methods, Dewey
57ibid,, p, 203,
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believes that the specific elements of an individual's method 
or way of attacking a problem are found ultimately in his 
native tendencies and his acquired habits and interests. In 
this way, the method of one will vary from that of another, 
as his original instinctive capacities vary, as his past 
experiences and his preferences vary. In addition to the 
general features of any method suggested above, Dewey states 
that, from the standpoint of the teacher, several attitudes 
are necessary in effective intellectual ways of dealing with 
subject matter. Among the most important attitudes are 
directness, open-mindedness, single-mindedness, and respon­
sibility. 58
Dewey's methodology places the child at the center of
the teaching-learning situation when he writes: "In this
case the child becomes the sun about thioh the appliances of
education revolve; he is the center about which they are
organized."59 While Dewey makes the child the center of the
educational process, and regards the natural activities of
the child as the point of departure in learning, he clearly
points out that direction is essential in the learning process
in the following statement:
The child is already intensely active, and the question 
of education is the question of taking hold of his 
activities, of giving them direction. Through direction, 
through organized use, they tend toward valuable results, 
instead of scattering or being left to merely impulsive
58lbid.. p. 204.
59]3ewey, School and Society, p. 35.
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expression.60
With the child as the center of the educational 
process Dewey suggests that any adequate methodology should 
capitalize on four impulses which are natural and available in 
the schools.61 There is the social instinct of the children 
as shown in conversation and personal communication. Since 
the language instinct is the simplest form of the social 
expression of the child, it is the greatest of all educa­
tional resources, according to Dewey, and is the second nat­
ural quality which should be considered in teaching methods.
Then there is the instinct of making, or what Dewey 
calls the constructive impulse. Since the child does not 
have much instinct for abstract inquiry, but does have an 
impulse to do and to make, an effective teaching method should 
utilize the child's impulse to do things and to see things 
happen. Again, the key to effective teaching or learning is 
directing the constructive impulse to give results of value.
A final natural impulse of the child is the impulse to inves­
tigation. In Dewey's thinking there is no distinction between 
experimental science for little children and work done in the 
carpentry shop. Work that children do in physics or in chem­
istry is not for the purpose of making technical generaliza­
tions or even at arriving at abstract truth. Children, says 
Dewey, simply like to do things and to watch to see what will 
happen. This impulse, properly directed, can be a factor in
60%bid.. pp. 37-38. 6libid.. pp. 42-43.
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effective method.
From the natural impulses innate in the human organ­
ism— >the interest in conservation or communication, the 
artistic expression as symbolized in language, the interest 
in making things, and the impulse to investigation--the 
teacher derives the basic aspects of method. When the indi­
vidual teacher directs these natural impulses into problem 
solving activities, with the aim of achieving desirable 
results, the method is natural, effective, and educative.
In his methodology, as in all his educational concepts, Dewey 
is consistently naturalistic.
Dewey applied his naturalistic philosophy to edu­
cational theory to the degree of equating philosophy and edu* 
cation. The aims of education were naturalistic, namely social 
efficiency, the development of discriminating judgment, and 
moral patterns of response. The curricular content, empha­
sizing the natural and the social sciences, was designed to 
appeal to the native impulses of the pupil. Dewey's method­
ology was a flexible, problem-solving approach which involved 
the directing of natural impulses toward particular goals.
During the first quarter of the twentieth century 
Dewey’s philosophy, with its penetrating criticism of tradi­
tional educational theories and practices and its emphasis 
on democracy and scientific method, met little opposition and 
gained widespread support. By the third decade of the 
century, however, the opposition to Dewey began to crystallise.
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Among the most articulate of the opposition was 
Robert M. Hutchins. Hutchins attacked vigorously the nat­
uralistic relativism of the progressive-education position. 
The objection of Hutchins was directed mainly at what he 
described as the anti-intellectualism of the naturalism of 
Dewey. In its stead he favored a humanistic education based 
on universal and eternal truth, arrived at in Aristotelian 
fashion by distinguishing that which is essential to a thing 
constituted from that which is merely an accident of its 
individuality.^2
Opposition to Dewey also came from ?. S. Breed and 
later from John Wild under the caption of the "new-realism." 
According to Wild, the realist holds that the world exists 
in itself, apart from our desires and k n o w l e d g e . The 
naturalism of Dewey had enclosed man in the natural process, 
thus eliminating his independence. The realist also holds 
that the human intellect and will cannot be adequately under­
stood in terms of purely physicalist categories.Realism 
also accepts the concept of personal dependence and con­
tingency, and is therefore more hospitable to religion.
In addition to the opposition of the classical hu­
manists and the philosophical realists, further opposition
p. 132.
^^Brubacher, A History of the Problems of Education.
^3john Wild, "Education and Human Society: A Real­
istic View," Modern Rhilosonhles and Education (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1955)» p. 23.
6^1bid.
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to Dewey came from a group led by William 0. Bagley. This 
group sponsored an educational philosophy called "essen- 
tialism," in which they sought to stabilize educational aims 
and methods by emphasizing the tried and true in experience. 
Sharp criticism to Dewey and his naturalism also came from 
within naturalistic philosophy itself. Boyd H. Bode, in 
Modern Educational Theories, opposed the scientific deter­
mination of educational objectives. Science, according to 
Bode, could determine what society actually desired, but it 
could not determine what society ought to d e s i r e . ^5
Perhaps the sharpest and the most penetrating critic 
of Dewey, was Herman H. Home, a contemporary of Dewey teach­
ing at Hew York University. Home was an idealist who felt 
that the system of Dewey was unsound philosophically and 
unsatisfactory educationally. The next chapter considers 
Horne’s philosophy from the perspective of idealism.
65Bode, Modern Educational Theories, p. 203.
CHAPTER VII
THE PERSPECTIVE OF IDEALISM; HORDE
Even as John Dewey was a conscious prophet of a
revolutionary approach to education, so Herman H. Horne was
a self-appointed critic of the new education, particularly
of its Deweyan philosophical assumptions. As Dewey first
rejected traditional philosophy, and then proposed his own
system, so Home rejects Dewey’s concepts, offering the
philosophy of idealism as a substitute. H o m e  is generally
recognized as the leading exponent of idealism in educational
philosophy in America in the twentieth century. Brubacher
assigns Horne to a place of leadership in idealistic thought
in the following comment :
Most prolific writer on the idealistic philosophy of 
education in the twentieth century was Herman Harrell 
Horne (1874-1946). At a time when idealism was already 
fast fading as the dominant American theory of educa­
tion, Horne managed to draw together the various strains 
of idealism into their more systematic educational 
exposition.1
Butler also pays tribute to the work of Home in the comment:
Probably no man in recent American education has been as 
much an exponent of the idealistic philosophic tradition 
as the late Herman Harrell Home, iriao, throughout a 
thirty-three year professorship at Dew York University,
^Brubacher, History of the Problems of Education.
p. 126.
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worked with distinction in the history and philosophy 
of education.2
Horne subscribed to the philosophy of personal 
idealism, which he defines as follows: "It is the philos­
ophy which finds both the reality and the values of life in 
the experience of persons who feel themselves not orphans, 
but at home in a purposeful u n i v e r s e . I n  more technical 
terminology H o m e  presents a precise definition of idealism:
Idealism is the conclusion that the universe is an 
expression of intelligence and will, that the enduring 
substance of the world is of the nature of mind, that 
the material is explained by the mental. Idealism as a 
philosophy stands in contrast with all those systems of 
thought that center in nature (naturalism) or in man 
(humanism.)*
Before discussing the philosophical concepts of Home 
it is essential to analyze his approach to the nature and to 
the content of philosophy, particularly in the areas where he 
differs from Dewey. H o m e  states that Dewey had not provided 
a real, logical refutation of classical, speculative philos­
ophy. Dewey had used the genetic approach to philosophy, 
assuming that philosophy arose from certain social conditions, 
Further, Dewey holds that since these social conditions have 
changed, the conclusions drawn from them are invalid. About 
the social origin of philosophic ideas Dewey states: "It
^Butler, OP. cit.. p. 211.
^Herman H. Home, This Hew Education (New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1931)» p. 11.
^Herman H. H o m e , , "An Idealistic Philosophy of Edu­
cation, " The Piftv-Pirst Yearbook of the National Society 
for the Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1942), p. 139.
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seems to me that the gemetic approach Is a more effective way
of undermining this type of philosophic theorizing than any
attempt at logical refutation.Stating that the social
origin of a theory does not determine its truth Home writes:
The fact that Plato wrote under aristocratic social con- 
ditons does not settle the question of the truth of his 
theory of ideas. Let it be noted that the same social 
conditions daw the birth of the Sophists, the first 
pragmatists and humanists.6
In addition, Home contended that the problem-solving 
attitude to which Dewey reduced philosophy was too narrow, for 
two reasons. First, the individual needs findings as well as 
seekings; second, the individual needs aesthetic enjoyment as 
well as intelligent action. Dewey, says Home, fails to give 
adequate recognition to these two aspects of life.? Further, 
H o m e  charges that Dewey has not eliminated dualism from his 
philosophy.8 For Dewey speaks, says Home, of the world 
having a measure of order, but offers no theory of the nature 
or origin of this order. Dewey's world has the flux of 
Heraclitus, but not the permanence of Parmenides.
Home also rejects the concepts of Dewey in the area 
of method. Home feels that Dewey's socio-centric universe 
cannot be proved by experimental inquiry nor sustained by 
scientific theory. Horne writes:
^Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 24.
^Home, This Hew Education, p. 107.
Gibld.. p. 110.
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But how can a Boclo-centrlc universe be either proven 
by the method of experimental inquiry or epeculatively 
defended in the light of Eddington'e cosmology set 
forth so majestically in his Science and the Unseen 
Universe.9
In fact, Home states that Dewey's position is more narrow 
than medievalism, for medievalism at least had Divinity above 
and humanity below, while Dewey reduces everything to man's 
ability to solve his own problems. In Dewey's system, says 
Home, habit formation takes the place of ontology and 
cosmology.10
While rejecting the Deweyan ideas of the nature and 
the method of philosophy. Home follows the traditional ap­
proach to philosophic interpretation. Philosophy, according 
to Home, is the mind of man wrestling with the universe.
Home states that the instrument of philosophy is thought, 
as it attempts to follow out in some final and self-consistent 
fashion the intimations of partial experience.12 With thought 
as the instrument of philosophy, the characteristic method 
of philosophy is to take what facts it can find in a given 
field of human experience and thentto seek logically to 
determine their meaning. Referring to the validity of his 
philosophical method Home comments:
It is a perfectly legitimate method of mental procedure, 
as used and vindicated by both science and art; only
9lbid.. p. 101. lOlbid.
llReme, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education,"
p. 159.
(Hew York: The Macmillan Go
l^Herman H. Home, The ^^losoohv^^f Education
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the whole which philosophy seeks Is larger, even reality 
Itself. IzL brief,,the method of philosophy Is reflec­
tion. 13
Home, by accepting the Idealistic Interpretation of the 
nature and of the method of philosophy, also accepts the Im­
plications of such an Interpretation of philosophy In the 
areas of metaphysics, eplstemology, axiology, and the nature 
of man.
Metaphysical Concepts of Home 
The two traditional phases of metaphysics, ontology 
and cosmology, are focal In the approach of Home to the 
problem of the nature of reality. Writing In general terms. 
Home states that Idealism finds Ideas and purposes to be the 
reality of existence, and personality, which Is the union of 
Ideas and purposes, to be the ultimate r e a l i t y . S p e k k l n g  
more specifically. Home defines ontology, or the nature of 
being. In these words: " . . .  according to Idealism, to be
Is to be experienced by an absolute self. He defines 
cosmology, or the nature of order In the world as follows:
" . . .  Idealism holds that the order of the world Is due to 
the manifestation In space and time of an eternal and splr- 
1 tual r eall ty. "
If the universe Is Interpreted from the naturalistic
13lbld.. p. 258.
^^erman H. Home, Idealism In Education (Hew York:
The Macmillan Go., 1923), p. vll.
ISHome, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education," p. 139. 
iGibld.. p. 140.
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point of view, then the burden of proof rests on substantial 
concepts, mechanical processes, developmental procedures, or 
a spirit of investigation. But if the nature of reality is 
described in idealistic concepts, the central ideas are the 
experiencing mind and the nature of order. Upon these two 
rational principles, the experiencing mind and the nature of 
order. H o m e  focalizes his attempts to explain his idealism, 
which ends ultimately in the concept of God as the essence 
of reality.
Horne begins his mentalistic interpretation of reality 
by asserting that mind, as mind, is the only plausible prin­
ciple of explanation. In a vigorous statement he asserts:
Mind is the principle of explanation. There is no 
denying this fact. It is our minds that raise prob­
lems, face problems, and seek the solution of problems. 
Mind is the explainer. Mind as the explainer is real. 
Mind, the real explainer, cannot consistently regard 
itself as unreal. Neither can mind, the real explainer, 
consistently say that anything else than itself is more 
real than itself. For this supposed thing other than 
itself supposed to be more real than itself, is itself 
a conception of the mind.17
Referring to the attempt of naturalism to interpret 
nature, or reality, in terms of natural law, Home writes that 
the assertion that the universe is govemed by the action of 
mechanical law is itself a mental judgment, an effect of mind 
as cause.18 Mechanism itself is thus a constmction of the 
human mind. So called "natural laws," says Home, are human
ITibid.. p. 142.
iSnerman H. Home, Free Will and Hun^n Responsibility 
(New York: The Macmillan Go., 1912), p. 108.
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formulations which fairly describe but do not exhaust nature.^9 
As H o m e  interprets mind, it is not only with mind but also 
by mind that we explain, that is, by concepts framed by the 
mind. Mind, subjectively used and objectively applied, is 
the sole principle of explanation.20
H o m e  attempts to describe the nature of mind by 
using the idea of negative elimination. Thus mind is not 
matter, for matter is a product of mind in the sense that the 
mind ascribes the qualities of space, weight, dimensions, and 
quantity. Further, the mind has qualities which matter can­
not possess, such as a remembered past and an anticipated 
future. Again, mind has meanings, while matter has no mean­
ing to itself. Also, says Home, mind perceives the quali­
ties of the world, such as colors, tones, tastes, odors; but 
matter, though it may be composed of waves, perceives no 
qualities. In summarizing the difference between mind and 
matter H o m e  concludes:
For these reasons and many others of a like import, we 
must conclude that mind is too qualitatively different 
from matter ever to be regarded as matter or as a 
product of matter, though matter may be regarded as 
objectified mind, or mind in its 'otherness,' as 
painting objectifies the thought, feeling, and pur­
pose of the artist.21
In his interpretation of reality in ontological terms 
H o m e  has thus far stated that mind is the only plausible
19lbid.
^^Home, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education,"
p. 142.
21lbld.. p. 143.
219
principle of explanation and that mind is not matter. A
third concept of Home regarding mind is that mind comes
from mind. In his thinking mind is too unlike matter to be
a derivative of matter. But he thinks that finite minds may
be derived from an infinite mind, for he writes: " . . .
the presence of any finite minds at all in the stream of time
may be to the self-manifestation of an infinite mind, just as
the law of gravity manifests itself in every falling body."22
Rejecting the theory of emergent evolution as an adequate
explanation of mind, Horne writes:
There must be a realized actual mind before there can be 
a potential derived mind. There must exist a reservoir 
of universal mind before any streamlets of mind can 
trickle through matter. . . .  It is both common sense 
and reason to hold that if mind is itself and not 
matter, then it came from mind and not from matter.23
Home accepts mind as a rational explanation of reality be­
cause mind is the only adequate source of explanation; mind 
is and cannot be matter, and mind is derived only from mind.
The concept of purpose in the universe is used by 
Home to support his idealistic cosmology. Accepting the 
theory of evolution. Home uses it as a support to his ideal­
ism, for to him evolution itself would appear to be a pur­
posive process. His use of the idea of evolution to support 
purposive idealism is indicated by the statement:
Every event in the process has its antecedent cause and 
its consequent effect. The cause is not only efficient 
but also final. The end is a purposive outcome of the
22ibid. 23ibid.. p. 144.
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process. Emergeât evolution itself is the outcome of 
an Immanent design or intention. This immanent design 
in time really is not self-ezpleuiatory but implies an 
eternal and universal purpose.24
In addition to the acceptance of mind and of order as 
a rationale for the metaphysics of idealism, Horne also 
. appeals to several general propositions related to man as 
subject. Home reasons as follows: "An object is always
an object of thought. The subject is a thinker. The thinker 
thinks an object. . . .  An alleged world of objects without 
a thinker to think them is a self-contradiction."^5 Further, 
man as subject has an inalienable conviction that personality 
is reality. By personality Home means the quality or state 
of being a person, with person defined as a self-conscious 
center of experience. Again, man as subject has the con­
viction that he is a free moral agent. According to Home, 
this conviction is justified, if Idealism is true.26 Finally, 
man as subject, in his racial development, has accepted the 
idea of the immortality of the soul. In Home's thinking, 
however, immortality as a supporting idea for idealism does 
not rest entirely on the history of the race. The evidence 
of immortality lies In the rationality of the universe.
Horne explains his position regarding immortality as follows:
. . .  if the death of the body, which is itself a 
creature of mind, meant the death of the mind too, 
then mind would not be the reality after all. But in 
a rational world whose order expresses mentality, it
24%bid. 25ibid.. p. 146.
26ibid.. p. 149.
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would be sheer waste and contradiction to destroy what 
mind has produced. The belief In man's Immortality Is 
a logical consequence of accepting the reality and 
universality of mind In our world.27
Both ontological concepts and cosmological ideas cul­
minate In an infinite being, according to Horne. For the 
transition Is easy in thought from the world as the object 
of finite thinking to the world as the object of finite 
thinking. The world then would exist in itself as the object 
of infinite thinking just as it exists for us as the object 
of finite thinking. Similarly personality might conceivably 
be in the line of descent from the super-natural, but it could 
not be in the line of ascent from the impersonal. Thus the 
personality of man and the values inherent in man proclaim an 
infinite mind that thinks the universe in personal terms. But, 
as Horne states it, to think the universe In terms of an
original Person expressing himself In finite persons Is
idealism as a p h i l o s o p h y .^8 More particularly, Home accepts 
God as ultimate reality.
Home accepts a position of Idealistic theism, which
he describes as follows:
Our conception Is neither a transcendent dualism, nor an 
Immanent pantheism, but an Idealistic theism. God Is 
the self-oonsclous unity of all reality. Within His life
falls the life of nature and of man. We are the content
of his consciousness, and not we only, but all that which 
Is, all that we know Is a part of the infinite fullness 
of the content of His consciousness.29
27lbld. 28lbld.. p. 147.
29Home, Philosophy of Education, pp. 269-270.
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The approach of Home avoids dualism by making the world 
immanent in the life of God, for God is the infinite Person 
in the unity of whose consciousness all things exist. Matter, 
then, is not something distinct or antithetical to God, for 
matter is the objective thought of the infinite conscious­
ness. As the objective expression of God's thought, matter 
remains substantial and solid in man's experience. The con­
cept of idealistic theism has a direct relation to man's view 
of the universe, as suggested by Horae: " . . .  the aware­
ness that man's life is lived as a part of the permeating 
Universal Life. This is not impersonal pantheism, nor arti­
ficial dualism, nor degrading materialism, nor hesitant 
agnosticism, nor anthropormorphic theism, but real monotheism. ^
Horne sponsors an interpretation which he prefers to 
call idealistic theism, or absolute idealism. To him the 
nature of mind, the evidence of purpose in the world, plus 
the history of the human race appear to be sufficient to 
justify the acceptance of the existence of an infinite mind, 
or self. He concludes his discussion of the idea of God as 
a sound metaphysical position with the words: "In the light
of the foregoing discussion, there is no content we can 
ascribe tc the term 'God' quite so worthy as the whole of 
experience, all reality, the Absolute.
5®Horae, Idealism In Education, p. 175*
31ibid.. p. 167.
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Theory of Cnnyledee
Horne approaches the problem of knowledge as he did 
the problem of metaphysics, by attempting to show the fal­
lacies of the Deweyan interpretation. Following his objec­
tions to the ideas of Dewey, Home discusses the nature of 
truth, and then deals with the problem of knowing, or grasping 
the truth.
Several criticisms are made of Deweyan concepts of
knowledge by Home. The first criticism is that while Dewey
proposed the experimental method as the only legitimate method
of apprehending tmth, yet he himself did not arrive at his
focal concepts by experimentation. Home expresses this
criticism of Dewey as follows:
But Dr. Dewey uses the literary and dialectic methods, 
methods which he denies, not the experimental method 
which he praises, in advocating his views. He does not 
go into the laboratory and experiment; he goes into his 
study and writes a book advocating the experimental 
method. . . . Besides, having stated his beliefs, he is 
transmitting them with whatever authority attaches to 
his great reputation.32
A further criticism is made by Horne of the assumption 
of Dewey that dualism in epistemology is the result of divi­
sions in society. Home points out that both naturalistic 
and monistic theories of knowledge have arisen from similar 
social settings. More pointedly. Home states that dualistic 
theories of knowledge have arisen from the same social matrix 
from which Dewey derived his theory of knowledge. Finally
3^Herman H. Home, The Democratic Philosophy of Edu­
cation (Hew York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 403.
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Home claims that Dewey asserts that contemporary society is 
only nominally democratic. Yet such social conditions 
offered no barrier to Dewey proposing a philosophy of conti­
nuity far different from the social context of his day.^^
Home also rejects the teaching of Dewey that experi­
ence as such, knows, with one experience giving meaning to 
another. To Home both reason and common sense recognize 
that experience cannot know any thing, that to know experi­
ence involves a knower and a k n o w n .  34 Home also asserts 
that the acoeptance of the doctrine of evolution, which he 
as well as Dewey accepts, involves a philosophic principle 
rather than a fact of experimental science. Finally, Home 
rejects the inclusive problem-solving approach to knowledge. 
Commenting on the problem-solving approach Home writes:
Some problems having been solved, it is not necessary 
or desirable that the schools should be devoted only 
to problem solving; some of their time may well be 
spent in learning what others have found put, in appre­
ciating it, and in laying adequate foundations for 
adding to it.35
For the reasons presented above Home regarded the approach
of Dewey to the problem of epistemology as inadequate. In
his approach to the problem of knowledge Home expresses the
concepts of traditional idealism.
Truth, asserts Home, is the mind of man mirroring
33ibid.. p. 484.
3^ b i d .. p. 485.
35ihid.. p. 491.
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reality.56 ideas change, facts change, but an idea correctly 
representing a fact at a given point in time establishes a 
relationship that is changeless. Truth does not change; it 
is eternal, it is godlike, according to Home. In his 
thinking the agreement of idea and fact is truth. Ideas have 
two purposes, a functional value in guiding conduct and a 
substantive value in representing fact. False ideas may 
function temporarily, but only true ideas work best in the 
end.
However, facts in themselves, writes Home, are only 
nature's symbols of inner meanings. It is the function of 
science to ascertain and to manipulate the symbols, but it is 
the task of philosophy to reveal the meanings of such symbols. 
The problem of philosophy is to read properly the universal 
meaning of the facts. All the symbols of nature must ulti­
mately be interpreted by mind, for Home states: "Matter
to us is symbolic of meanings we do not fully grasp, while 
mind to us is meaning itself."57
With truth defined as the mind of man mirroring 
reality. Home proceeds to elaborate the process by which mind 
is adequate to properly reflect reality. The process of 
arriving at an acceptable interpretation of reality is de­
scribed by Home in the observation:
56Home, This Hew Education, p. 263.
57nome, Idealism In Education, p. 146.
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If we should name the successive stages in the intel­
lectual development of the race or the individual, 
they would appear in some such order as this: sen­
sations, perception, memory, imagination, conception, 
judgment, and reasoning. Following perception there 
is apperception, which is rather a process of, than a 
period in, intellectual development. Sensation, then, 
is the alpha, and reasoning is the omega of knowing.3°
Home assumes the distinction between mind and body
without hesitation, for he writes: "Without attempting to
solve this dark difficulty. . . it is intelligible to say that
the child to be educated has a body and a mind."^^ However,
Home avoids a dualistic interpretation by suggesting that
the mind does not live in the body, but grows in the body as
a plant in its soil. The connecting apparatus between the
body and the mind, according to Home, is the nervous system.
His idea of the relation of body and mind is indicated by
the following statement:
It is man's nervous system that makes sensation and 
movement possible. From these two, sensation and move­
ment, develop all the final powers of consciousness. 
Sensation interpreted becomes knowledge, movement 
directed becomes will, the activity involved in each 
of these giving a tone of feeling to c o n s c i o u s n e s s .40
The nervous system, then, underlies consciousness, 
and sensations become the gateways to knowledge. Sensations 
are the response of the nervous system to environmental stim­
uli. Sense-perception thus has a significance for knowledge, 
for feeling, and for action. For knowledge sense-perception
3%erman H. Home, Psychological Principles of 
Education (New York: Macmillan Go., 1908), p. 84.
39ibid.. p. 57. ^ Ibid.. p. 61.
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signifies that sensation is the only way by which the mind 
gets information of the material objects of existence.41 
Since mental activity is dependent upon sensations and the 
resultant nervous activity in the brain, according to Home, 
it follows that the degree of mental activity and of under­
standing depends upon the state of the brain and the state 
of the physical body of which the brain is an organic part.
Following sensation, the next step in the process of 
knowing is perception, by which Home means the knowledge, or 
awareness, of individual objects. The first problem faced 
by the learning organism is the problem of coordinating 
sensations, to recognize the seen thing as also the felt thing. 
Relative to the reconciliation of sensations Home remarks : 
"This unification of sensations gives concrete objects of 
experience, things, the knowledge of which through a single 
sensation or more is perception."42 When sensations sym­
bolize things, knowledge is acquired.
To sensation and perception, as powers of the mind 
acting in harmony with the body. Home adds the beginnings 
of memory and imagination as important aspects of the process 
of arriving at valid knowledge. Memory, to Home, is the 
recall of the earlier impressions of sense, while imagina­
tion is the reforming of the images of the past in new 
f o r m s . 43 in the earlier stages of life, says Horne, both
41%bid.. p. 95. 42ibid.. p. 210.
43ibid.. p. 212.
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memory and imagination are almost exclusively the result of 
pleasure and displeasure, although other emotional reactions 
would also contribute to memory and imagination.
A most important aspect of the process cf arriving 
at a valid knowledge is the development of the powers of con­
ception. Home delineates between perception and conception 
as follows:
Perception is the knowledge of individual objects, con­
ception is the knowledge of general objects; perception 
gives immediate experience, conception gives mediate or 
generalized experience; perception gives mental growth, 
while conception gives mental development, that is, 
through perception we add to our store, and through con­
ception we come to think in new w a y s .44
Conception is the fulfillment of the lower stages of 
sensation, perception, memory, emd imagination. To conceive 
a thing, says Home, is to think of it as a universal dis­
tinguished from the particulars which it unifies. Discussing 
the higher level of conception Home states:
Conceiving is a higher power of mind than perceiving, 
for whereas perceiving gives us experience, conceiving 
takes it up and mediates it with thought, thus bringing 
out a new power of thought and also making our experi­
ences significant.45
Conception, then, is the discernment of relations among par­
ticulars, and the arrangement of individual perceptions into 
classes.
The powers of conception eure magnified in judgment and 
in reasoning. Judgment is the mind's power to comprehend and
44^ Ibld.. p. 155. 45ibld.. p. 158.
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to estimate situations, whether facts or principles.^ Judg­
ment Is, according to Home, the climax of mental activity: 
"It Is the highest Intellectual power. It Is the power to 
think. It comes as the result of training. The man of judg­
ment Is the man of Intellectual p o w e r . J u d g m e n t  and rea­
soning are complementary, for reason Is the mind at work 
discriminating and evaluating among perceptions and concep­
tions. Horne places reasoned Judgment as the capstone of the 
knowing process, and summarizes his position as follows:
. . . the trained judgment reports facts as they are, 
sees their meaning, foresees their consequences, and 
glimpses the whole of which they are fragments. Judg­
ment Is the mind's assertion about reality; It reaches 
beyond the content of Individual consciousness and lays 
hold of that which Is objectively true; It Is the typi­
cal act of Intelligence In Its effort to comprehend the
world.48
In his approach to the problem of epistemology Horne
follows traditional Idealistic procedures, except In two
significant Instances. First, he makes sensation the gate*
way to all knowledge of the objective physical world, and
second, he transcends the level of sensual experience by
accepting a mentallstlc concept of mind, and ultimately, of
truth. His epistemology, as his metaphysics, culminates
finally In God, for he writes:
All truth Is God's truth. . . .  In man. In nature, the 
truth Is the thought of God. This of course means 
utter justification for the common feeling that any 
least shred of truth found anywhere. In remotest star,
46ibld.. p. 233. 47ibld.
48ibld.. p. 235.
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in solid earth, in a stirring emotion, or in a quieting 
tho^^ht, is sacred, having somewhat of divinity about
Theory of Value
In approaching the problem of axiology Home begins 
by leveling several criticisms at the value concepts of Dewey. 
Home first attacks the idea of Dewey that all moral concepts 
and all ethical activities are aspects of a unified, con­
tinuous process. Dewey had accepted this asiological approach 
in his attempt to solve the problem of dualism in value con­
cepts. Horne, on the other hand, states that there is a 
difference between the inner motive and the outer activity. 
Horne illustrates the difference between the inner and the 
outer as follows:
In the case of a multiple personality. . . the unity and 
continuity of behavior is disturbed. The different per­
sonalities within the same organism alternate; successive 
states of the same personality are continuous with each 
other but are discontinuous with the altemating person­
ality. In the case of a deranged personality there is 
but little unity and continuity left.50
Hot only does Home state that Dewey has not solved the prob­
lem of dualism in his philosophy, but he also states that 
Dewey has actually arrived at a dualistic interpretation by 
speaking of "different phases of experience." Home also 
rejects the Deweyan theory of the social origin of ethical 
concepts. Again, Horne asserts that the reduction of all
49lbid.. p. 49.
SOgorne, Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 508.
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activity to interest motives is untrue and undesirable.
Horne expresses his disagreement with Dewey as follows:
Interest is presented as the adequate motivation of 
work. This overstates the case. Work done u*der 
coercion is not done through the motive of interest 
in the work; it is done through fear of the conse­
quences of not doing it. . . . Probably most of the 
world's work is actually done under extrinsic moti­
vation. 51
Finally, Home states that Dewey fails to establish a dis­
tinction, a working criterion, of good and e v i l .52 Dewey 
fails at this point, according to Home, because of the 
emphasis on the occupational and the instrumental approach 
to values.
In his interpretation of values Home attempts to har­
monize subjective experience with etemal, objective value 
concepts which are embedded in the stmcture of reality. From 
the standpoint of experience the term "values," according to 
Home, refers to those experiences that are most worth having.53 
Regarding values from the standpoint of objective existence 
Home states:
. . . all human values are but temporal expressions of 
an eternal order which has value in itself. This 
etemal order is spiritual in character and changeless 
in nature. It is the world of essential ideas and
ideals.54
Since Home incorporates the subjective aspect of
51lbid.. p. 517.
52ibid.. p. 523.
53Horne, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education,"
p. 181.
54%bid.. p. 183.
232
experience In his discussion of values, he regards the basic 
needs of human nature as directives in determining the values 
of life. Beginning with the values of human nature asso­
ciated with the physical body, Home ascends to the values 
necessary to man as man seeks to find meaning in the universe. 
In summarizing his ideas about the values associated with man 
as a physical organism living in a socio-spiritual environ­
ment, Home writes: "Here then is our list of the values of
human living, the realization of which constitutes our tme 
objectives of living and learning: health, character, social
justice, skill, art, love, knowledge, philosophy, and re­
ligi o n .  "55 Prom the practical side, all the values mentioned 
above are necessary for the completion of man's being, and as 
such constitute the objectives of man's living and learning.
Horne, however, does not terminate his value concepts 
at the level of human existence, for he states: "Life,
rightly understood, is just the development of man toward 
the fAfinlte pattem of perfection."5^ Expanding his ideal­
istic interpretation of values Home comments:
. . . the idealist answers that his ideal world is the 
most real world, that it exists in its own etemal way, 
that the etemal world is the only adequate, ultimate 
explanation of the existence of the temporal changing 
world and its values, and that man's progress consists 
in realizing more and more the etemal values in the 
temporal order.57
Season, common sense, and experience support the view
55ibid.. p. 182. 56ibid.. p. 183.
57ibid.
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that values have cosmic status, according to H o r n e . 58 Rea­
son says something cannot come out of nothing. Common sense 
realizes that life at its best lives by ideals. Individual 
experience also indicates that the existence of eternal ideals 
has played a vital role in the lives of mystics. Home admits 
that reason, common sense, and experience, all combined, do 
not conclusively demonstrate the truth of the idealistic con­
cept of values. But they do make it plausible, according to 
Home, to accept the idealistic interpretation. The lack of 
demonstrable proof does not present a serious problem to 
Home, for he claims that any other philosophical position 
faces a similar problem, that of absolute proof.
On the basis of immediate objectives and ultimate 
objectives. Home develops a hierarchy of v a l u e s .59 ihe 
criterion by which values are arranged in hierarchial order 
is the contribution that each value makes to the realization 
of man's absolute goal, his likeness to the spiritual order.
At the top of the scale of values Home places worship, since 
it brings man into conscious relation to the infinite spirit 
of the universe. Following worship comes character in the 
individual and justice in society as evidences of the adjust­
ment of the will of man toward the eternal right. The next 
level of values is the production and the enjoyment of the 
beautiful as revealing infinite perfection. Next would come
58ibid.. p. 184.
59ibid.. p. 59.
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knowledge as reflection upon the ideas embodied in the struc­
ture of the universe. The skill requisite to one's economic 
independence is also regarded as a value, for it is related 
to personal character and to social justice. Good health is 
placed at the bottom of the hierarchy, yet it is esteemed 
highly as a basic value for all the others, enhancing the worth 
and richness of all other values. All values are interrelated 
in the idealism of Home. The body and the mind and all the 
various functions of mind constitute one unity. The ideal for 
human life, as suggested by the hierarchy of values, is the 
integrated individual in an integrated society growing in the 
image of an integrated universe.
In considering the philosophical concepts of Home 
which are relevant to his educational philosophy the attempt 
has been made to summarize his theories of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and axiology. It is necessary, for a complete 
understanding of his educational theory, to discuss an addi­
tional concept, his idea of human nature.
Theory of Human Nature
In his theory of human nature Home agrees with natu­
ralism in holding that man is a product of evolutionary pro­
cesses. Home disagrees with naturalism, however, in his 
view of mind and in his idea of experience. First, the dis­
cussion deals with the evolutionary aspects of the biological 
development of man, then considers the nature of experience.
The nature of mind has already been treated in the presentation
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of the mstaphyslcal position of Home.
Horne accepts the evolutionary theory that man, as
animal, Is the result of natural development. However, he
does not limit man to animal classification, for he writes:
Man Is not a mere animal, nor even a mere man. An
animal Is not a mere animal, but, like man, has eif- 
flnltles In his nature with those beings that come both 
before and after him. The creation Is one from lowest 
matter to highest mind, and nothing occupying a place 
In this creation Is merely Itself.oO
Three problems emerge, according to Home, when human 
nature Is assigned a positive affinity with animal nature. 
These problems are the relation of the Instincts to educa­
bility, the significance of prolonged Infancy, and the rela­
tion of mind and brain. Man does not have fewer Instincts 
than the lower animals, but he has a greater capacity to 
delay reaction to stimuli, to learn from past experience, to 
adjust himself to new situations, and to form new and deli­
cate nervous reactions. Home regards an Instinct as an 
Inherited nervous mechanism which goes off when properly 
stimulated. In man's development he has learned, by the 
various processes of education, to be less and less depen­
dent upon his Instincts for his survival suid more and more 
dependent upon judicious selection among his Instincts and 
upon knowledge acquired from past experiences.
Another significant problem rising from man's bio­
logical affinity with nature Is the prolonged period of
60Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 18.
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human Infancy. Home accepts the explanation that the length 
of infeuicy is determined by the degree of complexity in the 
mental life of the organism and by the degree of complica­
tion inherent in the physical situation in which the organism 
operates. Prolonged infancy is thus a sign that the organism 
possessing it has a complicated d e s t i n y . S i n c e  nature can­
not fully prepare man in the pre-natal period for his compli­
cated role in life, then all the essential adjustments, 
except the instinctive, must be learned after birth.
A final problem related to the analysis of human 
nature as a biological organism by Horne is the relation of 
the mind to the brain. To Horne the brain is the organ of the 
m i n d .62 While mental functioning is correlated with the 
functioning of the brain, Horne admits such functioning is 
extremely vague. Referring to the educational significance 
of regarding the brain as the organ of the mind Horne 
remarks :
. . .  it is manifest that education consists in struc­
tural modification of the brain and of the central 
nezTona system of which the brain is headquarters.
Without the development of the sensory and motor 
regions of the brain, the fruits of education in the 
mental powers of observation, perception, reasoning, 
and volition cannot be reached. Mental habits are pri­
marily brain habits. Mental inefficiency is first 
brain inefficiency.63
The nature of experience, as well as man's biological 
affinity to nature, is important in the interpretation of
Gllbid.. p. 31. 62ibid,, p. 3 4 .
G^Ibid.. p. 36.
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htuuan nature accepted by Home. Here again Horne differs 
with Dewey. For Dewey, thinking begins with experience, 
while Home regards experience as the outcome of reflective 
thought. To Dewey, experience, being an active-passive or 
a passive-active affair, is not cognitive or intellectual, 
but practical. To Home experience is an event grasped by a 
self-conscious being who predicates meaning to experience. 
Home also claims that Dewey, in his reduction of experience 
to interaction between the organism and its environment, has 
omitted the exceedingly important idea of the interaction of 
the individual with other individuals.^^ Horne also rejects 
the Deweyan attempt to limit thinking to experience. Rela­
tive to the projection of thinking beyond experience, Home 
writes;
We do indeed think in terms of experience, but we can 
also think beyond the limits of experience. Thus Kant 
could examine the very conditions of all experience. 
Astronomers can formulate theories of the formation of 
the earth prior to any experience of man. . . .  In all 
these ways thinking can transcend the doing and under­
going of concrete experience.65
Horne further states that if all thinking is to be 
regarded as a function of experience, the concept of experi­
ence must be enlarged to cover Plato's vision of ideas, 
Kant's intellectual perception, and Hegel's absolute Idea. 
But if experience is expanded to include the contemplation
^%orne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education.
p. 184.
GSlbld.. p. 185.
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of abstractions, the philosophical fulcrum has shifted to 
idealism.
As an idealist, Home regards personality as ulti­
mately significant in human nature. He writes: "Person­
ality has ultimate worth, that is, we know and can think 
of nothing higher or more valuable than selfhood, or per­
sonality. To Home the greatest quality of personality is 
the possibility of growth. Referring to the potentiality of 
selfhood he writes:
The person seems endowed with unlimited capacities for 
growth in the attainment of knowledge and wisdom, in 
the production and enjoyment of the beautiful, and in 
the acquisiton of ideal virtues of understanding, 
sympathy, cooperation, forgiveness, and self- 
sacrifice.o7
In summary, Horne regards man as a finite person, growing, 
when properly educatèd, into the image of an infinite per­
son, that his real origin is deity, that his nature is freedom, 
and that his destiny is immortality.
As a background for the consideration of the phi­
losophy of education accepted by Horne the discussion of 
this chapter has revolved around his metaphysical concepts, 
his interpretation of epistemology, his idea of axiology, 
and his understanding of human nature. Horne is idealistic 
with every aspect of his philosophy focalizing ultimately 
in an Infinite Being who is the ground and the completion of
^^Horne, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education,"
p. 154.
67lbid.
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all existence. Because the general thesis of the disserta­
tion deals with the tension between idealism and naturalism 
in American education, the various points of divergence 
between Dewey and Horne, as representatives of these two 
systems of thought, have been emphasized. Having discussed 
the general philosophical position of Home, it is now 
possible to consider his educational philosophy. The next 
chapter is thus devoted to an analysis of the idealistic 
educational philosophy of Horne.
OHAJTER VIII
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF HORNE
In contrast to Dewey, who structured his educational 
philosophy within the processes of nature, Horne interpreted 
educational theory against a background of universal meaning 
and purpose. An idealistic philosophy of education, accord­
ing to Horne, is an account of man finding himself as an 
integral part of a universe of mind.^ Horne, however, repre­
sents a modified type of idealism, for he avoids an antago­
nistic dualism by incorporating nature into his philosophical 
system as an aspect of a universal mind, or person.
Horne, in agreement with Dewey, regards American 
education as deficient and in need of severe scrutiny, for 
he writes;
Our educational procedures in America have been what 
the philosopher Kant would call "dogmatic," that is, 
we have gone on somewhat blindly believing in educa­
tion and in its ability to make men and women, as Kant 
himself did, without once thoroughly raising the ques­
tion whether and to what extent education could make a 
man. There are many signs today that "A Critique of 
Education" would be welcome.2
iHome, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education,"
p. 140.
2nome, This New Education, p. 23 =
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Horae, however, seems to assume that a critique of
American education Is primarily a criticism of Dewey, for he
confines his analysis of educational theory and practice to
a review of the Deweyan Interpretation of education. The
philosophy of Dewey was, according to Home, an embodiment
of American social Idealism, American practicality, American
faith In education, and the Darwinian method of Inquiry.3
The following comment by Home relevant to the background of
Deweyan theories Is Illuminating :
Doctor Dewey's educational philosophy has both fallen In 
with the spirit of the times and. In a certain respect, 
run counter to It. It Is democratic and scientific, but 
antagonistic to our economic order. It Is consequently 
just the kind of educational philosophy to be seized 
upon by progressives everywhere. Unfortunately, however, 
his educational views have been accepted without a thor­
ough examination of their presuppositions and Implica­
tions.4
The root of the difficulty In Dewey, as Horne sees 
It, Is that Dewey Is an Intellectuallst In method and an anti* 
Intellectuallst In results.5 By this statement Home means 
that Dewey establishes the controlling function of thought 
and rejects, or at least subjects. Its representative func­
tion In science and Its reflective function In philosophy.
To Home such an approach Is the denial of philosophy alto­
gether, for the "reconstruction of philosophy" becomes In 
reality the destruction of philosophy. Continuing his 
criticism of Dewey, Home states:
3lbld.. p. 98. ^Ibld.
5lbld.. p. 107.
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. . . it Is amazing to see the connotations of philos­
ophy shrink to the theory of education in its most gen­
eral phases. Behold, philosophy, the mother of 
sciences, become the pedagogue of modern industrial 
society facing undemocratic economic conditions.6
Home summarizes his objections to Dewey in these words:
This view is objectionable in that it unduly limits 
both philosophy and the philosophy of education. It 
limits philosophy to human experience and it limits 
the theory of education to its own data, instead of 
setting education in some more general theory of the 
universe, such as Dewey himself has provided.7
Two fundamental, unfavorable consequences are implicit
in the philosophy of Dewey, according to Horne.® If the ideas
of Dewey are accepted, education becomes the reconstruction
of experience, which is impersonal, instead of the growth of
self-conscious personality in a universe of persons. A more
unfavorable result of Deweyan concepts is that it becomes
intellectually undemocratic to deny the possible validity of
non-pragmatic types of educational philosophy. Home regarded
his criticisms as more than a reflection of his personal views,
for he writes:
We badly need a critical evaluation of Doctor Dewey's 
educational philosophy. . . .Perhaps half the teachers 
of the subject, philosophy of education, do not accept 
his views, but they are not saying much about them in 
print.9
Having justified his criticism of Dewey as the representative 
of contemporary education, Horae is prepared to present the 
idealistic philosophy of education.
®Ibid.. p. 101. Tibid.
8ibid.. p. 104. 9ibid.. p. 99.
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Horne approaches the discussion of a philosophy of 
education by defining his concept of educational theory in 
these words: "By a philosophy of education we may rea­
sonably agree to mean an interpretation of the meaning of 
education in the light of a world view. Home regarded 
the formation of a philosophy of education as a two-way 
process, for he believed that the facts of education could 
be utilized in determining a world view, or one's world view 
could be utilized to interpret educational phenomena. Re­
ferring to the necessity and the value of a philosophy of 
education Horne writes:
Just as there is a philosophy of art, religion, the 
state, human conduct, etc., so there is a philosophy 
of education, like these other departments of human 
life, education has its own facts suggesting meanings 
in their own way. Its facts are like other facts in 
that they are closely woven into our unitary human life; 
and the meanings they suggest. . . ought to fit in 
harmoniously with the meanings already wrought out in 
the philosophies of other subjects.11
With the philosophy of idealism as a world view in 
mind Home proceeds to define education as follows: "Educa­
tion is the process of realizing the values of life. It is 
the process of life itself at full tide."^^ In another defi­
nition of education Home shifts the emphasis to the trans­
missive concept, as indicated by these words: "In the broad
sense of the term, education is the social transmission of
lOlbid.. p. 100.
l^Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 258.
l^Horne, This Hew Education, p. 151.
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ancestral experience to posterity; in the narrow sense of 
the term, education is the contribution of the school to 
this process of social transmission."13 a  third definition 
stresses the environmental concept, and is reflected in these 
words: "Educating is the purposeful providing of an environ­
ment; at bottom it is personality in and behind the environ­
ment that counts most; so educating is really a relation 
between personalities of different degrees of maturity."!^
The preceding definitions of education are not contradictory, 
but represent different facets of the idealism of Home.
As an introduction to the educational philosophy of 
Horne the discussion has dealt with his criticism of American 
education primarily as it is particularized in Dewey. Also 
included in the introductory discussion is the relation of 
education to philosophy, followed by three definitions of edu­
cation. The remainder of the chapter includes a discussion 
of four pivotal concepts of Home related to the pupil, the 
curriculum, the educative process, and the objectives of 
education.
The Pupil
Horne regards the leamer as a finite personality 
growing into the likeness of an infinite ideal.15 By viewing
p. 154.
13ibid.. p. 14.
l^orne. Idealism In Education, p. vii. 
l^Horne, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education,"
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the learner as a finite personality with unlimited potential
Horne thinks it is possible to utilize the strengths of other
approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. The traditional
view of the pupil as a distinct self possessing soul, body,
and mind is accepted by Home. In presenting his concept
of the nature of the pupil Home writes;
In our conception of the learner we may progress from 
the atomic organization of the naturalist to the selec­
tive nervous system of the realist, then to the behaving 
organism of the pragmatist, and then on to the growing, 
finite personality of the idealist. In our conception 
of the responses of the pupil, we may progress from the 
mechanical reactions of the naturalist and realist to 
the creative response of the pragmatist and then to the 
personal, chosen, response of the idealist.1°
As indicated earlier, human nature is, according to 
Home, the product of an evolutionary process. Man's origin 
is described by Horne in these words: " . . .  man is what the
labor of the heavens and the earth has brought forth. He 
stands at the summit of the evolutionary process as so far 
unfolded. What greater beings may later arise we can only 
surmise.Specifically, Home regards man as having a 
body and a soul.
To Home the term "soul" is synonomous with self. 
Regarding the origin of the soul. Home admits the impos­
sibility of accurately tracing its beginning, for he writes: 
"Just how the living cells from the parental loin that con­
stitute the body of the new child also convey to him his soul,
iGlbid.
l?Horne, Idealism In Education, p. 1.
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we cannot say."18 Home apparently followed traditional 
theology in accepting both body and soul as the product of 
his ancestors.
There are three main functions of the soul, according 
to Horne. These three functions are willing, feeling, and 
knowing.19 Willing is the activity of the soul in such 
varied forms as instincts, impulses, imitation, suggestion, 
habit, choice, and attention. Peeling is the accomplishment 
of the activity of the soul, agreeable when activity is 
normal, disagreeable when activity is abnormal in any way. 
Knowing is first the result and then the guide of activity.
It is the content of the soul representative of fact. These 
three functions of the soul are not really distinct from each 
other, as Home describes them. They overlap as a twisted 
cord composed of three strands. Our acts give basis for our 
emotions and reality to our ideas. Our ideas interpret our 
emotions and guide our conduct. Thus the soul of man is a 
unity in variety. Though each function has a field of its 
own, it also overlaps each of the other two.
The function of the body is to be the medium of 
adjustment of the mind and soul to their environment, accord­
ing to Home. Describing the two-way communication effected 
by the body Horne writes;
IQjbid.. p. 19.
l^Herman H. Home, Jesus— Qur standard (Hew York:
The Macmillan Co., 1918), p. 24.
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The body Is material, and so is one with the physical 
universe. At the same time through its arrangement of 
afferent and efferent nerves, it effects communion of 
the soul in some unknown way. Thus the soul can receive 
impressions from the eternal world by means of the body 
and also manifest expressions of its own nature in the 
form of reactions upon the external w o r l d . 20
The body is able to perform its functions most ideally in a
state of health. Health and physical vigor are a golden mean
between asceticism, which subjects the body to the interests
of the soul, and professional athleticism, which subjects
the soul to the interests of the body.
The body as a physical entity has a highly important 
relation to education, in Home's thinking. Home distin­
guishes between physical heredity and social heredity, and 
places great emphasis on physical heredity, which he describes 
as follows;
Physical heredity is the transmission from parent to 
offspring of certain distinguishing characters of stmc- 
ture and function. . . .  By this process of transmission 
of distinguishing characteristics, physical heredity 
introduces a certain unity into the living organisms of 
past, present, and f u t u r e . 21
In terms that appear to excessively emphasize the importance
of heredity. Home writes:
Our mental and moral gifts and defects, the emotional 
tendencies toward grave, or gay, the moral inclination 
toward right and wrong, the peculiar little mental 
twists and twins that charm or frighten our associates—  
all these we inherent from our ancestors as truly as 
we inherit their blood, race, and nationality.22
20lbid.
23-Home, Idealism In Education, p. 15.
22ibid.. p. 21.
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The Intellectual child, then, is not an accident; nor
is the lazy child, nor the weakly, emotional child, nor the
industrious child, nor the honest child. These, and all
other mental traits, constitute a physic complex which is the
equivalent of certain definite elements in the nervous system
inherited from one's ancestors. Another significant fact
about the action of heredity is that inherited qualities do
not all appear at birth, but develop as the offspring grows.
Home does not accept the transmission of either specific
traits, or of acquired characteristics. He accepts, however,
the idea that the human organism does inherit several things
highly important to educational theory, namely instincts,
temperament, constitution, and capacity. Relating these
qualities to education. Home writes:
The greatest of these is capacity. Instincts are in­
herited nervous mechanisms, which enable us to act 
usefully without having to leam, as the instinct of 
acquisition. Temperament defines our general emotional 
and practical attitude toward the world. Our physical 
constitutions, whether strong or weak, are likewise the 
fmits of inheritance. And most significant of all for 
the man, capacity, which is the limit of possible attain­
ment, is an inheritance.23
To Home every potentiality of development is an in­
heritance. While capacity is inherited, character is not 
inherited. Education cannot change capacity given by heredity; 
it can only develop inherited capacity. Because individual 
capacities vary, there is no possibility of democracy in 
education, in the sense that the school tums out equal minds.
23lbid.. p. 30.
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The business of the school, as Horne defines it, is to enable 
each type of mind to put its omn inherited talent to work. 
Education develops Innate ability, but it cannot endow the 
pupil with something he does not possess by nature. Con­
cluding his remarks on the importance of heredity, Horne 
writes: “Education cannot begin at the beginning; it must
take account of a foundation that is already laid.“24
In addition to the soul and the body, which are both 
inherited. Home regards the pupil as possessing a mind, by 
which he means self-awareness, or mentality. He further 
divides the mental into the volitional, the emotional, smd 
the intellectual. While accepting the concept of mind, Horne 
rejects the idea of the mind as an ioslated entity, as indi­
cated by the following words:
Education must yield the theory that the mind is an 
isolated entity caught in this mundane sphere and de­
tained in the body as its prison-house, in favor of 
the theory that mind and body together constitute one 
organic unity.25
Each of the constituent elements of the mind is important to
education.
In order to avoid possible misconceptions regarding 
the organic unity which is a self. Home points beyond the 
individualistic concept of the pupil to the social aspect of 
the pupil's life. Of the social nature of the pupil he 
writes:
24ibid.. p. 45.
25Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 37.
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The Individual is a whole and he is also a part of a 
larger whole. It is the nature of an individual to be 
both himself and a socius. Individuality is not a 
narrowly circumscribed sphere, but is a large circle 
inclusive of one's fellows. The individual really 
finds his own unity in the service he can render to 
many selves.26
There is an additional aspect of the pupil which is
significant to Horne, as an idealist. The pupil is regarded
as a spiritual being in a spiritual environment. Referring
to the quality of spirituality in both the individual and the
environment Horne states;
The environment of the person to which his chosen 
responses are made may properly be regarded as spir­
itual. By this it is meant that the social environ­
ment exists for a purpose and that the physical 
environment exists for a purpose.27
The pupil as a spiritual being in a spiritual environment is 
understandable only when regarded as part of a purposeful 
process which is rooted and grounded in Ultimate mind, which 
is both self-active and actually realized. The pupil's true 
mission in life is self-realization through a process of be­
coming. Relative to the pupil as an active self in the 
process of becoming. Home comments:
The self-activity of man, conditioning his education, 
is the clearest expression in the limits of time of the 
immanent and transcendent self-activity of reality.
It is as though in man, realizing his destiny through 
self-activity, the absolute beheld himself reflected.
The Absolute is; the finite becomes.28
Z^Ibid.. pp. 142-143.
2 7 n o m e ,  An idealistic Philosophv of Education.
p. 154.
20Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 268.
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The pupil, then, is an organic unity, consisting of 
soul, body, and mind. As such the pupil is a finite per­
sonality moving in the direction of the perfection person­
ified in Infinite Being. Education occupies a place of 
prime importance in the process of self-realization, in which 
the pupil uses the capacities inherent in his being to move 
toward the perfection which is his basic purpose in life.
In addition to the central importance of the pupil, the cur­
riculum also is important in the philosophy of Home. The 
idealistic approach to the study of the curriculum is the 
next topic to be considered.
The Curriculum
Horne proposes a curriculum in harmony with his ideal­
istic philosophy. He rejects the approach to the curriculum 
which is based on a method that makes knowledge function only 
in a situation involving a problem. To Horne the functional 
approach of Dewey produces a cultivated vocationalist because 
the curriculum is limited to providing the full meaning of a 
vocation. Horne does not object to the inclusion of the 
vocational phase of life in the curriculum. But he believes 
the educated man should not be merely a cultivated voca­
tionalist, but also a cultivated human being, who is sympa­
thetically acquainted with his race's performance in action, 
in art, in knowledge, and in thought.29 Home states his
29ibid.. p. 311.
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views on the curriculum as a background for a cultivated
person in these words:
The conception of education is bigger than the con­
ception of culture at work; it is the conception of 
culture at both work and play. A cultured vocation­
alist, yes; but more, a cultivated man, whose mind 
will be free in both his vocation and his vacation.50
To Horne the curriculum involves more than acts of 
learning and quiet study. It involves occupations, produc­
tions, achievements, exercise, and a c t i v i t y .51 i n  deter­
mining the content of the curriculum, regard should be given 
to three things, according to Home: the ability and needs
of the children, the legitimate demands of society, and the 
kind of universe in which the pupil lives. The ability and 
the needs of children are derived from psychology, the valid 
demands of society upon the school are suggested by sociol­
ogy, while the nature of the universe is determined, to a 
great extent, by philosophy. Any subject included in the 
curriculum should serve a two-fold purpose, to acquaint 
pupils with some set of naturalistic or social facts, and to 
give ideas of rightly regulated c o n d u c t .52
In accord with his view of the nature of man as a being 
who thinks, feels, and wills, Horne asserts that the curricu­
lum should be divided into three parts, the sciences, the
50lbid.. p. 313.
5lHerman H. Horne, Psychological Principles of Edu­
cation (Hew York: Macmillan Co., 1908), p. 32.
5%orne. Idealism In Education, p. 134.
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fine arts, and the practical arts.33 Horne thinks that the 
natural sciences have the greatest appeal to the Intellectual 
nature of man. Among the sciences disclosing the Intellectual 
nature of man are physics, chemistry, biology, geography, 
mathematics, astronomy, psychology, and sociology. In the 
area of the fine arts such subjects as drawing, painting, 
sculpture, architecture, the various forms of poetic and prose 
literature, and music are considered as essential by Horne.
In the production and the appreciation of the various phases 
and forms of the fine arts man’s need for emotional expres­
sion Is met, as well as man's need for discriminating taste.
In addition. Home prescribes some practical art, or voca­
tional training. In these subjects, practical arts or manual 
training, the Ideas of honesty and accuracy are realized In 
concrete Instances, and the value of attainment Is experienced. 
Such practical subjects as agriculture, lumbering, manu­
facturing, trade, carpentry, plumbing, printing, and politics 
should be Included In the curriculum; for all of these sub­
jects reveal man as an active agent, having a will to change 
and to Improve conditions. What, then, are the essential 
studies? Horne answers:
. . . the student must familiarize himself with the 
scientific method and with some of the sciences. . . .
He will need also to appreciate one of the arts, like 
literature or music. And Ihe will need to become him­
self a skillful agent at some one of the arts and to 
know the record of man’s achievement in the past . . . .
^%ome, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education,"
p. 161.
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And still, in addition, the student will acquire for 
himself, by his experience and observation, a total 
view of the w o r l d .54
The total curriculum is the work of man, it is the effect of
the life of man in his world, and it is both a social product
and a social heritage. As such it is vital in the educative
process.
The Educative Process 
Education is, according to Home, self-development 
through self-activity for self-hood and social s e r v i c e .35 
The three elements contributing to the educative process are 
heredity, environment and will, or effort. Man, the product 
of education, is partly born, partly made, and he partly 
makes himself. Since education has as yet exerted, in the 
view of Horne, no great influence on heredity, its activi­
ties must deal with the environment and the will. The fol­
lowing discussion presents the place of environment in the 
educative process, the role of will, or effort in the edu­
cative process, and the function of the teacher in the edu­
cative process. Finally, the discussion deals with the 
actual process by which the student learns, involving such 
ideas as imitation, interest, effort, discipline and self- 
activity.
The pupil who is iritfciated in the educational process 
34ibid.. p. 162.
35Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 251.
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has a certain capacity, which Is the result of heredity.
The school provides an environment In which the pupil, an 
organic unity, has occasion for development. The adapta­
tions to environment show what the Inherent capacities were.
To provide opportunity for capacity Is the prime function of 
environment. Home specifies two kinds of environment that 
Influence living organisms, the physical and the social. The 
physical environment Includes such elements as soil, air, 
light, heat, climate, water, food, scenery, and even the 
body. The social environment Influences all animals activated 
by group Impulse, Including man. It Includes all forms of 
association, the use of language, the expression of emotions 
In the crowd, habits, customs, conventions, facts, fashions, 
and moral standards. The greatest element In the social 
environment of man Is Ideas, or public opinion, for men adjust 
themselves to the Ideas of other men, to what society as a 
whole approves. The Influence of environment may be stated 
In the form of a law, which Is one of the fundamental laws of 
biology. Home comments on the law as follows:
The living organism must be adapted to Its environment. 
This process of adaptation means that the environment 
modifies the organism, that the organism In turn modi­
fies to some extent the environment, resulting In the 
outcome that the organism becomes physlcaxly and 
socially like Its environment.
Both the physical environment and the social environ­
ment exert specific Influences on the organism. Physical
5%ome, Idealism In Education, p. 64.
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environment calls out the capacities of heredity. It leads 
to the development of inherited qualities through use. It 
also represses certain functions by giving them no oppor­
tunity. The primary function of the physical environment, 
as Home puts it, is selective rather than productive. Home 
assigns a selective rather than a productive role to the 
physical environment because environment does not produce 
qualities, but provides opportunity for inherent qualities to 
show themselves. He states his position in these words;
"The origin of an organism and its characteristics is due to 
heredity; the survival of an organism, the prominence of 
certain qualities, the repression of others, is due to en­
vironment. "37
The specific influences of the social environment are 
summarized in the meaning of such comprehensive terms as 
competition, imitation, suggestion, and instruction. Compe­
tition is the struggle between the individual and the social 
environment. The tension created by the stmggle involved in 
social opposition leads to the development of greater indi­
viduality and to greater achievement. Horne points out that 
imitation is the result of social pressure to do as others do. 
Imitation is instinctive, unless there is inhibition. The 
Instinct of imitation is thus one of the means by which the 
environment brings the organism into conformity with itself. 
Suggestion is doing as another says. The social environment
37ibid.. p. 69.
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exerts pressure, not to simply imitate, but also to follow 
out ideas and directions. The influence of the social 
environment is consciously brought to bear in instruction.
By instruction the lessons of the past are orally transmitted. 
By instruction new ideas are released in society. By instruc­
tion the elders and teachers deliberately plan to bring the 
young into conformity with their social and spiritual environ­
ment. 38
In his emphasis on the environment Horne apparently 
attempts to find a mediating position between stimulus re­
sponse naturalism and detached idealism. He seems to recog­
nize an organic affinity of the organism with natural pro­
cesses, yet he transcends the realm of nature. Because of 
his concept of the organic unity of the pupil, the environ­
ment becomes a foundational aspect of his theory of the 
educational process. Commenting on the importance of the 
environment in the educative process Home writes : "Put into
the environment of the young what you want their souls to 
incorporate, and the laws of survival, of imitation, and of 
the power of impression will effect such incorporation.
The three elements paramount in the educative process 
of Home are capacity, environment, and effort, or will. The 
discussion thus far has considered the importance of heredity, 
which supplies capacity, and the role of the environment,
38%bid.. p. 77.
39ibid.. p. 76.
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which provides opportunity. Another element which is essential 
in the learning process is will, or effort. The idealistic 
pupil is characterized, according to Home, by the will to 
perfection.40 Home admits that the element of will is the 
least regarded among educational theorists, who explain edu­
cation in physical terms. Writing of the importance of the 
will in education Horne states;
That the conclusions of this book go beyond the forces 
of heredity and environment into the region of indi­
vidual will in the explanation of men and women is to 
be credited rather to the philosophy of life that I 
hold than to the science I have learned. . . .  We need 
today a popular philosophy that shows how the mechan­
ism of science is itself a product of the free 
inquiring spirit of man.41
The term "will" is defined by Home as the active aspect of 
consciousness which determines a person's individuality.
Home claims that the tendency to eliminate will in the ex­
planation of the individual is closely associated with the 
tendency to eliminate will and personality in the explanation 
of the world.
The contributions attributed to the will by Home are 
significant for the educational process. In the first place, 
it is through will that we develop or neglect the capacity 
bestowed by nature. He writes: "It is by will that we
realize capacities, that we neglect capacities, that we 
choose to be or not to be what our inherent potentialities
40Horne, "An Idealistic Philosophy," p. 156.
4lHorne, Idealism In Education, pp. xi-xii.
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a l l o w . "^2 Secondly, will uses or abuses the opportunities of 
environment. The opportunity is the gift of the environment, 
while the proper use of the environment is a matter of will. 
Within the limitations of inherited capacities and of environ­
mental opportunities, man becomes what he wills. The will, 
as an energetic or responsive element of consciousness, 
influences the development of the organism by the following 
process ;
Wow when the conscious organism by its own will influ­
ences its own making and that of its kind, the process 
is that of attention to ideas. Attention to ideas 
result in thought, and the control of one's thought is 
the secret of all individual attainment. Thoughts then 
lead to deeds and deeds through repetition to habits, 
and our habits taken together are our character, and our 
character leads by cause and effect to our d e s t i n y .^3
Since the element of will is basic in the educative 
process, the will itself requires a degree of education. In 
considering the right way to educate the will, the aim of 
such education is decisive. The aim of educating the will is 
two-fold, according to Horne, to socialize it and to make it 
effective. Socializing the will makes it right, and effect- 
ualizing it makes it capable. The aim of education is to 
build the right and the capable will.
Horne lists five aspects of the process of educating 
the will. The first education of the will is indirect and 
reaches the will by action rather than by ideas. The emphasis 
belongs on action rather than on ideas until adolescence. A
42lbid.. p. 120. 45ibid.. p. 123.
260
second approach involves the use of object-lessons, for the 
object-lesson is concrete, simple, sensible, obvious, and 
actual. Another device used in educating the will is the 
direct suggestion of the power of the will. Relative to the 
direct suggestion of the use of the will Horne writes:
"Pupils often can, if they only will, and many times they 
can will. Effort is something to be put forth."44 The 
fourth step in educating the ifill becomes even more distinct, 
for Horne urges, at this point, an insistence on effort, for 
he writes :
Insist on effort from the beginning. . . . Effort is 
not a popular word in the interest-loving, deter­
ministic, Herbartian traditions in educational theory 
and practice, but we can never outgrow effort so long 
as duties sometimes prove disagreeable.45
The clumination of the process ié discipline. Discipline con­
sists, as Horne sees it, in an approach which has exactly 
defined expectations applied in a gentle but firm manner.
In extreme cases, where the need is evident, the use of force 
is permitted to insure discipline.
In summary, it is again stated that heredity bestows 
capacity, unchangeable in the individual but subject to 
improvement. Environment provides opportunity. Effort of 
will realizes the inherited capacity and utilizes the oppor­
tunities offered by the environment. These various elements, 
capacity, opportunity, and will, are things inherent in the 
pupil or included in the environment. But it is the unique
44ibid.. p. 131. 45ibid.
261
function of the teacher to coordinate and to stimulate capac­
ity, opportunity and effort into a harmonious process. The 
teacher thus becomes focal in the idealistic educational 
process.
The idealistic teacher, like the idealistic pupil, 
pursues the method of perfecting, while subscribing to the 
ideal of a cultivated personality. Because the teacher is 
in a singular position of determining what the students 
opportunities for learning and growing shall be, he is the 
key to the educative process. Particularly in the early years 
of the pupil's education the teacher represents, to a great 
degree, the society in which the pupil operates. The teacher 
organizes subject matter, determines objectives, selects 
methods, and in so doing represents the single most important 
influence in the educative process.
To Home the four indispensable qualifications for 
teachers aze a knowledge of the subject taught, knowledge of 
the pupil taught, the ability to teach, or a knowledge of 
methods, and a worthy character. Horae reduces the concept 
of a teacher's mastery of subject-matter to five principles: 
(1) He cannot teach what he does not know; (2) He must know 
the principles of the subject taught, which means he will 
know more than he teaches; (3) He is more enthusiastic about 
teaching when he knows his subject; (4) A knowledge of the 
subject engenders self-confidence; (5) A teacher who knows
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his subject Is more apt to win the respect of his students.
A knowledge of the pupils taught is an important
qualification for teaching. The teacher needs a knowledge
of the individual pupil in the class. Home asserts that the
teaching relation is at its full power only when there is a
real person at each end of it. The importance of a knowledge
of the pupil is indicated by the following statement of Horne:
. . . the constant variation inherent in individuality 
demands a constant adjustment of principle to person­
ality. . . the teacher will find that the best place 
to learn his pupils individually is not in the class­
room, but on the playground, on trips, down the street, 
and in the home. 4-7
Horne accepted without reservation the necessity of 
study in the field of psychology as the avenue of arriving at 
a knowledge of the pupil. Since the teacher's task is the 
development of self-conscious personality, and since psychol­
ogy deals with the developmental phases of conscious men­
tality, a teacher needs thorough grounding in psychology, in 
Horne's approach. He teaches that the descriptive and the 
explanatory conclusions of psychology should, for the sake of 
efficient service, be transformed into the applicable and the 
practical principles of education. Few writers have affirmed 
the benefits of psychology in more sweeping terms than Horne:
Psychology describes how the mind learns; it is the busi­
ness of teaching to cause the mind to leam. Psychology
^^Horne, Psychological Principles of Education.
p. 44.
47lbid.. p. 48.
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describes how the mind appreciates beauty; it is the 
business of teaching to cause the mind to appreciate 
beauty; psychology describes how character is formed; 
it is the business of the teacher to assist in character 
formation; psychology describes the nature of the 
religious sense; it is the business of teaching to stim­
ulate the religious sense. This psychology is one of 
the sciences of which teaching is the artT^B
In addition to knowledge of the subject and knowledge 
of the student, the teacher should have the ability to teach, 
or a knowledge of teaching methods. To Horne method is un­
avoidable. In introducing his idea of method Home writes:
In the last analysis, method is but the way of doing a 
thing, and all teachers, whether trained or not, have 
and must have some way of setting about their work. . . 
since method of some kind is inevitable, we ought to 
use the best available.49
While accepting all teaching methods as sound, Horne
is particularly critical of the lecture method and the quiz
method of teaching. He states that the lecture method is an
autocratic institution in which the lecturer states his own
views without giving the class the option of accepting or
rejecting such views. The lecture method makes no allowance
for developing thoughtfulness on the part of the student.
Home regards the quiz method as little better than the lecture
method. Criticizing both the lecture method and the quiz
method Home observes:
The quiz method is little better than the lecture. The 
student answers what the book says, or is supposed to 
do so. In the first case the lecturer is the final 
authority; in the other the textbook; neither method, 
as ordinarily used, leads the individual student to
48ibid.. p. 59. 49ibid.. p. 64.
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independent t h i n k i n g .50
To avoid aristocracy in the classroom Horne suggests 
the use of the discussion method. By discussion the class 
group undertakes the search for truth. The function of the 
professor is to be the leader of the discussion, to keep it 
to the point, to secure considerations for different phases 
of the problem and to make the summarizing statement. Horne 
is aware of possible weaknesses in the discussion method, for 
he writes : "The use of the discussion method, unless in the
hands of a skilled leader, can waste a lot of time and get no­
where. For successful use it presupposes experience, study, 
observation and knowledge on the part of those pa r t i c i p a t i n g .
The project method is not rejected by Horne, but he 
does recommend supplementary methods. The project method is 
inadequate to carry the whole burden of instruction. At times 
it is too slow and too limited in its range, and always it is 
unsystematic. There are also some practical disadvantages 
related to the project method, such as the expense it may 
involve, interference with a regular schedule of work, its 
imposition on pupils by teachers, the difficulty of defining 
it exactly, and the lack of teachers trained to use it. The 
experimental method, while worthy of a place in classroom 
methodology, also receives criticism by Home, who writes as 
follows regarding this method: "Yes, we learn to do by doing.
SOHorne, This Hew Education, p. 122.
5 1 l b i d . . p. 82.
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But this is not all— we learn also to think by doing; also 
to think by thinking; also to do by thinking. . . the experi­
mental method is a very expensive way of transmitting funded 
k n o w l e d g e . "52 in the area of methodology Horne prefers the 
discussion approach, under the guidance of a democratic- 
minded and a well informed teacher.
In harmony with his idealistic philosophy Home 
regards character as the most important quality of a teacher. 
Pointing to the almost universal desire for character in a 
teacher he writes:
It will be noticed that the colleges and universities 
in their preparation of teachers have underemphasized 
the knowledge of the pupils and the ability to teach, 
that the normal schools have underemphasized the 
knowledge of the subject, while all have agreed in 
affirming that a worthy character is necessary.53
While Horne regards acceptable character as essential in a 
teacher, he refrains from an extensive elaboration of specific 
qualities of character. The teacher should present a char­
acter that is sane, decisive, stable, honest, and righteous.
By sanity of character Home means poise, balance, or pro­
portion. Decisiveness is the quality of intelligent choosing 
by which a person delineates his individuality. Stability of 
character raises the teacher above response to solicitation 
or pressure. Honestly implies the willingness to condemn 
poor work and shoddy academic practices. Righteousness of
52lbid.. p. 84.
53Home, Psychological Principles of Education.
p. 43.
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character Involves a profound respect for personality com­
bined with a desire for the pupil's fullest development.
The teacher is one who helps awaken dormant powers in 
younger selves. As such he is an apostle of progress and a 
companion in the process of developing personality. His 
primary function is to assist in the birth of the new gen­
eration spiritually and to inspire in the pupil the purposes 
which history ultimately will realize.5^ The teacher's task 
is the perfecting of the mind, the highest form of existence
in the cosmos.55
The discussion of the educative process has considered 
the capacity of the pupil, the environment in which the pupil 
leams, and the role of the teacher in developing capacities 
and providing opportunities for development. The climax of 
the educative process comes as the teacher, and the school, 
provide opportunities for innate capacities to develop 
through imitation, interest, effort, discipline, and self­
activity.
B y  imitation Home means the t e n d e n c y  t o  r e p e a t  t h e  
t h o u g h t  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  o f  a n o t h e r .  I t s  i n f l u e n c e  i s  b o u n d  up 
with the social order and permeates all conduct. The impor­
tance attached to imitation b y  Horne is reflected in the 
following statement:
In a large sense imitation is synonomous with learning, 
and accounts for all the content of civilization except
5^Horne, This Hew Education, p. 75.
55Home, Psychological Principles of Education, p. 39.
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that small but weighty fraction added by invention. In 
the limited sense of the term, it means the influence of 
personal example, and in this sense only is its dis­
cussion of practical moment.56
While recognizing the benefits derived from the use of some
models of work in art, literature, or music. Home thinks
that the most effective use of imitation is in focusing
attention on great personalities. Two selections from Horne
present his idealistic principle of learning by imitation:
It is in the realm of personality and its influence 
that the principle of imitation has its highest educa­
tional service.57
The child through imitating others, becomes aware of 
his own capacity for a wide variety of acts that he 
otherwise would have believed were beyond his p o w e r s . 58
Among the more prominent mental effects which imitation tends 
to produce are the power of speech, voluntary movements, self- 
consciousness, originality, and morality and religion. Child­
ren are going to imitate somebody, according to Horne, and 
if there is no worthy model to offset the suggestion of the 
unworthy, the imitation is also inevitably of the unworthy.59 
Not only does the impulse to imitate provide unlimited oppor­
tunity to learn, but his impulse also provides, in the 
thinking of Horne, a solution to the quandary of the school 
as to how to cultivate morality and religion without direct 
instruction, by the provision of teachers with personalities
56ibid.. p. 279.
57nome, Philosophy of Education, p. 184.
58itid.. p. 180. 59ibid.. p. 186.
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worthy of imitation by the pupils.
The transition from imitation to interest is easy, 
according to Home. The child imitates that which interests 
him. Interest, to Home, is a feeling, and feeling is an 
immediate experience of consciousness. Horne thus defines 
interest as a pleasurable activity of the self.^O Home 
agrees with Dewey that interest is one of the great themes of 
education, for it removes drudgery from the school, puts the 
motive power of the feelings at the disposition of the teacher,
and is the immediate aim of all instruction. In addition to
imitation and interest, effort is essential in the educative 
process. Horne differs with Dewey in his interpretation of 
effort, for to Home effort begins when interest ends. Rela­
tive to effort Home writes:
At the mmment when interest fails but attention con­
tinues we have effort. And at any moment when the
right thing to do is not the most interesting there is 
the opportunity for effort. . . . Effort is the strain 
consciousness puts upon itself in performing unin­
teresting work.61
Effort, a volitional quality of consciousness, requires 
discipline. By discipline Home means some extraneous action 
by the teacher to stimulate the pupil to complete the task in 
which he is involved. Interest, effort, and discipline are 
closely related. Interest is essential and desirable, but it 
is not a sufficiently broad base to direct the total educa­
tional process. Horne comments relative to the limitations
GOlbid.. p. 189. Glitid.. pp. 198-199.
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of interest as follows: "Doing a thing because one loves it
is too ideal to be always practical, and at times too indi­
vidualistic to be socially desirable."^2 Effort sind dis­
cipline are necessary because life requires both immediate 
and remote interests. Horne states that one weakness of 
"the new education" is that it relies too much on immediate 
interest and involuntary effort, and is thus not in harmony 
with the demands of life.
Interest, effort, and discipline are, to Horne, methods 
which lead to self-activity. It is self-activity that con­
stitutes the actual educational process. Horne is in full 
agreement with the new education regarding the importance of 
self-activity, as indicated by the statement: "The educa­
tional process is not so much the stimulus shaping the indi­
vidual, as the individual responding to the stimulus."^3 
Summarizing his concept of the entire educative process Home 
writes :
The development of mind is from within out, not from 
withAnt in. . . . The teacher may lead the pupil to 
the fonts of learning, but he cannot make him drink. 
Teaching is not so much the cause of learning. . . as 
it is the occasion or condition of learning. The cause 
of learning is the pupil himself and his effort. . . .
The ultimate responsibility for winning an education 
rests with the will of the pupil.o4
In his approach to the educative process Home uses 
the traditional concept of a finite personality possessing
^%ome. This New Education, p. 85.
G^Ibid.. p. 96.
^^Horne, Philosophy of Education, pp. 275-274.
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distinct qualities of soul, mind, and body. These qualities 
are inherited and determine the capacity of the pupil to 
leam. Education cannot bestow capacity upon an organism, 
but education does structure the environment in which the 
human organism finds opportunity for development. The teacher 
is the most important aspect of the formal educational en­
vironment. As a focal point in the learning process the 
teacher should have a knowledge of the subject, a knowledge 
of pupils, the ability to teach, and an acceptable character. 
The educative process utilizes the natural impulse to imitate, 
incorporates the principle of interest, stresses the need of 
effort and discipline as essential to self-activity. Having 
discussed the nature of the human organism called the pupil 
and the nature of the educative process, the discussion now 
turns to a consideration of the objectives of education.
The Objectives of Education
As an expression of his idealistic philosophy Home 
discusses two groups of educational objectives. The first 
group is divided into immediate objectives and remote ob­
jectives. The second group is divided into individual and 
social objectives. For the purposes of this study it seems 
sufficient to discuss only the individual and the social ob­
jectives of education.
Individual objectives are suggested in the form of 
ideals being defined as more or less remote ends of action 
whose realization is sought through mediation of reflection
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and effort.65 The objectives for the individual are well 
stated in the portrait of the educated man presented by Home 
in one of his latest writings. The list includes the follow­
ing:
1. He is physically fit.
2. He lives near the maximum of his efficiency.
3. He has a body which is the ready servant of his will.
4. He is capable of earning a living for himself.
5. He is constantly doing his work better and better 
through study.
6. He knows about the human factors of the situation of 
which he is a part.
7. He regards other persons as having the same rights 
as himself.
8. He keeps old friends and makes new ones.
9. His social interests are constantly widening.
10. He is indignant at social wrongs.
11. He is a suitable life partner for another, or 
becoming so.
12. He is tolerant of opinions different from his own.
13. He has good will toward all sorts and conditions of 
people.
14. He gives wisely of himself and his means.
15. He stands for the welfare of the larger group 
in the clash of human interests.
16. He holds existing social arrangements to be improvable,
17. His loyalty extends beyond family and friends to good 
causes.
18. He is self-controlled without being inert, and active 
without being nervous.
19. He loves nature.
20. He prizes the creative more than the possessive.
21. His intellectual horizon is constantly expanding.
22. His opinions are based on evidence, not on emotional 
attitude.
23. He is careful in expressing judgments.
24. He is good company to himself.
25. His is a happy life.
26. He can enjoy a vacation.
27. He prefers that useful articles be also aesthetici
28. He has the courage to do right against odds.
29. He feels at ease in the presence of those greater 
than himself.
30. He can make something with his hands.
65Herman H. Home, Jesus— Our Standard (New York: 
Abingdon, 1918), p. 20.
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31. He is democratic in his attitudes.
32. He can play with children and have a truly fine time.
33. He senses his kinship with all men and with the
Reality of which they are an express p a r t . 66
The personal objectives of education in the idealistic 
philosophy of Horne culminate in man's spiritual or religious 
education. Commenting on religious education as the capstone 
of the educational process Horne writes: "Religious educa­
tion is the natural and logical conclusion of all education, 
just as religion is the natural and complete expression of 
man's being. . . religion is simply and clearly the whole 
consciousness in its relation to deity."^7 To Horne the edu­
cation of the spirit is the goal of all education as well as 
its capstone, for all the personal objectives have ultimate 
meanings. Health is the divine blessing of conformity to 
natural law. Skill is cooperation with God in making a more 
useful and a more beautiful universe. Intellectual activity 
is thinking God's thought after Him. Emotional responses 
are manifestations of the perfections of God. Moral 
achievements is interpreting the good as the will of God.
Social aptitutde is the ability and the willingness to estab­
lish right relationships as the kingdom of God among men.^®
Horne expands his educational objectives beyond the 
individual to the social. Referring to the social objectives
^%orne. This Hew Education. Paragraph headings in 
Chapter VI, "Are We Educated?" pp. 125-136.
^^Horne, Pvschological Principles of Education, p. 333.
68ibid.
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of education he writes;
The end of ends, the goal of goals, according to 
idealism, is the increasing realization of the Abso­
lute Idea for the individual, society and race. It 
includes the conception of an ideal social order, which 
may very well be a social democracy.
It may be stated concisely that the social objectives of Horne 
are simply the individual objectives expanded to all society 
in a democratic manner. The basic motivation of such demo­
cratic application of individual objectives on a universal 
scale is the recognition that the environment of man is God. 
God is defined as the self-conscious unity of all reality. 
Commenting on the role of democracy in education Horne writes:
Democracy in education must cultivate the sense of unity 
between the social classes, the various races, the many 
nations. Democratic education is inter-class, inter­
racial, inter-national, in understanding, in sympathy, 
in co-operation. Democracy is a spiritual unity in a 
social variety. But it does not demand that all classes 
become one class, that all races through miscegination 
become one race, that all nations be merged in a super­
world government.71
By the application of the individual educational objectives in
an all inclusive manner. Home attempts to provide adequate
goals for education.
The discussion presented in this chapter has attempted 
to succinctly summarize the salient features of the idealistic 
educational philosophy of Horne. The opening remarks of the 
chapter presented the criticism of Home relative to progres-
^^Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 301.
70lbid.. p. 272.
7lHome, This New Education, p. 118.
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sive education as represented by Dewey. Following the crit­
icism of the Deweyan concepts, the idealism of Home was dis­
cussed as it relates to the educational theory. Ihe next 
area of discussion was the nature of the pupil, dealing with 
the pupil as a unified organism possessing body, soul, 
mentality, and as such was a finite personality moving toward 
perfection. The curriculum of education was discussed next, 
followed by a description of the educative process. Finally, 
the discussion presented the objectives of the educational 
process, individual and social.
To Home education reveals in man a capacity for 
infinite growth. He believes that there is an opportunity 
for man, guaranteed by his universe, and unabridged by the 
incident in life called death, to finish his education, to 
achieve his destiny, and to grow unceasingly into the like­
ness of the Infinite B e i n g . The idealism of Home leads 
to the following definition of education:
Education is the eternal process of superior and partly 
controllable adjustment of physically and mentally 
developed, free, conscious human beings to God, as 
manifested in the intellectual, emotional, and voli­
tional environment of God.73
72Home, Philosophy of Education, p. 283. 
73ibid.. pp. 315-316.
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY MB CONCLUSIONS
Prom the study of educational theory and practice in 
the United States between I86O-I96O, it is possible to draw 
■everal significant conclusions. The first conclusion to be 
drawn is that naturalism and idealism represent the two most 
vital and dynamic approaches to educational philosophy in 
American educational theory. Both idealism and naturalism 
have long histories, beginning centuries before the Christian 
era. Each of these philosophical approaches has undergone 
consistent modification from within and each has been the 
object of attack from without. But despite internal modifi­
cation and external criticism, idealism and naturalism appear 
to be the two most influential interpretations of life in 
contemporary society.
Naturalism first interpreted reality in terms of sub­
stance, then rejected the substantial interpretation in favor 
of a mechanical concept of the universe. Primarily due to 
the rise of evolutionary thought, after 1859 naturalism re­
garded nature, or reality, in terms of a process. In the 
twentieth century naturalistic thinkers have rejected, to a 
great extent, the narrower reductionism of earlier thinking
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and have adopted an approach which is basically a spirit of 
investigation to the world as it is. In the field of edu­
cational theory the outstanding naturalists, prior to the 
twentieth century, were John Loche, Jean J. Rousseau and 
Herbert Spencer. Among the influential naturalistic educa­
tional philosophers of the present century are such theorists 
as George Mead, William Kilpatrick, Boyd Bode, John Dewey, 
and Sidney Hook. The fact that the impact of these and 
other naturalistic thinkers is evident in contemporary edu­
cational theory and practice attests the persistent influence 
of naturalism.
Idealism has also experienced modification and con­
tinues to exert itself as a force in educational philosophy.
The various types of idealism have been designated as objective 
idealism, subjective idealism, organic idealism, and personal­
ism. In the history of idealism the names of Plato, Berkeley, 
Hegel, Bowne, Royce, and Brightman are accepted as leading 
exponents of its various phases. In idealistic educational 
theory some of the recognized leaders have been Plato, Martin 
Luther, William T. Harris, and Herman H. Home. The persistence 
of idealism in the structure of American education supports 
the conclusion that idealism, like naturalism, is a vigorous 
and a dynamic philosophical approach.
Another conclusion drawn from the study of American 
education is that education inevitably reflects, or incor­
porates, some basic philosophical assumptions. In the
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colonial period of American history the emphasis of educa­
tion grew out of a practical Christian idealism. The purpose 
of the early colleges was primarily practical, to train young 
men for the ministry, for law, and for medicine. After the 
middle of the nineteenth century, however, a practical utili­
tarianism developed in American educational theory, particu­
larly as it applied to the rapidly growing universities. It 
is evident that many educational leaders were not openly 
antagonistic to idealistic concepts in general. But the 
emphasis placed on the practical, utilitarian and technical 
concept of education initiated the process of secularizing 
completely a large segment of American education. After a 
period of prolonged tension between practical idealism and 
utilitarian naturalism, the breach was openly sponsored by 
advocates of rational idealism and pragmatic naturalism. When 
John Dewey appeared as the spokesman for a completely natu­
ralistic interpretation of education, naturalism was generally 
regarded as the most advanced concept of education developed 
by man.
In spite of the fact that Dewey reduced philosophy to 
educational procedure and had reduced thinking, or learning, 
to methodology, his system itself is the result of ante­
cedent philosophical assumptions. Dewey, the prime advocate 
of the experimental method, did not arrive at his position 
by experimentation. Further, Dewey did not teach by experi­
mentation, preferring rather to lecture and to write.
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Similarly, Home approached educational theory with a funda­
mental view of the world in which he structured his ideas.
The second conclusion of the study is that any formal attempt 
to educate of necessity involves fundamental philosophical 
assumptions regarding the nature of reality, the nature of 
knowledge, the nature of value and the nature of man.
Dewey and Horne interpreted educational theory from 
opposing philosophical positions. It seems that Home was 
more objective in his acceptance of a world view in that he 
frankly acknowledges his idealistic bias. Dewey, on the other 
hand, claims that his position is the ultimate in objectivity. 
But Dewey finally arrives at a position which is more narrow 
than the position of Horne, for in reality he sponsors a type 
of reductionism without an apparent awareness of the limita­
tions involved in his approach. Horne is deliberately meta­
physical in his approach, positing his entire philosophy on 
a theistic idealism. Dewey reflects the impatience of much 
of naturalistic thought with problems of a metaphysical 
nature. A theory of knowledge, rather than a theory of meta­
physics, is the point of departure in the attempt of Dewey to 
reconstruct philosophy.
To Dewey the problem of knowledge did not involve the 
endeavor to get a previously distinct and subjective knower 
and an objective world of objects and ideas together again. 
Dewey regarded the problem of knowledge as contextual problems 
in which the investigator, himself part of nature, initiated
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and directed a series of Inquiries called into existence by- 
difficulties to be overcome. Horne accepted a traditional 
concept of knowledge, with a subjective, separate kuower 
apprehending objective things, events, and ideas. In con­
sistency with his epistemology of transaction Dewey regards 
intelligence as the ability to discover connections, rela­
tionships, and consequences behind the events which comprise 
experience. Home regards intelligence as the ability to 
discover meaning, order, and purpose in the events of life.
The process of knowing is, to Dewey, operational, while the 
process of learning is, to Home, the acquisition and the 
application of facts or ideas inherent in reality.
In his understanding of axiology Dewey follows the 
demands of evolutionary continuity, while Home accepts a 
hierarchy of values culminating in an Infinite Mind. Dewey 
requires that values be closely related to the world in which 
man finds himself. To Dewey objects or events do not possess 
qualities which contribute to their value, but the processes 
of nature assign values to specific objects and to particular 
events as these objects and events contribute to the reali­
zation of goals, ends, purposes and outcomes. Dewey regards 
the separation of value from the processes of nature, of which 
man is a part, as the impositior of an artificial dualism on 
nature. In a philosophy of naturalism, values are recognized 
when man makes choices that assist in his adaptation to his 
environment. In a philosophy of idealism man discovers values
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when he achieves insight into the significance of an indi­
vidual event or of a specific object as the event or objects 
are related to cosmic values.
Philosophical assumptions are also the focal point 
in the concepts of human nature held by Dewey and Horne. Both 
Dewey and Horne regard the physical organism as the product 
of biological, evolutionary processes. To Dewey man remains 
as a part of the natural processes, without any additions or 
modifications from without nature. Human nature, to Dewey, 
is simply nature expressed in one of its aspects called hu­
manity. Home thinks of human nature as the combination of 
the physical organism and a soul. While Horne accepts the 
existence of a soul, he passes hastily over the discussion of 
the source of man's soul. Nevertheless in the philosophy of 
Horne the soul is essential, for it is the bridge between the 
physical organism enclosed in nature and the Infinite Mind 
transcending nature. Consciousness, to Dewey, is the result 
of the interaction of the organism with its environment, but 
to Home consciousness is the self-awareness inherent in per­
sonality which transcends its physical environment. Mind, 
to Dewey, is a function of the brain, while to Home mind is 
the reflective aspect of individual personality. Neither 
Dewey nor Horne accepts romantic or traditional concepts of 
human nature. Both men regard human nature as a concrete 
given which becomes what the environment causes it to become. 
Both Dewey and Home seek to avoid dualistic concepts of human
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nature, and both succeed, although the method of eliminating 
dualism is different in each man.
Dewey and Horne apply their philosophical assumptions 
to educational theory without reservation. Dewey regards the 
pupil as a physical organism involved in the total processes 
of nature. As a physical organism the experiences of the 
pupil constitute a transaction between the organism and its 
environment. The ultimate objective of education, according 
to Dewey, is to solve problems to enable the organism to 
adapt itself to its environment. The primary method of edu­
cation grows out of the necessary activity of the organism 
as it attempts to adapt itself to its environment. The founda­
tion of the experimental method is the natural, spontaneous 
interest of the pupil. Dewey states that the school should 
be a miniature of society in which the pupil could leam with­
out the use of artificial motivation. Home places more 
emphasis on the transmissive nature of education. To Horne 
the pupil is the product of heredity, environment, and will. 
Heredity, according to Home, endows the pupil with his innate 
capacity, the environment furnishes the pupil with develop­
mental opportunities, and will is the decisive factor in which 
the pupil utilizes the opportunities afforded by the environ­
ment for self-development. Because of his emphasis on will 
as an essential aspect of the educative process, Horne accepts 
the necessity of external motivations and of discipline in the 
learning process. Education is, to Dewey, the modification
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of behavior. Education is, to Horne, self-development toward 
the perfection inherent in all personality. Since it is 
impossible to sustain, without serious qualification, either 
the naturalism of Dewey or the idealism of Horne by empirical 
data, it seems sound to assert that their educational theories 
are based on philosophical assumptions.
A third general conclusion derived from this dis­
sertation is the idea that educational theory, regardless of 
its philosophical outlook, tends to become static at certain 
levels. Idealism became identified, to a great degree, after 
i860, with a prescribed curriculum and an accepted social 
order. Supporters of the idealistic type of education too 
often attached undue import to particular areas of subject 
matter and to distinct, unchanging methods. In so doing 
idealism lost the ability to meet the needs of a changing 
cultural atmosphere. Naturalism also became rigid in many 
instances by its stress on method, by its emphasis on problem­
solving, and by its encouragement of freedom.
Theoretically, idealism regards personality as the 
greatest value in life and as the only adequate explanation 
of life. Yet the values and the purposes inherent in person­
ality were frequently neglected by idealistic educational 
practice. The neglect by idealism of the values and of the 
purposes inherent in personality is indicated by an apparent 
lack of social concern, by the absence of a dynamic method­
ology, and by the frequent indifference to life issues.
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In theory, naturalism,proposed to adapt man to his 
environment and to develop a cultured vocationalist. In 
practice, naturalism with its stress on individual freedom, 
frequently produced men who misused and exploited their en­
vironment. Instead of a cultured vocationalist naturalistic 
education often produced a self-indulgent functionalist who 
saw no particular significance in life. Prom the evidence 
of the study it seems possible to state that educational 
concepts tend to crystallize, or to become static at certain 
levels of development.
A fourth conclusion resulting from the study is the 
principle that in a democratic, pluralistic society, it is 
both impossible and undesirable to impose permanently any 
philosophy of education on the educational structure. Prom 
the inauguration of Harvard College until the Civil War the 
ecclesiastical interests were predominant in the United States. 
But running parallel with the dominance of idealism, even 
during the late eighteenth century, was a stream of antago­
nistic naturalistic thought. Ultimately naturalistic educa­
tional theory became dominant in the first half of the 
twentieth century. The reaction of idealists, such as Home, 
to naturalism and the resurgence of idealism in some current 
educational theory and practice indicates that a democratic, 
pluralistic society will probably retain both naturalistic 
and idealistic philosophies and that these two philosophies 
will continue to exist in polar tension.
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A principle closely associated with the one mentioned 
above Is that American educational theory and practice reflect 
the social and the Intellectual atmosphere of the society In 
which It operates. As long as the cultural background of the 
United States was agrarian and traditional In religious out­
look, traditional Idealism dominated the educational pattern.
But when the cultural pattern was revolutionized by the 
development of a technical, Industrial, commercial and urban 
society, the concepts Inherent In naturalism became Increas­
ingly Influential In educational theory. The role of the school 
In society, whether the school should reflect Its cultural 
background or modify It, appears to be one of the unsettled 
problems of American education. From the history of education 
In America between I86O-I96O It seems that, with a few notable 
exceptions, educational theory and practice does reflect the 
spirit of American culture. This tendency of educational 
theory to reflect the cultural environment Is significant In 
that materialistic and secularlstlc trends In society may 
provide Increasing support for naturalistic education at the 
expense of Idealism.
The study of American educational theory and practice 
also Indicates a gr«rwlng desire among certain Intellectual 
leaders to assume more and more Intentional control of the 
social process. Both Dewey and Horne agree that education 
has a responsibility to change the nature of society. Home 
would go so far as to support a program of enforced eugenics
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to improve the quality of the race. Dewey thought that the 
scientific method, as practiced in the school-room, should be 
the source of continual enlightenment and consistent appli­
cation to society. Dewey was particularly critical of tra­
ditional religious concepts which he regarded as obstructions 
to the advancement of the democratic ideal. Contemporary 
educational theorists, of whom Sidney Hook is representative, 
also feel that the school should be in the vanguard of those 
directing American life toward desirable goals.
The history of American educational theory reveals 
that the American people possess an almost naive faith in the 
limitless possibilities of education. When the colonial 
leaders wanted to insure the propagation of their religious 
faith, education was accepted as the instrument for the preser­
vation of faith. Later, when phenomenal church growth required 
a sharp increase in trained clergymen, the denominations founded 
colleges to help provide leaders. During and following the 
Civil War the technical, mechanical, and utilitarian needs of 
society resulted in the establishment of agricultural and 
mechanical institutions. In the twentieth century the nation 
has again turned to the school to provide for diverse needs 
ranging from citizenship to driver-education to a conquest of 
space. While the faith of the American people in the results 
of the educational process has not been completely justified, 
this faith has been the source of much of America's technical 
and scientific progress.
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In addition to the preceding general conclusions, it 
appears to be permissible, on the basis of the data presented 
in this dissertation, to state several weaknesses in American 
educational theory which deserve further consideration. The 
tension between idealism and naturalism has been a contrib­
uting factor in the development of the weaknesses listed 
below.
It is apparent that American educational theory and 
practice have not been successful in incorporating formal 
religious ideas and aziological concepts in its approach.
The pendulum of valuational concepts has varied from extreme 
sectarianism to relativistic materialism. A continued 
neglect of religious and ethical aspects of education could 
conceivably result in the fragmentation of American education 
or in a system of education characterized by technical 
efficiency and moral impoverishment. Further study should 
include the problem of the separation of church and state as 
one aspect of the problem of adequately incorporating religion 
and values in educational theory.
A second problem still unsolved is involved in the 
ideal of education for citizenship. At the present in Ameri­
can educational theory, the assumption appears to be that a 
specified number of years spent within a formally structured 
academic environment is equivalent to good citizenship. Further, 
if spending a particular amount of time in a formal academic 
environment produces good citizens, what is the status of
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those who do not qualify in numerical attainment? Further, 
would not a longer period of formal education produce still 
better citizens?
The history of educational theory and practice in the 
United States between I86O-I96O also seems to indicate that 
those who have inaugurated educational institutions, those 
who have administered educational programs, and those who have 
conducted educational procedures have frequently been deficient 
in understanding or devoid of insight regarding the underlying 
philosophies involved in various educational programs. Many 
politicians, administrators, and teachers apparently have 
stressed methods and functions without an awareness of the 
implications inherent in their educational program.
A final problem arising out of this study is the 
apparent paradox between the traditional faith of the American 
people in the power and the necessity of education on the one 
hand and the anti-intellectual attitude of a large segment of 
the population on the other. Education as a utilitarian 
program or as a status standard is apparently acceptable. But 
education for the purpose of individual self-realization and 
for artistic enjoyment has never appealed to the American 
people to any considerable degree.
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